Mistreatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked by the International Committee of the Red Cross study on customary International Humanitarian Law by Benoit, James P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-01
Mistreatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked
by the International Committee of the Red Cross
study on customary International Humanitarian Law
Benoit, James P.









Mistreatment of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
By The International Committee of the Red Cross Study 
On Customary International Humanitarian Law 
By 
James Paul Benoit 
 
B.S., June 1985, Cornell University 
M.B.A., May 1987, Cornell University 




A Thesis submitted to 
 





The George Washington University 
Law School 
in partial satisfaction of the requirements 








Thesis directed by 
Sean David Murphy 
Professor of Law
  





I.   Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
II.  Overview of ICRC Study ................................................................................... 7 
(A) Origins .................................................................................................. 10 
 
(B) Scope and Methodology........................................................................ 12 
 
(C) Organization ......................................................................................... 17 
 
(D) U.S. Response to the ICRC Study ........................................................ 20 
 
III.  Traditional Theory of Customary International Law (CIL) Formation ....... 25 
(A) Relevant State Practice ......................................................................... 28 
 
(B) Opinio Juris Sive Necessitatis ................................................................ 34 
 
(C) Role of Non-State Actors in Formation of CIL ................................... 37 
 
(D) Role of Treaty Law in Formation of CIL ............................................ 39 
 
(E) Persistent Objection to Formation of CIL ........................................... 45 
 
(F) Continued Relevance of CIL in the Area of the Law of War.............. 49 
 
IV. ICRC Rules Regarding the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked ....................... 60 
(A) Rule 109:  Duty to Search For, Collect and Evacuate the 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked ........................................................ 60 
 
(B) Rule 110:  Duty to Care For the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked ......................................................................................... 95 
 
(C) Rule 111:  Duty to Protect the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked ..... 109 
 
V. Conclusions..................................................................................................... 116 
  1 
I.   Introduction1 
In 2005 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)2 completed a ten-year 
                                               
1 This article explores the rationale behind the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, and discusses three of the study’s 161 rules.  It does not, however, 
purport to provide a complete overview or analysis of the remaining rules.  Cf. Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 11 ¶ 21 (2006) (noting “[i]t is not 
proposed here to parse every Rule in the study.”); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  
The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 239, 263 (2006) (explaining that one piece or symposium can only begin to discuss issues raised 
by the ICRC Study).  A preliminary draft of this article was submitted to Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, one of the 
two co-authors of the ICRC Study for comment, but to date he has not responded. 
2 There is some debate as to whether to give credit (and hence responsibility) for the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law to the ICRC as an organization, or to its two authors, who led the study while 
working in the ICRC’s legal division.  See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing the credentials 
of the two authors of the ICRC Study).  Although the ICRC Study was mandated by the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement (see infra note 39 and accompanying text), presumably funded by the ICRC, and 
has the ICRC logo on the book’s cover, spine and title page, the ICRC President, Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, is 
careful in his introduction to the book to slightly distance the ICRC from the Study, “[c]onsidering this report 
primarily as a work of scholarship … [and] respect[ing] the academic freedom both of the report’s authors and 
of the experts consulted.”  I JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW xi (2005).  See also id. at 
xvi (noting that “[t]he ICRC’s Legal Division was assigned this difficult task and given the means to do a 
thorough job.  Lavish means were not necessary … How then can such an investment be justified?  Why devote 
large-scale resources ?”).  Compare PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 16 n. 7 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ICRC STUDY] (noting that the disclaimer in the ICRC Study that it represents the authors’ work and should 
not be attributed to the ICRC “mirrors statements made in relation to the [Pictet] Commentaries [to the Geneva 
Conventions]”) with George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on 
behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 504-05 (2006) (noting that 
the ICRC’s “credibility should not be jeopardized by mistakenly thinking that it is responsible for the 
conclusions of the study.…  While the copyright to this study is held by the ICRC, its findings are solely those 
of [the two authors].”); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 240 
n. 5 (2006) (noting that “[t]he precise status of the study as an ICRC document is a little more complex than 
might be thought. … it is not a formal ICRC statement of views”); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary 
Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (noting that “the task of elucidating the [ICRC Study] 
rules based on the evidence was left largely to the two editors”).  It could be argued that the ICRC seeks to 
distance itself from the Study not too far to still be able to claim credit for it if the ICRC Study is well-received, 
but far enough that the ICRC is not held responsible for it if it is not.  See I JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & 
LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW xlix (2005) [hereinafter ICRC STUDY] (noting that “[t]he authors, jointly, bear the sole 
responsibility for the content of the study.”).  Presumably the reason the ICRC sought to distance itself from the 
Study was to maintain its appearance as a neutral and impartial observer, instead of as an advocate for the 
further development of international humanitarian law.  See infra note 8 (describing the inherent tension 
between the ICRC’s role in assisting victims of conflict, which relies on the “special status” afforded to the 
ICRC based on its principles of neutrality and impartiality, versus the ICRC’s role in advocating the 
development of international humanitarian law). 
  2 
study on customary international humanitarian law,3 based on an assessment of the State 
practice of forty-seven nations over the preceding thirty years.4  Somewhat surprisingly,5 but 
                                               
3 International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is synonymous with the Law Of War (LOW), Law Of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC), and jus in bello (i.e. the regulation of the conduct of hostilities during the course of war).  This 
concept is to be distinguished from jus ad bellum, which is the regulation of resorting to war in the first place 
(i.e. deciding to use force).  The ICRC Study has abbreviated Customary International Law (CIL) in the area of 
International Humanitarian Law as Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL).  See also Letter from 
John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State & William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, U.S. 
Department of Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, International Committee of the Red Cross 1 (Nov. 
3, 2006) [hereinafter DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC], available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/Customary_International_Humanitiarian_Law.pdf (indicating a U.S. 
governmental preference for the phrases “law of war” or “laws and customs of war” rather than “international 
humanitarian law”); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxv (noting “this branch of international law 
has traditionally been called” “the ‘laws and customs of war’”); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 13-14 (2004) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES] (coining the term “Law of International Armed Conflict” or LOIAC). 
4 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlv, xlvii, xlix (2005).  Cf. id. at xlvi (noting that “ICRC 
delegations around the world” augmented the 47 reports on State practice).  See, e.g. id. at 396-405, Vol. II:  
Practice, at 2590-654 §§ 1-550 (discussing the State practice of one hundred States vis-à-vis the proposed rules 
regarding the wounded, sick and shipwrecked). 
5 The importance of the ICRC Study on Customary International Law to the field of public international law 
cannot be overstated.  See, e.g., Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of 
International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 
1217, 1241 (2005) (noting that “[w]ith the Study’s publication, it will be possible for the first time to refer to a 
concrete rule rather than to a nebulous custom, thereby reducing the scope for disagreement among actors.”).  
To the extent that the rules of the ICRC Study are generally accepted as accurately reflecting norms of 
customary international law, which are binding on all States except perhaps those whom have established 
themselves as persistent objectors, the ICRC Study could potentially be as significant to public international law 
as the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, or at least the Pictet commentaries thereto.  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that the ICRC Study “sought to take on the mantle of the Pictet commentaries 
to the Geneva Conventions” and failed); id. at 14 (same, because “[c]rystallising custom is not the same as 
interpreting a treaty.”).  Contra id. at 16 n. 7 (arguing that “there is reason to expect that the Study will assume a 
status equal to that of the [Pictet] Commentaries.”).  See generally INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], 
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED 
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION 
I]; ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (II) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF 
WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter 
PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II]; ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE TO THE 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION III]; 
ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS 
IN TIME OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION IV].  See also DOS/DoD 
Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 1, attachment p. 7 (statements evidencing the intent of the U.S. to persistently 
object to the ICRC Study’s findings).  But see Posting of Marko Milanovic to Opinio Juris, 
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1178652249.shtml#3684 (May 9, 2007, 01:54) (arguing that the DOS/DoD 
letter does not raise persistent objection to the ICRC Study as much as it implies that certain rules do not exist 
whatsoever); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 16 (expecting the ICRC Study to assume the 
mantle accorded to the ICRC commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols “because 
of its provenance and the wealth of practice it surveys.”); infra note 179 (discussing the absence of persistent 
objection to jus cogens norms).  Essentially, to the extent that the ICRC Study is cited by international and 
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perhaps owing to the sheer size of the ICRC Study,6 there have been relatively few scholarly 
articles written about it,7 and only one State has officially responded to the ICRC:  the United 
                                                                                                                                                 
national tribunals, jurists and practitioners as being dispositive, it will have served as an ICRC end run around 
what is otherwise a fairly tight defense of staunch, conservative States intent on maintaining the status quo with 
respect to the law of armed conflict.  See generally PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 8 
(noting that “[p]articularly when heavy reliance is placed on treaties to which a number of States are not parties, 
initiatives to derive customary rules may be seen as an attempt to circumvent the requirement of express 
consent necessary for a State to be bound by the treaty-based rule.”); id. at 9-10 (same); Malcolm MacLaren & 
Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1224 (2005) (same); Joshua Dorosin, 
Assistant Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State (speaking in his personal capacity), Roundtable 
Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of 
Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an 
Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 14 (2006) (same).  See infra note 
173 and accompanying text (discussing the role of consent in international law). 
6 The ICRC Study is so massive (taking up over eight inches or 20 centimeters of shelf space), it had to be 
separated into three separate books, totaling over 5,000 pages, which is the equivalent of over five copies of Leo 
Tolstoy’s infamous War and Peace.  See generally, http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1853260622 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Yoram Dinstein, who was responsible for the Israeli country report for the ICRC 
Study, described Volume II’s “size is not just daunting:  it is overwhelming.”  Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 3 ¶ 5 (2006).  See also id. at 1 ¶ 2 
(noting that “[t]he [ICRC Study] represents the largest scholarly undertaking (on any theme) ever undertaken in 
the long history of the ICRC.”); Ryszard Piotrowicz, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 25 AUSTL. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 348, 348 (2006) (book review) (commenting “I have not read the whole book and have not the 
slightest intention of doing so.  Life is too short. … I use it as a reference book, which is what you should be 
doing with it, although it is heavy enough to use in self-defence if you have to.”). 
7 Much of the scholarship on the ICRC Study was contained in a symposium edition of Oxford University’s 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law published in the Summer of 2006.  Peter Rowe, The Effect on National Law 
of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 165 (2006); Dieter 
Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179 (2006); David Turns, 
Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 
201 (2006); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239 (2006); Heike 
Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in the 
ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 265 (2006).  See also Jamieson L. Greer, A 
Critique of the ICRC’s Customary Rules Concerning Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, Conflation, and a 
Missed Opportunity, 192 MIL. L. REV. 116 (2007); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503 
(2006); Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1 
(2006); Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223 
(2006); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  
The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217 (2005); Theodor 
Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817 (2005); W. Hays Parks, The ICRC 
Customary Law Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208 (2005).  There has also 
been a complementary (and generally complimentary) book recently published about the ICRC Study.  
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at vii.  Finally, there are at least two legal weblogs (aka 
“blogs”) which have also discussed aspects of the ICRC Study.  Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/ and 
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States, in a letter co-signed by the Department of State Legal Adviser, and the Department of 
Defense General Counsel.8 
The ICRC is a venerable organization with noble goals,9 and its study is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kenneth Anderson’s Law of War and Just War Theory Blog, http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/. 
8 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 1 (noting “that a significant number of the rules set forth in the 
[ICRC] Study are applicable in international armed conflict because they have achieved universal status, either 
as a matter of treaty law or – as with many provisions derived from the Hague Regulations of 1907 – customary 
law.”).  See infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. response to the ICRC Study).  See 
also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 411 (noting that “[r]eactions to the Study by States 
are not yet sufficiently numerous to give an indicative picture.”); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, 
An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1226-27 & n. 45, 1233-34 (2005) (noting that the paucity of such 
official reaction to the ICRC Study is significant, and that State silence can be viewed as acquiescence, 
particularly when the ICRC consulted with national authorities in the drafting of the Study).  The joint letter to 
the ICRC from the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State and the General Counsel to the U.S. 
Department of Defense is well-reasoned and temperate in language compared to the scathing invective 
contained in a U.S. Senate Republican Committee Policy Paper, Are American Interests Being Disserved by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross?, (June 13, 2005), available at 
http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Jun1305ICRCDF.pdf (criticizing the ICRC for being funded to a significant extent 
by the United States, and for supposedly being impartial, and yet promoting the development of international 
humanitarian law in ways contrary to U.S. national interests); Interview with MAJ Jose Cora, U.S. Army, The 
Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, in Charlottesville, Va. (Dec. 16, 2007) (questioning 
whether the silence of other States is due to their simply ignoring the ICRC Study, and waiting until they have 
an actual dispute to raise any issues).  Contra Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the 
Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 
GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1234-35 (2005) (describing the inherent tension between the ICRC’s role “in attending to 
actual victims of armed conflict,” which is based on lex lata [what the law is] and on the “special status” 
afforded to the ICRC based on its principles of neutrality and impartiality, versus the ICRC’s role “in 
advocating the humanitarian cause,” which is based on lex ferenda [what the law ought to be] and which may 
run contrary to particular States’ interests); Interview with MAJ Jose Cora, U.S. Army, The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center and School, in Charlottesville, Va. (Dec. 16, 2007) (noting that the ICRC has an 
“inherent conflict of interest,” and while it purports to be a neutral arbiter in publishing the ICRC Study, it 
actually does so under its role as an advocate for the development of international humanitarian law).  The 
ICRC Study presumably falls within the ICRC’s latter role.  See supra note 2 (discussing whether credit and 
responsibility for the ICRC Study should be given to the ICRC, or to its two authors).  Thus, the ICRC Study 
may be particularly relevant to the United States, which “is the outstanding laggard in signing IHL treaties and 
is therefore most likely to be affected by the confirmation of conventional rules as customary law.”  Malcolm 
MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC 
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1232 (2005).  See also infra note 
124 (noting that at least two scholars claim that the United States is a “specially affected” State with regard to 
all of international humanitarian law, and therefore that “[an ICRC Study] rule would be hard, if not impossible, 
to regard as having taken on customary status were a State such as the United States opposed to it; the practice 
concerned could not be said to be representative.”). 
9 ICRC, ICRC in Action 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0728?opendocument 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
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monumental work10 compiling a surfeit of State practice.11  Nevertheless, the ICRC Study on 
customary international humanitarian law articulates “rules”12 that are not sustainable under 
the traditional theory of customary international law formation,13 as may be seen by 
analyzing even the three seemingly uncontroversial14 rules proposed by the ICRC Study for 
                                               
10 See PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at vii, ix, 3, 13 and 409 (singing the praises of the 
ICRC Study as “a valuable work of great service to international humanitarian law” that “has considerably 
advanced our understanding of the law”); Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 
AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 692 (2007) (book review) (commenting that the ICRC Study “is an undeniable 
embarrassment of empirical riches”); id. at 695 (calling the ICRC Study “a phenomenal resource for 
information on state and institutional practice in the humanitarian field.”); Peter Rowe, The Effect on National 
Law of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 165, 165 (2006) 
(stating that the ICRC Study is a milestone in the development of international humanitarian law); Yoram 
Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 1 ¶ 1 (2006) 
(admitting that the ICRC Study is “undoubtedly an important landmark”); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, 
Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law 
Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 263 (2006) (admiring the ICRC Study as “a stunning piece of 
work”); Ryszard Piotrowicz, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 25 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 348, 349, 
350 (2006) (book review) (arguing that the ICRC Study is “a massive contribution to elucidating IHL”); 
Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1217 (2005) (admiring the 
ICRC Study as “undeniably a remarkable feat and a significant contribution to scholarship and debate in this 
area of international law.”). 
11 Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 692 (2007) (book 
review) (commenting that the ICRC Study “is an undeniable embarrassment of empirical riches”); George H. 
Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 523-24 (2006) (arguing that “the vast collection of 
backup material in Volume II is irreplaceable”); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 833 (2005) (noting that “[n]o restatement of international law has eve[r] tried to amass such 
a rich collection of empirical data.”). 
12 The ICRC Study’s use of the term “rule” of customary international law is not, in itself, unusual.  The present 
author’s concern is that some of the “rules” in the ICRC Study do not accurately reflect customary international 
law, and thus may not be accurately described as “rules” of customary international law, hence the quotation 
marks.  See also George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 507 (2006); Peter Rowe, The 
Effect on National Law of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY 
L. 165, 166-67 (2006). 
13 See infra notes 92-240 and accompanying text.  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 
5 (“nagging sense” that the ICRC Study is vague in “too many steps in the process of crystallization and of the 
formulation of the black letter customary rules”); Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 8 ¶ 15 (2006) (expressing his belief “that there are grave 
errors in the formulation of some of the Rules, and part of the commentary, in ways that adversely affect the 
ability of the Study to project an image of objective scholarship.”). 
14 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at ix.  This companion book to the ICRC Study omitted 
discussion of these rules because they “were regarded as uncontroversial and an example of Rules where the 
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handling the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.15  Thus, this article seeks to add to the 
discussion16 of the ICRC Study by focusing in Section IV specifically on the three rules 
proposed by the ICRC Study pertaining to the treatment of the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked (specifically, Rules 109, 110 and 111).17 
Before analyzing these three rules, however, it will be necessary in Section II to 
briefly provide a synopsis of the ICRC’s involvement in the development of international 
humanitarian law18 and an overview of the ICRC Study itself.19  Section III discusses the 
principal issues associated with the traditional theory of customary international law 
formation,20 which admittedly involves using “imprecise methods out of uncertain 
                                                                                                                                                 
authors of the Study have comprehensively encapsulated the law.”  Id.  See also id. at 169 (same); George H. 
Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 522 (2006) (same).  The present article seeks to reveal 
that even the three seemingly uncontentious rules for dealing with the wounded, sick and shipwrecked are 
fatally flawed, and in doing so, hopes to add to the discussion, admittedly from the perspective of a military 
lawyer.  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 4. 
15 See infra notes 241-378 (evaluating proposed Rule 109:  Duty to Search For, Collect and Evacuate the 
Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked), infra notes 379-455 (evaluating proposed Rule 110:  Duty to Care 
For the Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked), and infra notes 456-497 (evaluating proposed Rule 111:  
Duty to Protect the Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked). 
16 Dr. Yves Sandoz recognizes, in his forward to the ICRC Study, that “this study will have achieved its goal 
only if it is considered not as an end of a process but as a beginning.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  
Rules, at xvii.  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 5 (hoping “that the material provided in this 
letter … will initiate a constructive, in-depth dialogue with the ICRC and others on the subject.”); Robert Cryer, 
Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the 
ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 241 (2006) (stating that “it is important, even 
for those sympathetic to it, to appraise the [ICRC] Study as objectively as possible, even though its aims are 
unquestionably meritorious.”); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an 
Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505 
(2006) (noting the ICRC Study’s “importance rests on its being used as a basis for further work, and as a spur to 
such works, rather than on its conclusions.”). 
17 See infra notes 241-497 and accompanying text.  The ICRC Study espouses Rules 109-111 regarding the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked in Chapter 34.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396-405. 
18 See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 36-62 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 92-240 and accompanying text. 
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materials.”21  Finally, Section V contains the author’s conclusions about the ICRC Study.22 
 
II.  Overview of ICRC Study 
The ICRC has a lengthy and exemplary involvement with the formulation of 
international humanitarian law,23 and arguably even “act[s] as a guardian of humanitarian 
law.”24  Henri Dunant, a wealthy Swiss businessman, helped found the ICRC in 1863.25  The 
                                               
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (1987) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].  See also id. at § 111 reporters’ notes p. 48 (noting “[t]he non-formal 
character of customary law, and the uncertainties in determining whether and when it has come into effect and 
what is its content”); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xii (noting that “[c]ustomary international 
law … [is] notorious for its imprecision”); Jamieson L. Greer, A Critique of the ICRC’s Customary Rules 
Concerning Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity, 192 MIL. L. REV. 
116, 121 (2007) (noting that “customary law is inherently vague because it is not the product of deliberate 
processes but rather is the sum of many parts.”); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International 
Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 185 (2007) (noting that “the very nature of CIL determinations is indeterminate.”); 
Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and 
its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 232 (2006) 
(noting “the foggy world of customary IHL.”); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 202 (2006) (same); Malcolm MacLaren 
& Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1219 (2005) (calling customary 
international law “esoteric”); MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES:  INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1999) [hereinafter CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF 
RULES] (contrasting the formality of treaty law formation with “rules of customary international law [which] 
arise out of frequently ambiguous combinations of behavioural regularity and expressed or inferred 
acknowledgments of legality.”). 
22 See infra notes 498-535 and accompanying text. 
23 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxvi. 
24 Gabor Rona, The Humanitarians:  The International Committee of the Red Cross, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 
259 (2007) (reviewing David Forsythe (2005)); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  
The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 239, 240 & n. 6 (2006); Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in 
Bello: The Impact of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 179, 195 (2006); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of 
International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 
1217, 1234 (2005); ICRC, ICRC in Action 2, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0728?opendocument (last visited Dec. 16, 2007); Prosecutor 
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 109 (Oct. 
2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (deciding that “[t]he practical 
results the ICRC has thus achieved in inducing compliance with international humanitarian law ought therefore 
to be regarded as an element of actual international practice; this is an element that has been conspicuously 
instrumental in the emergence or crystallization of customary rules.”).  See also Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
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ICRC initiated efforts which led to the adoption in 1864 of the first Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,26 thereby “la[ying] 
the cornerstone of treaty-based international humanitarian law.”27  Subsequent revisions and 
expansions of the Geneva Conventions in 1906,28 after World War I in 1929,29 and after 
World War II in 194930 were again led by the ICRC.31  Since every State in the world has 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S.T. 3115, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I] at arts. 3, 9-11, 23; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II] at arts. 3, 9-11; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III] at arts. 3, 9-11, 56, 72, 73, 75, 79, 81, 123, 125, 126, Annex II arts. 2, 
3, 5, 8, 11, Annex III art. 9; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] at arts. 3, 10-12, 
14, 30, 59, 61, 76, 96, 102, 104, 108, 109, 111, 140, 142, 143, Annex II art. 8; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], at arts. 5(3) & (4), 6(3), 33(3), 
78(3), 81(1), 97(1), 98(1) & (2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II], at arts. 18(1), 24(1); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, 8 Dec. 2005 [hereinafter 
Additional Protocol III], at arts. 3(1)(b), 4, 13(1). 
25 ICRC, Discover the ICRC 6, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0790/$File/ICRC_002_0790.PDF!Open (last visited Dec. 
16, 2007).  See generally HENRI DUNANT, A MEMORY OF SOLFERINO (ICRC, 1986) (1862). 
26 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 
1864, 22 Stat. 940, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva04.htm. 
27 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at ix.  See also ICRC, The Geneva Conventions:  the core of 
international humanitarian law, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/genevaconventions (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
28 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded of the Armies in the Field, July 6, 
1906, 35 Stat. 1885. 
29 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 
July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074. 
30 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24; Geneva Convention III, supra 
note 24; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24. 
31 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at ix.  Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  
The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 239, 240 & n. 6 (2006); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the 
Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 
GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1234 (2005).  See also Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at arts. 3, 9-11, 23; Geneva 
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either ratified or acceded to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,32 they “constitute the 
foundation of international humanitarian law in force today.”33  The ICRC also had its 
imprimatur on the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions following the 
Vietnam War, “which brought up to date both the rules governing the conduct of hostilities 
and those protecting war victims.”34  Thus it should come as no surprise that a Swiss-
appointed group of experts assigned the ICRC with the monumental task of conducting a 
study on customary international humanitarian law.35 
                                                                                                                                                 
Convention II, supra note 24, at arts. 3, 9-11; Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at arts. 3, 9-11, 56, 72, 73, 
75, 79, 81, 123, 125, 126, Annex II arts. 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, Annex III art. 9; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, 
at arts. 3, 10-12, 14, 30, 59, 61, 76, 96, 102, 104, 108, 109, 111, 140, 142, 143, Annex II art. 8. 
32 See generally ICRC, State Parties to Geneva Conventions, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView (last visited Dec. 16, 2007); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 526 
(2006).  The last State to accede to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 was Montenegro on August 2, 2006.  
Id.; PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 32.  The United States ratified all four Geneva 
Conventions on August 2, 1955.  DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 361, 368 (Adam Roberts and Richard 
Guelff eds., Oxford University Press 3rd ed. 2000). 
33 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at ix.  See also Additional Protocol I and II, supra note 24, which 
the majority of States have either ratified or acceded to, and which were again led by the ICRC.  ICRC STUDY, 
supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxvi. 
34 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at ix.  See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at arts. 5(3) & 
(4), 6(3), 33(3), 78(3), 81(1), 97(1), 98(1) & (2); Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at arts. 18(1), 24(1).  
Some scholars suggest that the purpose of the ICRC Study is to bind those States who remain non-parties to the 
1977 Additional Protocols, such as Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and the United States, as a matter of 
customary international law.  Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 
Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 3 ¶ 4, 14 (2006) (questioning whether the real impetus for the ICRC Study was an effort 
to claim that the provisions in Additional Protocol I had achieved the status of customary international law); 
David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 201, 236 (2006) (same); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an 
Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505-06 
(2006) (same); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 833 (2005) 
(same); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that the ICRC Study rules rely heavily 
on the treaty provisions of Additional Protocol I).  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 
(arguing that the assertion that a significant number of rules in the Additional Protocols “have achieved the 
status of customary international law applicable to all States” is a general error that runs throughout the ICRC 
Study). 
35 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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(A) Origins 
A three-day International Conference for the Protection of War Victims met in 
Geneva in late August 1993, and called upon the government of Switzerland to assemble a 
“group of experts to study practical means of promoting full respect for and compliance with 
[international humanitarian] law.”36  This “Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the 
Protection of War Victims met in Geneva in January 1995 and adopted a series of 
recommendations aimed at enhancing respect for international humanitarian law, in 
particular by means of preventive measures that would ensure better knowledge and more 
effective implementation of the law.”37 
The Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection of War Victims’ second 
recommendation suggested that “[t]he ICRC be invited to prepare … a report on customary 
rules of [international humanitarian law] applicable in international and non-international 
armed conflicts.”38  At the end of 1995, the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent approved this recommendation “and officially mandated the ICRC to 
prepare a report on customary rules of international humanitarian law applicable in 
international and non-international armed conflicts.”39  The ICRC assigned the project to the 
                                               
36 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxvii. 
37 Id 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  Cf. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 
76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he 
ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether customary international law provides a more detailed 
framework for non-international armed conflicts.  In fact, the ICRC preferred to be mandated to prepare a report 
on non-international armed conflicts only but that was unacceptable to some States at the International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and so the organization was asked to look at both types of armed 
conflict.”). 
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Deputy Head (later Head) of its Legal Division, Ms. Louise Doswald-Beck,40 who had 
recently completed her service as the editor of a similar restatement,41 the San Remo Manual 
on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea,42 and Dr. Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts.43  These two ICRC lawyers worked on the project over the next decade, 
coordinating the efforts of six research teams, which consisted of dozens of academic experts 
                                               
40 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlix.  See also Graduate Institute of International Studies, 
Geneva, International Law Section Faculty, Professor Louise Doswald-Beck, Curriculum Vitae, 
http://hei.unige.ch/sections/dr/faculty/doswald-beck/CV.pdf (noting that Professor Doswald-Beck left the ICRC 
in February 2001 to serve as the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, which she left in 
October 2003 to serve as a Professor of Public International Law and Director of the University Centre for 
International Humanitarian Law at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, both of the latter 
positions which she apparently continues to fill as of the time of this writing). 
41 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 15-16 (comparing the ICRC Study to the Harvard Drafts 
of the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, and the San Remo Manual); Dieter 
Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 198 (2006) (arguing that “the 
great value of the ICRC Study [is] as a prominent restatement of current customary international humanitarian 
law”); Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 225 
& n. 12 (2006) (noting that the ICRC Study “closely resembles an American-style restatement’s articulation of 
common law-based rules.”). 
42 SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-
Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL].  Interestingly enough, the San Remo Manual admits to being 
“a contemporary restatement of the law, together with some progressive development,” (see id. at ix) (emphasis 
added) an admission only hinted at by the authors of the ICRC Study.  See infra note 58 and accompanying text 
(noting that the ICRC Study hints at its aspirational bias when it admits that eight of its rules only “arguably” 
apply to non-international armed conflicts.  See also Jamieson L. Greer, A Critique of the ICRC’s Customary 
Rules Concerning Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity, 192 MIL. L. 
REV. 116, 126 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he aspirational nature of the ICRC Rules concerning displaced persons 
and the covert attempt to expand IDP protections at refugee expense ensures that the Rules will remain purely 
of academic interest rather than contributing substantively to the development of customary law.”). 
43 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Legal Adviser, International Committee of the Red Cross, Address at The George 
Washington University Law School (Sep. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Henckaerts Address].  See also Theodor 
Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (noting that “the task of 
elucidating the [ICRC Study] rules based on the evidence was left largely to the two editors; the expert 
committee that had guided the study was disbanded in 1999.  The very good work done by the editors might, in 
my view, have been further strengthened by the continued involvement of the expert committee, as a group, 
until the project’s completion in 2004, to ensure that the black-letter rules would reflect a broader range of 
consultations.”).  Cf. supra note 2 (discussing whether credit and responsibility for the ICRC Study should be 
given to the ICRC, or to its two authors). 
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and national researchers.44 
(B) Scope and Methodology  
With the assistance of academic experts and national researchers, the authors 
collected State practice from forty-seven States over a thirty year period.45  Each of the six 
research teams focused on a separate part of the study.46  The authors sought to make the 
collection of State practice all-encompassing, by including not only physical acts (i.e. 
behavior on the battlefield),47 but also verbal acts, including: 
military manuals, national legislation, national case-law, instructions to armed 
and security forces, military communiqués during war, diplomatic protests, 
opinions of official legal advisers, comments by governments on draft treaties, 
executive decisions and regulations, pleadings before international tribunals, 
statements in international organizations and at international conferences and 
                                               
44 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlv, xix-xxii. 
45 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlv, xlvii, xlix.  See infra note 280 and accompanying text 
(criticizing the ICRC Study for citing to these “Reports” of State practice as further evidence of State practice, 
when they merely represent a working draft of the ICRC Study itself, and they are not generally available for 
examination). 
46 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlv, xlvi.  See infra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing 
the six parts of the Study). 
47 Contra W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 
PROC. 208, 210, 212 (2005) (criticizing the ICRC Study for its lack of consideration of actual battlefield 
behavior); W. Hays Parks, Assistant General Counsel for the U.S. Department of Defense and Adjunct 
Professor at the American University Washington College of Law, Roundtable Discussion at the North 
American launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in 
Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of 
International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 16 (2006) (same); W. Hays Parks, Comments on the 
ICRC Customary Law Study, (Sep. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript at 1, on file with author) (arguing that 
“[b]attlefield realities determine whether treaty texts agreed to in the comfortable diplomatic atmosphere of 
Geneva are, at the end of the day, practicable.  Further, to determine the law, reference to State practice in 
wartime is essential.  A key missing element in the ICRC Study is any consideration as to State practice in 
wartime.”); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 203 (2006) (same); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2 (criticizing the 
ICRC Study for placing insufficient weight on “actual operational practice by States during armed conflict.”).  
Contra PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 37 (noting that “the claim that battlefield practice 
should be seen as paramount is not without difficulty, particularly if this departs from views previously 
expressed by a State.  Surely a peacetime assessment of what the law requires is more considered, precisely 
because it is detached from the pressures of conflict?”); id. at 38 (arguing that “[i]f a State’s battlefield behavior 
differs from its earlier views, in the absence of justification, how can a principled departure from its earlier 
position be distinguished from its violation?”). 
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government positions taken with respect to resolutions of international 
organizations.48 
 
The authors anticipated objections to the inclusion of some of these ‘verbal acts,’49 and thus 
                                               
48 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxii, xlv-xlvi.  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, 
supra note 2, at 24-25; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A 
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 74-75 (2002). 
49 See, e.g., DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2 (criticizing the ICRC Study for placing too much 
emphasis on written materials); id. at 3 (noting that “States often include guidance in their military manuals for 
policy, rather than legal, reasons.”); id. at 3-4 (criticizing the ICRC Study’s overly heavy reliance on military 
manuals, and its inability to “distinguish between military publications prepared informally solely for training 
or similar purposes and those prepared and approved as official government statements.”); id. at attachment p. 8 
(explaining that the Operational Law Handbook “is simply an instructional publication and is not and was not 
intended to be an authoritative statement of U.S. policy and practice.”); Jim Garamone, DoD, State Department 
Criticize Red Cross Law of War Study, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Mar. 8, 2007, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/03/mil-070308-afps02.htm (quoting W. Hays Parks 
as saying that the ICRC Study relies on one “study prepared by an Air Force judge advocate for a class he was 
teaching.”); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 134 (noting that “military manuals often 
provide a useful indication of whether the issuing State believes a practice to be obligatory (or prohibited) as a 
matter of law.  Yet, manuals also reflect policy and operational concerns.  One must, therefore, be cautious not 
to infuse them with a normative character that may have been unintended by the promulgating States.”); 
DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that “[s]pecial importance in the context of 
LOIAC [Law of International Armed Conflict] is attached to military manuals and operational handbooks.”); 
Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 6 ¶ 12 
(2006) (making a similar argument regarding “the so-called Israeli Manual on the Laws of War of 1998” which 
he informed the Study editors that “this is merely a tool used to facilitate instruction and training, and it has no 
binding or even authoritative standing.”).  See, e.g., ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 391 (citing to 
the “manual used for instruction in the Israeli army”).  As both a member of the faculty and a contributor, the 
present author can attest to the limited utility in the realm of international law of the “Operational Law 
Handbook,” published annually by the International and Operational Law Department of The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army.  Although this fine publication is helpful as a pedagogical aid 
to instruction at the Army JAG School and as a handy reference for deployed judge advocates, it nevertheless 
represents the views of at most a couple dozen instructors and military judge advocates, each writing about his 
or her own area of expertise, with minimal peer review, and with no review whatsoever by the Office of the 
Army Judge Advocate General, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.  THE JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK at i (2007).  
Unfortunately, the imprimatur of The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School has led to it being 
quoted, often out of context, by the ICRC Study, and even by the U.S. Supreme Court (to a related publication 
which is no longer in print).  See, e.g., ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 883 n. 175, 4207 (citing 
the 1993 edition of the OPLAW Handbook!); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2796 n. 63 (2006) (citing 
to the 2004 Law of War Handbook).  The ICRC must have found a copy of the 1993 OPLAW Handbook in its 
archives, because it is not cited by the Report on US practice.  See generally BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, 
CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:  REPORT ON THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (undated, added to UVA Law Library on June 17, 1998) [hereinafter CARNAHAN, REPORT 
ON U.S. PRACTICE].  Moreover, the 1993 Operational Law Handbook is so out-of-date, that the author of the 
present article was unable to find a copy, even at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School.  The 
most current edition of the OPLAW Handbook contains the caveat that “the Handbook is not intended to 
represent official U.S. policy regarding the binding application of varied sources of law, though the Handbook 
may reference source documents which themselves do so.”  THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER 
AND SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK at ii (2007).  Despite these caveats (express or 
implied), the ICRC Study consistently cites to a number of “commanders guides” and “teaching manuals.”  See, 
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e.g., ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2592-98, 2605-06, 2617-21, 2625, 2634 §§ 23, 25, 29, 34, 
38, 43, 49, 74, 128, 130, 134, 216, 219, 224, 228, 231, 243, 248, 280, 356, 358.  See also infra note 394 (noting 
that Australia’s 1994 Defence Force Manual and New Zealand’s 1992 Military Manual conflict with their treaty 
obligations under the Additional Protocols, and thus probably are not good evidence of their respective State’s 
practice).  The cornerstone of democracy is civilian control of the government, hence the hesitance on the part 
of the military in a democratic State to set national policy.  For that reason alone, military manuals should not 
be dispositive as evidence of State practice.  Moreover, State practice “includes diplomatic acts and instructions 
as well as public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of policy ….”  RESTATEMENT OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. b.  It is highly suspect whether military manuals and 
handbooks, often intended strictly for an internal audience, constitute official statements of policy, especially if 
these military manuals or handbooks are not reviewed at higher levels.  Compare THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2007) (representing the 
views of “subject matter experts” with minimal peer review, and with no review whatsoever by the Office of the 
Army Judge Advocate General, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense) with U.S. ARMY 
FIELD MANUAL (FM) 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956) (considered the foundational text by the U.S. 
Army for the law of armed conflict on land, officially vetted within the Department of the Army, and thus under 
revision for a number of years) and id. at § 1 (noting that “[t]he purpose of this Manual is to provide 
authoritative guidance to military personnel on the customary and treaty law applicable to the conduct of 
warfare on land and to relationships between belligerents and neutral States…. This Manual is an official 
publication of the United States Army.  However, those provisions of the Manual which are neither statutes nor 
the test of treaties to which the United States is a party should not be considered binding upon courts and 
tribunals applying the law of war.  However, such provisions are of evidentiary value insofar as they bear upon 
questions of custom and practice.”).  Thus FM 27-10 constitutes official U.S. Army policy, and hence U.S. State 
practice, whereas the OPLAW Handbook is merely a handy quick reference guide for judge advocates, does not 
represent official U.S. Army policy, and hence cannot represent U.S. State practice.  Compare NWP 1-14M, 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 3 (2007) (noting that it is “intended for use by 
operational commanders and supporting staff elements at all levels of command.  It is designed to provide 
officers in command and their staffs with an overview of the rules of law governing naval operations in 
peacetime and during armed conflict.”) and id. (“letter of promulgation” on joint Department of the Navy and 
Department of Homeland Security letterhead, and signed by senior representatives of the U.S. Marine Corps, 
U.S. Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard (quite literally the imprimatur of representatives of those two departments)) 
with NWP 1-14M, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS at iii (1997) (noting the caveat “the annotations in this Annotated Supplement are not to be 
construed as representing official policy or positions of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Government.”).  
Thus, while NWP 1-14M constitutes official U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard policy, and 
hence U.S. State practice, its annotated supplement does not (and is intended primarily as a quick reference 
guide for judge advocates).  See also USAF Pamphlet 110-31, JUDGE ADVOCATE, GENERAL ACTIVITIES, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 1 (1976) (containing the 
caveat “[t]his pamphlet is for the information and guidance of judge advocates and others particularly 
concerned with international law requirements applicable during armed conflict.  It furnishes references and 
suggests solutions to a variety of legal problems but is not directive in nature.  As an Air Force pamphlet, it 
does not promulgate official US Government policy although it does refer to US, DOD and Air Force 
policies.”).  Thus the USAF Pamphlet 110-31 is also merely a handy quick reference guide for judge advocates, 
does not represent official U.S. Air Force policy, and hence cannot represent U.S. State practice.  The lesson to 
be learned from this is that U.S. military manuals typically note whether or not they represent official policy, 
and hence whether they are even potential candidates for U.S. State practice.  While these “official policy” 
caveats are not dispositive, they are at least presumptive.  Contra W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law 
Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208, 209 (2005) (distinguishing between 
government statements that represent policy decisions versus “a government’s declaration of its interpretation 
of its law of war obligations”); Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State 
(speaking in his personal capacity), Roundtable Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at 
the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of 
Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 
HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 14 (2006) (noting that “States place rules in manuals for a variety of reasons, not always 
because they believe they are legally obligated to do so ….  Often practice that is reflected in the manuals is 
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cited to the International Court of Justice, the International Law Commission, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the International Law 
Association in similarly considering such sources.50  In addition, the authors augmented the 
collection of State practice by reviewing the ICRC archives for materials related to forty 
recent armed conflicts.51 
 Once the six research teams had collected this potential surfeit of State practice, they 
summarized and consolidated it into “Reports on the Practice of”52 specific States, which the 
ICRC consolidated into the two parts (i.e. books) of Volume II:  Practice of the ICRC 
Study.53  The authors then went through an iterative process of summarizing this State 
                                                                                                                                                 
based on a policy of including a certain rule, rather than a sense that the rule flows from a legal obligation.”). 
50 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxii-xxxiii.  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, 
supra note 2, at 37 (noting that “in principle, the Study’s use of essentially verbal acts in the construction of its 
Rules is unimpeachable.”); CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 156 (arguing that 
“[f]or the purposes of determining whether and to what degree an instance of State practice is legally relevant, it 
is not particularly important whether that practice involves statements or acts.”).  See generally CUSTOM, 
POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 134-36 (summarizing the different arguments for and 
against consideration of verbal acts).  Cf. Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 4 ¶ 7 (2006) (agreeing that verbal acts of States can constitute State 
practice, but arguing that the ICRC Study “go[es] way too far” in generically considering verbal statements and 
in not differentiating between statements depending on “who is making the statement, when, where and in what 
circumstances.”). 
51 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlvii.  See PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 
44 (questioning the appropriateness of considering “confidential communications made to the ICRC as evidence 
of State practice.”); Gabor Rona, The Humanitarians:  The International Committee of the Red Cross, 101 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 259, 260-61, 263, 264 (2007) (reviewing David Forsythe (2005)) (noting that the ICRC has to make a 
“‘devil’s bargain’ of discretion in return for access”).  But see Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 7 ¶ 14 (2006) (remembering that 
“[e]verybody hoped that the research [into the otherwise inaccessible IRCR archives] would yield a trove of 
inaccessible State practice.  In [any] event, the results have been quite disappointing.”). 
52 See infra note 280 and accompanying text (criticizing the ICRC Study for citing to these “Reports” of State 
practice as further evidence of State practice, when they merely represent a working draft of the ICRC Study 
itself, and they are not generally available for examination). 
53 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlvii-xlviii.  See infra note 280 and accompanying text 
(criticizing the ICRC Study for citing to these “Reports” of State practice as further evidence of State practice, 
when they merely represent a working draft of the ICRC Study itself, and they are not generally available for 
examination).  See also Garamone, supra note 49 (quoting W. Hays Parks as likening the methodology of the 
ICRC Study to “to performing an Internet search and then not assessing the results for applicability or 
  16 
practice into proposed rules, which they submitted to academic and government experts for 
comment before consolidating these 161 proposed rules in Volume I:  Rules.54  The ICRC 
published the complete study in 2005.  Unfortunately, although the ICRC Study’s stated 
methodology would appear to be unassailable, its execution does not live up to its promise of 
academic rigor, as will be seen.55 
                                                                                                                                                 
accuracy.”). 
54 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlviii, l-li. 
55 See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that “although the statement of 
methodology … is generally sound, the rigorous approach described therein is not always evident in the 
discussion and evaluation of State practice and opinio iuris.”); id. (noting that while the Study purports to 
consider ‘density’ or “the weight[] of relevant items of practice, there is often little or no evidence that this is 
done.  For example, resolutions of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights seem to attract the same weight as 
the legislation or policy statements of specially affected States.”); id. at 402 (noting that “the authors of the 
Study have sometimes adopted an approach which is less conservative than is claimed.”); id. at 403 (concluding 
“that the Study has on occasion adopted a fairly relaxed view of what is needed to constitute customary 
[international] law.”); Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 
693 (2007) (book review) (noting that “[t]he results [of the ICRC Study] can be quite deceptive.  They lead us 
to believe that a rule is much older—and its normative pedigree much deeper—than might actually be the 
case.”); Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 243 
(2006) (noting that “[i]t is clear that the ICRC did not carry out this study in conformity with the traditional 
methods of assessing what state practice is customary.”); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the 
Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 249 (2006) (noting that “one of the problems with the study – it is often silent on 
the weight given to particular evidences of custom”); id. at 252 (noting that the ICRC Study fails to explain the 
weight that is to be attached to the elements of crimes adopted under the Rome Statute); DOS/DoD Letter to 
ICRC, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that although the ICRC Study purports to follow an appropriate approach, “the 
Study frequently fails to apply this approach in a rigorous way.”); id. at 2-3 (criticizing ICRC Study for 
equating “the practice of States that have relatively little history of participation in armed conflict,” and those 
with a more substantial history of participation in armed conflict); id. at 4 (criticizing the ICRC Study for 
asserting that certain rules have become customary international law binding in non-international armed 
conflicts “notwithstanding the fact that there is little evidence in support of those propositions.”); PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 407 (same); W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study:  A 
Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208, 210, 212 (2005) (criticizing the ICRC Study for its 
lack of consideration of actual battlefield behavior, despite its claims to the contrary); Dieter Fleck, 
International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 197 (2006) (noting that “[s]ome of [the 
ICRC Study’s] findings remain rather vague due to the absence of convincing practice.”); George H. Aldrich, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 507 (2006) (noting that “[w]hile it certainly would be desirable from a 
humanitarian perspective if the ICRC could establish such [demilitarized] zones in non-international armed 
conflict, such desirability and a few welcome instances do not make customary law.”); id. at 514-15 (calling 
Rule 43’s restrictions on conducting hostilities that impact the environment “a wish list that is unnecessary and, 
to the extent new, has no foundation in existing law.”); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 202, 237 (2006) (arguing that the ICRC 
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(C) Organization 
The Study is divided into two “volumes”: 
Volume I:  Rules 
Volume II:  Practice 
Volume I contains 161 annotated proposed rules of customary international 
humanitarian law (which arguably apply to all States, and most apply to all “parties” to the 
conflict).  Thirteen proposed rules claim to apply only to international armed conflicts,56 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Study seems to “assert[] custom without necessarily meeting the standards for proving its existence” thereby 
conflating the lex lata [what the law is] with the lex ferenda [what the law ought to be]); id. at 210 (noting that 
“serious methodological problems arise with the breezy manner in which the Study alternatively justifies the 
extension of weaponry provisions to non-international armed conflicts.”); id. at 223 (noting “flaws in the 
Study’s tendency to be satisfied with minimal evidence of State practice”); id. at 224-25 (observing that Rule 
76’s prohibition on the use of herbicides as a method of warfare “is a quite astonishing exercise in extrapolation 
of a detailed rule from very little hard evidence….  The inescapable impression is that the Study is essentially 
relying on itself, rather than on actual State practice”); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian 
Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (predicting that “some critics of the ICRC study might argue that while 
traditional in methodology, the study was too progressive in interpreting practice and thus in determining black-
letter rules.”); infra notes 233-238 (criticizing the ICRC Study’s methodology, and noting at least two 
intellectual shortcuts taken by the Study).  But cf.  Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  
The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 243 (2006) (observing that “[i]f one’s goal is to create a tool that increases 
compliance with humanitarian principles, as was the purpose of this study, that goal cannot be realized by using 
only a traditional assessment of customary law; in order to pursue its stated goals, the ICRC had to take a non-
traditional approach.”); Ryszard Piotrowicz, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 25 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 348, 349 (2006) (book review) (noting that anyone could find fault with particular rules of the ICRC Study, 
but “inevitably there will be differences in attitude towards the weight of various types of state practice … on 
whether opinio juris is really present … on whether a rule has in fact crystallised….  So the book may not be 
perfect but I do not think it could be, especially when setting out rules of customary international law.”); 
Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (noting that 
“many of the critics of the less formal approach [to determinations of customary international law formation] 
that has been in vogue in recent decades will appreciate the traditional approach taken by the ICRC.”). 
56 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 11 (Rule 3 provides that all members of armed forces are 
combatants in international armed conflicts, except for medical and religious personnel); id. at 14 (Rule 4 
defines armed forces in an international armed conflict as including all groups who subordinate themselves to a 
party’s command); id. at 135 (Rule 41 requires the occupying power in an international armed conflict to 
prevent the illicit export of cultural property); id. at 173 (Rule 49 permitting the seizure of military equipment 
as war booty in international armed conflicts); id. at 178 (Rule 51 permits the use of public property in occupied 
territory in an international armed conflict); id. at 384 (Rule 106 requires combatants to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population in international armed conflicts); id. at 389 (Rule 107 affirms that spies lose their 
right to POW status in an international armed conflict); id. at 391 (Rule 108 explains that mercenaries do not 
have the right to either combatant or POW status in international armed conflicts); id. at 411 (Rule 114 requires 
parties to return the remains and personal effects of deceased to the party to which they belong in an 
international armed conflict, or upon request to the next of kin); id. at 462 (Rule 130 prohibits the deportation of 
civilians into occupied territory in international armed conflicts); id. at 513 (Rule 145 limits belligerent reprisals 
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two proposed rules purport to apply only to non-international (i.e. internal) armed conflicts.57  
However, the vast majority of the proposed rules assert that they apply equally to both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.58  Volume II is comprised of two lengthy 
                                                                                                                                                 
to stringent conditions in international armed conflicts; id. at 519 (Rule 146 prohibits belligerent reprisals 
against protected persons in an international armed conflict); and id. at 523 (Rule 147 similarly prohibits 
belligerent reprisals against protected objects in an international armed conflict). 
57 Id. at 526 (Rule 148 prohibits belligerent reprisals in non-international armed conflicts); id. at 611 (Rule 159 
requires States to consider granting amnesty broadly to persons involved in non-international armed conflicts).  
Although Rule 126 purports to only apply to non-international armed conflicts, it was incorrectly worded in the 
ICRC Study, and in the original version of the International Review article on the ICRC Study.  See generally 
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 448; International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, no. 857, 209 
(2005-original version) (on file with author).  Apparently “Rule 126 should have been split into two rules, as is 
done for other rules with different formulations for IAC and NIAC.”  E-mail from Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
Legal Adviser, ICRC Legal Division, to author (ICRC Ref. No. DC_JUR/GVA07E961) (Nov. 22, 2007, 
05:10:59 EST) (on file with author).  Thus, the corrected rule should read as follows: 
Rule 126. 
A. Civilian internees must be allowed to receive visitors, especially near relatives, to the 
degree practicable.  
B. Persons deprived of their liberty in connection with a non-international armed conflict 
must be allowed to receive visitors, especially near relatives, to the degree practicable. 
Id.  Note that the International Review article on the ICRC Study has only had its bracketed explanation 
“[IAC/NIAC]” corrected, and not the rule itself.  International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, no. 857, 209 
(2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-857-
p175/$File/irrc_857_Henckaerts.pdf.  Not surprisingly, Rule 126 continues to be miscited as only applying to 
non-international armed conflicts.  See, e.g., Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the 
Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 
GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1229 & n. 51 (2005). 
58 Henckaerts Address, supra note 43.  Cf. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
– A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as one of the co-authors 
of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether customary international 
law provides a more detailed framework for non-international armed conflicts.  In fact, the ICRC preferred to be 
mandated to prepare a report on non-international armed conflicts only but that was unacceptable to some States 
at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and so the organization was asked to look at 
both types of armed conflict.”).  Somewhat surprisingly, the ICRC Study reveals its aspirational bias when it 
admits that of the 146 rules that apply equally to both international and non-international armed conflicts, eight 
of them only “arguably” apply to non-international armed conflicts.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, 
at 65 (Rule 21 requires military commanders to select the objective with the lowest threat of collateral damage); 
id. at 71 (Rule 23 requires parties to avoid locating military objectives near densely populated areas); id. at 74 
(Rule 24 requires parties to remove civilians and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives); id. at 
147 (Rule 44 requires military commanders to take all feasible precautions to minimize incidental damage to the 
environment); id. at 151 (Rule 45 prohibits the use of  weapons which may be expected to cause serious damage 
to the environment); id. at 213 (Rule 62 prohibits the improper use of an adversary’s flags, emblems, insignia or 
uniforms); id. at 218 (Rule 63 prohibits the use of a neutral State’s flags, emblems, insignia or uniforms); id. at 
283 (Rule 82 requires parties who use landmines to record their placement).  See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN 
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books containing the State practice corresponding to the proposed rules in Volume I. 
Each volume is divided further into six parts, corresponding to the six areas of 
research: 
Part I:  Principle of Distinction 
Part II:  Specifically Protected Persons and Objects 
Part III: Specific Methods of Warfare 
Part IV: Weapons 
Part V:  Treatment of Civilians and Persons Hors de Combat59 
Part VI: Implementation.60 
Each part is further divided into topical chapters in both Volumes.  Thus, each 
proposed rule and chapter in Volume I has corresponding State practice in Volume II.61  Due 
                                                                                                                                                 
RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 103 cmt. a (noting that “[a] determination as to whether a customary rule has 
developed is likely to be influenced by assessment as to whether the rule will contribute to international 
order.”).  Even more surprisingly, the ICRC Study does not present a rule for determining the existence of an 
armed conflict, or whether it is an international or non-international armed conflict.  PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at ix, 408; Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the 
Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 
GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1226-27 & n. 45 (2005) (criticizing the ICRC Study for not including a single rule on this 
topic); id. (citing a personal communication with Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, one of the ICRC Study’s authors, 
as to such an endeavor “requir[ing] a study in and of itself.”); Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 694 (2007) (book review) (expressing his surprise at the ICRC 
“[S]tudy’s failure to define international and noninternational armed conflicts … [particularly] in view of the 
defining and operational significance that these concepts hold for all of the rules contained in the study.”).  The 
Study also avoids taking a position on the legality or illegality of using nuclear weapons, purportedly due to 
deference to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ’s) advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case.  ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 255.  See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 247 ¶ 52, 265-67 ¶ 105 (July 8).  Contra David Turns, Weapons in the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 34 (2006) 
(positing that “[i]t is inappropriate for the ICRC to defer to such a controversial decision, especially when it 
amounted to a non-finding”). 
59 This article focuses on the rules pertaining to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, which fall under Part V.  
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at vi. 
60 Id. at xlv, xlvi. 
61 But cf. Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 694 (2007) 
(book review) (noting that Volume II of the ICRC Study fails to distinguish between State Practice supporting 
the particular rule in international versus non-international armed conflicts, unlike the commentary to the rules 
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to the sheer magnitude of the State practice,62 the section numbers are reset at the beginning 
of each chapter in Volume II. 
(D) U.S. Response to the ICRC Study 
As indicated earlier,63 only the United States has officially responded to the ICRC 
Study,64 in a letter co-signed by the Department of State Legal Adviser, and the Department 
of Defense General Counsel.65  The U.S. response admits that it simply represents “the U.S. 
Government’s initial reactions to the ICRC’s recent study” because “[g]iven the Study’s 
large scope, we have not yet been able to complete a detailed review of its conclusions.”66  
However, the U.S. response envisions the United States “provid[ing] additional comments or 
otherwise mak[ing its] views known in due course.”67 
The U.S. response generally criticizes the ICRC Study’s unorthodox methodology,68 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Volume I); infra note 332 and accompanying text (same). 
62 See supra note 6 (discussing the immensity of the ICRC Study). 
63 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the sole U.S. response to the ICRC Study). 
64 Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 248 (2006) 
(noting that the U.S. response to the ICRC Study was eagerly awaited, and that “its response could have a 
significant impact on whether the 161 rules are actually implemented.”). 
65 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 5.  These two officials would appear to have the requisite 
seniority to express the official view of the United States vis-à-vis the ICRC Study.  See infra notes 116-118 
and accompanying text (discussing which government officials’ statements should be considered in evaluating 
State practice). 
66 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added).   
67 Id. 
68 Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 245 
(2006).  See supra note 55 and accompanying text (listing numerous criticisms of the ICRC Study’s 
methodology); infra notes 233-238 and accompanying text (same). 
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including both the State practice it considered, and its lack of proof of opinio juris.69  With 
regard to the former, the U.S. response outlines five concerns:  (1) the State practice provided 
is often too thin to support a new norm of customary international law; (2) “too much 
emphasis on written materials, such as military manuals and other guidelines published by 
States, as opposed to actual operational practice by States during armed conflict”; (3) 
overreliance on “statements by non-governmental organizations and the ICRC itself”; (4) 
inadequate weight given to “negative practice, especially among those States that remain 
non-parties to relevant treaties”; and (5) inadequate weight given “to the practice of specially 
affected States.”70 
With regard to the subjective opinio juris element of customary international law,71 
the U.S. response to the ICRC Study raises four additional concerns:  (1) the Study’s 
tendency “to merge the practice and opinio juris requirements into a single test”;72 (2) 
inferring “opinio juris from the practice of States that are parties to conventions, since their 
actions often are taken pursuant to their treaty obligations”;73 (3) basing opinio juris 
“predominantly [on] military manuals” which either “implement treaty rules, are intended to 
                                               
69 See infra notes 92-133 and accompanying text (discussing these traditional elements of customary 
international law). 
70 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2-3.   
71 See infra notes 92-133 and accompanying text (discussing the objective and subjective elements of customary 
international law formation). 
72 See infra note 237 and accompanying text (criticizing Dean Kirgis’ “sliding scale” approach to customary 
international law formation). 
73 See infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of considering State practice that 
is merely consistent with existing treaty law obligations in the formation of related norms of customary 
international law). 
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provide policy (vs. legal) guidance,74 or are “prepared informally solely for training or 
similar purposes”; and (4) lack of “positive evidence of opinio juris that would be necessary 
to justify concluding that the rules advanced by the Study are part of customary international 
law and would apply to States even in the absence of a treaty obligation.”75 
The U.S. response mentions four other general methodological concerns about the 
ICRC Study:  (1) its oversimplification of “complex and nuanced” norms of international 
law;76 (2) its overreliance on “non-binding recommendations in human rights instruments”;77 
                                               
74 Cf. W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 
PROC. 208, 209 (2005) (distinguishing between government statements that represent policy decisions versus “a 
government’s declaration of its interpretation of its law of war obligations”); Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal 
Adviser to the U.S. Department of State (speaking in his personal capacity), Roundtable Discussion at the North 
American launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in 
Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of 
International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 14 (2006) (noting that “States place rules in manuals 
for a variety of reasons, not always because they believe they are legally obligated to do so ….  Often practice 
that is reflected in the manuals is based on a policy of including a certain rule, rather than a sense that the rule 
flows from a legal obligation.”).  See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between 
legal obligations, statements of policy, and actual battlefield practice); infra notes 114, 316, 423 and 
accompanying text (same). 
75 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 3-4.   
76 See, e.g., infra notes 273-275 (noting the ICRC Study’s overgeneralization or mischaracterization of military 
manuals of the U.S. and at least nine other States).  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4, 
attachment p. 6 (criticizing the ICRC Study for its tendency to oversimplify complex and nuanced rules:  “many 
rules are stated in a way that renders them overbroad or unconditional, even though State practice and treaty 
language on the issue reflect different, and sometimes substantially narrower, propositions.”); PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 405 (same); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
– an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 507, 
523-24 (2006) (same); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 202-03 (2006) (same); infra note 349 (discussing the problems with a 
customary international law norm that deviates from a related treaty provision); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, at 44 (criticizing the ICRC Study for its “tendency to take statements at their face value 
rather than scrutinise their normative significance.”).  But see PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, 
at 22 (arguing that in order to reduce uncertainty and to avoid ambiguities inherent in customary international 
law, “the Study should result in reasonably straightforward rules insofar as this is possible, rather than more 
sophisticated norms which entail evaluation or discretion in order that they may be applied.”). 
77 Contra Heike Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 265, 289 (2006) (applauding the ICRC 
Study for “successfully demonstrate[ing] how human rights law can complement and reinforce humanitarian 
law and help[] interpret some of its rules.”); id. at 291 (concluding that “[b]ecause of the importance democratic 
societies attach to human rights law, it is likely that human rights law, despite the problems that are involved 
with its application, will play a more and more important role in the context of armed conflicts.”); Louise 
  23 
(3) its “assertion that a significant number of rules contained in the Additional Protocols … 
have achieved the status of customary international law” binding on all States, including 
those States which “have declined to become a party to those Protocols”; and (4) its 
“assertion that certain rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols have become binding as a matter of customary international law in internal armed 
conflict, notwithstanding the fact that there is little evidence in support of those 
propositions.”78 
“[T]o illustrate how these flaws call into question some of the Study’s conclusions,”79 
the U.S. response “review[s] a fair cross-section of the Study”80 by examining four of the 
ICRC Study’s proposed rules:  Rule 31 dealing with respecting and protecting humanitarian 
relief personnel;81 Rule 45, which involves protecting the environment from weapons that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Doswald-Beck, co-author of ICRC Study, Professor of Public International Law and Director of the University 
Centre for International Humanitarian Law at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, 
Roundtable Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at the American University 
Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The 
Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 13 
(2006) (arguing that “[t]he distinction between humanitarian and human rights law … has become less clear 
over time, and it is now impossible to create purely humanitarian rules when examining behaviors that reflect 
both human rights and humanitarian legal norms.”). 
78 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4.  Contra Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian 
Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 819 (2005) (noting that “the customary law character of … practically [] the entire 
corpus of the Geneva Conventions, is now taken for granted and virtually never questioned.”); George H. 
Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 506 (2006) (noting that it is “impossible to suggest 
that the Protocol, like the 1949 Geneva Conventions, should be considered to represent as a whole a 
codification of customary international humanitarian law.”).  Cf. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) 
(explaining, as one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in 
seeing whether customary international law provides a more detailed framework for non-international armed 
conflicts.”). 
79 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 1. 
80 Id. at attachment p. 22. 
81 Id. at attachment pp. 1-6. 
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may cause serious environmental harm;82 Rule 78’s prohibition against the anti-personnel use 
of exploding bullets;83 and Rule 157’s support for vesting domestic courts with universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes.84 
Although illustrative, the analysis by the U.S. response to the ICRC Study of these 
four rules is neither suitably comprehensive nor sufficiently systematic to determine the U.S. 
position vis-à-vis each rule of the ICRC Study.85  This “pars[ing of] every Rule in the 
Study,”86 or at least those to which the United States is opposed, would be necessary in order 
for the United States to properly register its status as a “persistent objector”87 to the new 
norms of customary international law revealed by the ICRC Study rules.  This, of course, 
assumes that the ICRC Study’s publication of its 161 rules itself represents the crystallization 
of these new norms.88  If the ICRC Study is correct that it merely represents a “‘photograph’ 
of customary international humanitarian law as it [already] stands today,”89 then arguably it 
is too late for the United States’ objections to the pre-existing norms of customary 
                                               
82 Id. at attachment pp. 7-12. 
83 Id. at attachment pp. 12-17. 
84 Id. at attachment pp. 17-22.  See generally James P. Benoit, The Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction Over 
War Crimes, 53 NAVAL L. REV. 259, 264-310 (2006). 
85 The U.S. letter in response to the ICRC Study admits that an “in-depth consideration of many other rules” 
may “reveal additional concerns.”  DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at attachment p. 22. 
86 Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 11 ¶ 
21 (2006). 
87 See infra notes 173-189 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of persistent objection). 
88 Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (opining that 
“[o]ver time, the [ICRC] study may well have the same sort of crystallizing effect as Nicaragua’s holding [by 
the ICJ] regarding the customary law character of common Articles 1 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions.”). 
89 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xi (2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 526 (2006). 
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international law to qualify the United States as a persistent objector to them.90 
Before the present article discusses three of the ICRC Study’s rules, it will be 
necessary to understand the traditional theory of customary international law formation,91 in 
order to establish the benchmark against which the Study rules will be examined. 
 
III.  Traditional Theory of Customary International Law (CIL) Formation 
Although the concept of customary international law certainly predates the formation 
of the United Nations92 and its judicial organ, the International Court of Justice (ICJ),93 the 
Statute of the ICJ “is the traditional starting point for discussions of [customary international 
law].”94  Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ lists the relevant law which the World Court 
should follow: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
                                               
90 See infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing how persistent objection must begin when the new 
norm is being formed in order to be effective). 
91 See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that “[t]he mechanics of custom 
formation is perhaps one of the most contested, yet fundamental, issues in contemporary international law.”). 
92 Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 129 (2007) 
(tracing the first usage of customary international law to Francisco Suarez’ foundational international law text 
“Tractatus de Legibus, Ac Deo Legislatore,” published in 1612).  For example, the United States bases its 
continued reliance on anticipatory self-defense on the 1837 Caroline Case, as evidence of a norm of customary 
international law that the United States argues was not subsumed by article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  See, e.g., 
Joseph E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law in Combating Terrorism:  A Maginot Line 
for Modern Civilization Employing the Principles of Anticipatory Self-defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REV. 
87, 107 (2004). 
93 See, e.g., Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 122 
(2007). 
94 Id. at 131.  See, e.g., DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 5; JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. 
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2005) [hereinafter THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
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b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.95 
Thus, the traditional view is that customary international law is formed96 when there 
is “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
                                               
95 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis 
added).  See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102(1); ICRC STUDY, supra note 
2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxi.  There are thus generally considered to be three types of international legal 
obligations, based on treaty law, on customary international law, or on general principles of law.  See, e.g. 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, 
supra note 21, at 166.  “Of these three sources, the first two – treaties and customary international law – are 
considered much the more important.”  CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 166.  
Treaties are binding on those States who have become parties to them, under the Latin maxim pacta sunt 
servanda (meaning treaty obligations must be fulfilled in good faith).  Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, 
at 175-76; THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 83, 189; DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, 
supra note 3, at 7.  But cf. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 14-15, 84-106, 185-203, 225 
(rejecting the traditional assumption that States comply with international law out of good faith instead of 
because it is in their best interests).  Customary international law is generally viewed as a normative rule formed 
by a relatively consistent practice by a meaningful group of States, especially those States which are uniquely 
affected by the norm, who have complied with the practice out of a belief or sense that they were legally 
obligated to do so (i.e. opinio juris sive necesitatis).  See infra notes 92-133 and accompanying text.  See also 
CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS xxiii, 427 
(2003); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2-3 (criticizing ICRC Study for equating “the practice of 
States that have relatively little history of participation in armed conflict,” and those with a more substantial 
history of participation in armed conflict, which presumably would include the U.S.).  But cf. LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 13 (positing their theory that instead of imposing obligations on States, 
“[i]nternational law emerges from states’ pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage. … It is not 
a check on state self-interest; it is a product of state self-interest.”) (emphasis added); id. at 39, 43, 185-203, 225 
(same); id. at 225 (arguing that “[m]uch of customary international law is simply coincidence of interest.”). 
96 Custom is also said to ripen, crystallize or harden into customary international law.  See, e.g. Nicholas F. 
Lancaster, Occupation Law, Sovereignty, and Political Transformation:  Should the Hague Regulations and the 
Fourth Geneva Convention Still be Considered Customary International Law?, 189 MIL. L. REV. 51, 68 n. 127 
(2006) (ripens); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, International Customary Law and Articulation Theories:  An 
Economic Analysis, 2 B.Y.U. INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 201, 206 n. 5 (2006) (same); Leah M. Nicholls, The 
Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 240 (2006) (crystallizes); 
Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 243 (2006) (same); 
Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 148-49 (2007) 
(hardens); Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 784 (2001) (same). 
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obligation”97 or opinio juris sive necessitatis.98  The fact that the Statute of the ICJ lists treaty 
law before customary international law may be perceived to represent a hierarchy of legal 
norms, with the former trumping the latter if both are on point.99  Of course, this traditional 
formulation of customary international law begs for its terms to be defined.100  Other issues 
                                               
97 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102(2).  See also THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 94, at 21, 23; DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3,  at 5; Theodor Meron, 
Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 817 (2005) (observing “that, at least in the 
field of humanitarian law, customary law continues to thrive and to depend in significant measure on the 
traditional assessment of both state practice and opinio juris.”).  But cf. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 94, at 14-15, 84-106, 185-203, 225 (rejecting the traditional assumption that States comply with 
international law out of good faith instead of because it is in their best interests).   
98 See generally, RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102, cmts. b & c; DUNOFF, RATNER 
& WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 75 (2002); 
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxii; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, 
at 130; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42-46 ¶¶ 73-81 (Feb. 20).  Contra 
Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 121 (2007) 
(describing the traditional view of customary international law formation as “state-centric” and “wrong, both 
factually and normatively.”). 
99 See, e.g., Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to 
Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377, 415-16 (2006); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 137 ¶ 274 (June 27); infra note 167 (discussing how 
certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions may not be modified by subsequent customary international law).  
This argument is further supported by the plain language of Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ, which lists 
“judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists … as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis added).  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 
103 reporters’ notes pp. 37-38.  This implies that the list is hierarchical.  Contra Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 21(1)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 135 (entered into force July 1, 2002) 
(listing customary international law on the same tier as treaty law); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra 
note 2, at 7 (same); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. j (same); id. at cmt. l 
(only listing general principles of law as a secondary source of international law); CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK 
L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS xxiii (2003) (same); THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 21 (same).  See infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the 
fact that customary international law modifying an existing treaty is relatively rare).  At least one author posits 
that there is no clear answer regarding the preeminence of treaties versus customary international law, and that 
“[t]hese are complex doctrinal questions which are not answered simply by the affirmation that treaties must be 
interpreted in the light of any relevant rules of customary international law.”).  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, at 49.  Cf. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 reporters’ notes 
p. 33 (arguing that “an [international] agreement is ordinarily presumed to supplement rather than to replace a 
customary rule” but that “[m]odification of customary law by agreement is not uncommon”). 
100 See infra notes 107-124 and accompanying text (discussing the State practice element of customary 
international law); infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text (discussing the opinio juris element of 
customary international law). 
  28 
include the role of non-State actors101 and treaty law102 in the formation of customary 
international law, and whether States can opt out of a new norm of customary international 
law by persistently objecting to its formation.103  One final issue104 addressed by the present 
article is the continued relevance of customary international law in an area “of heavy 
regulation by treaty”105—namely the law of war.106  
(A) Relevant State Practice 
Of the two components required for the formation of customary international law, 
State practice is considered the objective element,107 because at least theoretically it should 
be possible to weigh State practice on some sufficiency scale.108  However, two primary 
                                               
101 See infra notes 134-148 and accompanying text (discussing the role of non-State actors in the formation of 
customary international law). 
102 See infra notes 149-172 and accompanying text (discussing the role of treaty law in the formation of 
customary international law). 
103 See infra notes 173-189 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of persistent objection to the 
formation of customary international law). 
104 There are other doctrinal problems associated with the traditional theory of customary international law 
formation, such as “[t]he traditional paradigm[’s inability to] explain how customary international law emerges 
from disorder, or how it changes over time …”  THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 25.  
These issues are beyond the scope of the present article.  See generally id. at 10-14, 26-35 (positing a more 
descriptive paradigm, with four behavioral models based on rational choice theory). 
105 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 6.  See also id. at 13 (postulating that “one should 
approach exercises of distilling customary international law in areas that are heavily regulated by treaty with 
caution.”). 
106 See infra notes 190-240 and accompanying text (discussing the continued relevance of customary 
international law); supra note 3 (explaining that the Law Of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is synonymous with the 
Law Of War (LOW), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and jus in bello (i.e. the regulation of the conduct 
of hostilities during the course of war). 
107 DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 5; Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary 
International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 132 (2007). 
108 But cf. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 24 (explaining the difficulties of surveying 
194 States for their State practice, and “[t]hus,customary international law is usually based on a highly selective 
survey of state practice that includes only major powers and interested states”).  See also id. (noting that 
“[i]increasingly, courts and scholars ignore the state practice requirement altogether …  It is thus unclear when, 
and to what degree, the state practice requirement must be satisfied.”).  
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questions arise when considering upon which State practice to base a new norm of customary 
international law.  First, what is considered legitimate evidence of a particular State’s 
practice?109  Second, how consistent or widespread does the practice have to be?110  In other 
words, how many, and which States have to abide by the practice?111 
Just as we would consider an individual’s statements and actions to determine her 
beliefs, we need to consider a State’s statements and actions to determine the practice of that 
State.112  However, since a State is only a juridical person and cannot technically make 
statements or take action itself, we must necessarily consider the statements and actions of its 
leaders, as well as those of its organs.113  Thus, State practice “includes diplomatic acts and 
instructions as well as public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of 
policy ….”114  This, of course, raises the question as to which public officials’ statements and 
                                               
109 See, e.g., THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 23 (noting that “[t]here is little agreement 
about what type of state action counts as state practice.’). 
110 See, e.g., id. at 24. 
111 See infra notes 123-124, 162 and accompanying text (discussing the involvement of important and specially 
affected States in the formation of customary international law). 
112 See infra notes 134-148 and accompanying text (discussing the role of non-state actors in the formation of 
customary international law). 
113 Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 ¶ 62 (Apr. 29).  Cf. W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law 
Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208, 209 (2005) (criticizing the ICRC Study for 
“fail[ing] to include any frame of reference for government statements it offers.”). 
114 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. b.  See also id. at reporters’ notes p. 31 
(including “what states do in or through international organizations” as contributing to State practice); DUNOFF, 
RATNER & WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 74 
(2002) (including the following as evidence of State practice:  “diplomatic contacts and correspondence, public 
statements of government officials, legislative and executive acts, military manuals and actions by military 
commanders, treaties and executive agreements, decisions of international and national courts and tribunals, and 
decisions, declarations, and resolutions of international organizations.”  Contra W. Hays Parks, The ICRC 
Customary Law Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208, 209 (2005) 
(distinguishing between government statements that represent policy decisions versus “a government’s 
declaration of its interpretation of its law of war obligations”); Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal Adviser to the 
U.S. Department of State (speaking in his personal capacity), Roundtable Discussion at the North American 
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actions count towards establishing State practice (i.e. how far down the chain-of-command 
do we consider)?115 
For example, certainly presidential statements and presidential actions contribute 
toward establishing U.S. practice, and, perhaps arguably, those made or done by the 
President’s cabinet (i.e. the Vice President, and Secretaries of executive departments) since 
their statements and actions would presumably reflect those of the President.  However, what 
about statements made by the deputy secretaries, the under secretaries, their assistants and 
legal advisors,116 or even the deputy legal advisors?117  In determining whether the statements 
                                                                                                                                                 
launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina 
Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International 
Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 14 (2006) (noting that “States place rules in manuals for a variety of 
reasons, not always because they believe they are legally obligated to do so ….  Often practice that is reflected 
in the manuals is based on a policy of including a certain rule, rather than a sense that the rule flows from a 
legal obligation.”). 
115 Cf. Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 
4 ¶ 7 (2006) (agreeing that verbal acts of States can constitute State practice, but arguing that the ICRC Study 
“go[es] way too far” in generically considering verbal statements and in not differentiating between statements 
depending on “who is making the statement, when, where and in what circumstances.”).  Part of the question 
“how far down the chain-of-command do we consider” is the issue of the consistency of practice within a given 
State.  For example, if presidential statements are at odds with those of the Secretary of Defense, which differ 
from those of senior military commanders, which are at variance from the statements of members of Congress, 
what is the U.S. practice?  Compare Associated Press, Bush says U.S. ‘does not torture people,’ MSNBC, Oct. 5, 
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21148801/ with Understanding American Law and Torture Policy, Posting 
to Amnesty International, Stanford’s Blog to End America’s Use of Torture, 
http://torture.stanford.edu/2007/02/understanding_american_law_and.html (Feb. 13, 2007, 19:47) and Dick 
Durbin, United States Senator, McCain-Graham-Durbin Amendment on U.S. Torture Policy Approved by U.S. 
Senate (Oct. 6, 2007), http://durbin.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=247007.  In the Nicaragua v. U.S. case, the ICJ 
noted that State practice need not: 
be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.  In order to deduce the existence of 
customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule 
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the 
recognition of a new rule.  If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized 
rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the 
rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the 
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 ¶ 186 (June 27). 
116 See supra note 65 (discussing the DOS/DoD letter to the president of the ICRC, and concluding that since 
the letter was signed by the chief legal adviser of each of these executive departments, that it represents the 
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of particular government officials should count in assessing U.S. practice, factors to consider 
might include how removed these officials are from the President, whether their position 
requires Senate confirmation, and even whether or not they have direct access to or guidance 
                                                                                                                                                 
official U.S. position vis-à-vis the ICRC Study).   
117 On the one hand, legal advisors may help establish policy if their bosses (i.e. clients) follow their legal 
advice, but on the other hand, legal advisors should feel free to express their professional opinions without fear 
that these legal opinions (if made public) could somehow be construed as U.S. practice.  This is not an academic 
exercise.  In 1987, then U.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser, Mr. Michael Matheson, attended a 
“Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.”  Note that while the principal legal advisor to many departments of the U.S. executive branch is 
given the title “General Counsel” (e.g. Department of Defense, Department of the Treasury, Department of 
Agriculture, etc.), the principal legal counsel to the Department of State is titled “Legal Adviser to the Secretary 
of State.”  See generally http://www.state.gov/s/l/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Mr. Matheson’s remarks were 
subsequently published in the American University Journal of International Law and Policy.  The Sixth Annual 
American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop 
on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. 
J. INT’L & POLICY 419 (1987).  Mr. Matheson apparently prefaced his remarks as “a presentation on the United 
States position concerning the relation of customary international law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions.”  Id. at 419.  While the “Legal Adviser holds a rank equivalent to that of Assistant 
Secretary of State and reports directly to the Secretary of State,” the same cannot be said for his “[f]our Deputy 
Legal Advisers.”  Practicing Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser, http://www.state.gov/s/l/3190.htm (July 
15, 2007).  Although Mr. Matheson’s remarks predate the Digest of United States Practice in International Law 
published by the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, there is no indication that his remarks 
were subsequently endorsed by higher officials in the Department of State.  W. Hays Parks, Comments on the 
ICRC Customary Law Study, (Sep. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript at 8 & n. 14, on file with author) 
(revealing “personal knowledge” that “Mr. Matheson spoke in a personal capacity” and that Mr. Matheson’s 
statements were “not cleared by the Department of Defense, and to the best of [Mr. Parks’] knowledge [were] 
not cleared by any other agency.”).  See generally Digest of International Law, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c8183.htm.  Nevertheless, Mr. Matheson’s remarks are routinely cited as representing 
the U.S. view as to which provisions in Additional Protocol I represent customary international law, especially 
by the ICRC Study.  See, e.g., John T. Rawcliffe, Changes to the Department of Defense Law of War Program, 
2006 ARMY LAW. 23, 31 n. 56 (2006) (noting that Mr. Matheson’s remarks “are often cited as to the U.S. 
position regarding Protocols I and II”); Nicholas F. Lancaster, Occupation Law, Sovereignty, and Political 
Transformation:  Should the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention Still be Considered 
Customary International Law?, 189 MIL. L. REV. 51, 64 n. 95 (2006) (citing Mr. Matheson’s remarks as 
supporting the proposition that the majority of the provisions in the Additional Protocols “reflect customary 
international law”); Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. 
Hum. Rts. 1, 2 ¶ 3 (2006) (same); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 11 (same); George H. 
Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 507 (2006) (same); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, 
Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law 
Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 256 n. 108 (2006) (noting that Mr. Matheson’s remarks are “[t]he 
most heavily used piece of academic literature, which is used to assist in the determination of custom” by the 
ICRC Study); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International 
Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1233 & n. 
73 (2005) (citing to Mr. Matheson’s remarks as supporting the view that the United States has led the charge in 
“obstruct[ing] the crystallization of certain rules as customary.”).  Cf. Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary 
Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 820 (2005) (noting that “Additional Protocol I … is also generally 
viewed as conforming broadly with customary international law.”). 
  32 
from the President.  At some point, one could argue that the statements of lesser officials 
should not be considered as contributing to State practice unless those statements are ratified 
or somehow endorsed by more senior officials.118 
Even more difficult than the question of which practice counts in determining a 
particular State’s practice is the question of how consistent does that practice have to be over 
time and across the 194 States in the world.119  The general view on this question is that: 
[t]he practice necessary to create customary law may be of comparatively 
short duration, but … it must be “general and consistent.”  A practice can be 
general even if it is not universally followed … but it should reflect wide 
acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity.  
Failure of a significant number of important states to adopt a practice can 
prevent a principle from becoming general customary law though it might 
become ‘particular customary law’ for the participating states.120 
Thus, while it may not take much time for a new norm of customary international law 
to crystallize,121 it still must be practiced by a sufficient number of States in order to 
                                               
118 See, e.g. Aug. 1 2002 Memo from Jay Bybee, Asst. Atty. Gen’l. to White House Counsel, available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/memos_dir/memo_20020801_JD_%20Gonz_.pdf.  
Contra PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 40 (arguing that since State responsibility attaches 
to the actions of lesser officials as long as they are acting in their official capacity, therefore “the presumption 
must be that acts of officials are acts of State.”).  However State responsibility is not coterminous with State 
practice.  For example, arguably “[a] State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law 
attributable to it.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 530 (Rule 149).  Yet isolated instances of law 
of war violations certainly do not support a conclusion that a particular State has a practice of committing, 
encouraging or condoning the perpetration of war crimes. 
119 Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The 
New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1220 (2005).  See 
generally ICRC, State Parties to Geneva Conventions, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) (listing 194 State parties to the 
Geneva Conventions, which constitutes universal adherence). 
120 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. b.  See also id. at § 102 cmt. e. 
121 Id. at § 102 cmt. b.  The concept of a State’s sovereignty over its “continental shelf as the natural 
prolongation of the land territory of the coastal State,” first proclaimed by President Truman in 1945, is 
generally cited as the paradigmatic example of “instant customary international law” due to the speed with 
which similar claims were made by other coastal States and generally acquiesced to by other States.  Id. at § 102 
reporters’ notes p. 30.  See also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 ¶ 74 
(Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 55 ¶ 77 (June 3); David Turns, Weapons in the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 202 (2006) 
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constitute a “general practice.”122  It especially must be practiced by “important States,”123 
and perhaps even more importantly, it must be practiced by those States which are specially 
affected.124  Once it is determined that there exists a relatively consistent State practice, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
(wondering if the ICRC Study rules differ from their pre-existing norms, but are nevertheless accepted by 
tribunals as dispositive, whether that will be another instance of instant customary law).  For an interesting 
discussion regarding the role of State power in the formation of the customary international law norm 
concerning the continental shelf, and “the Truman Proclamation [as] a classic example of a conscious, 
successful effort to develop a new customary rule,” see generally CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, 
supra note 21, at 39, 90-92. 
122 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. b.  See also id. at § 102 cmt. e; 
DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 6. 
123 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. b.  The implication of the Restatement 
is that the United States is one such “important State,” and that it would be difficult for a new norm of 
customary international law to crystallize without having the support of consistent U.S. State practice.  This 
implication is despite the Restatement’s claimed independence from the U.S. perspective.  See id. at 3.  See also 
Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 244 (2006) (arguing that 
because the statements of non-parties are especially relevant to whether treaty provisions have passed into 
customary international law, “US views on Additional Protocol I are of particular note.”); CUSTOM, POWER AND 
THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 37 (likening the formation of customary international law to the 
“‘gradual formation of a road across vacant land …  Among the users are always some who mark the soil more 
deeply with their footprints than others, either because of their weight, which is to say their power in this world, 
or because their interests bring them more frequently this way.’) (quoting  CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND 
REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (Percy Corbett trans., Princeton University Press 1957) (1957)); 
CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 37 (noting that “[a]mong other things, powerful 
States generally have large, well-financed diplomatic corps which are able to follow international developments 
globally across a wide spectrum of issues.  This enables those States to object, in a timely fashion, to 
developments which they perceive as being contrary to their interests.”); id. at 205.  But cf. THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 24 (noting the difficulties of surveying 194 States for their State 
practice, and “[t]hus,customary international law is usually based on a highly selective survey of state practice 
that includes only major powers and interested states”). 
124 Acceptance of a new norm of customary international law does not require universal acceptance, but 
sufficiently widespread acceptance, particularly by those States specially affected by the proposed norm.  See 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. b; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 75 (2002); DINSTEIN, 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 6; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 
3, 42 ¶ 73 (Feb. 20); infra note 162.  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2-3 (criticizing ICRC 
Study for equating “the practice of States that have relatively little history of participation in armed conflict,” 
and those with a more substantial history of participation in armed conflict, which presumably would include 
the U.S.); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that while the Study purports to 
consider ‘density’ or “the weight[] of relevant items of practice, there is often little or no evidence that this is 
done.  For example, resolutions of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights seem to attract the same weight as 
the legislation or policy statements of specially affected States.”).  Thus, perhaps not too surprisingly, the ICRC 
Study purports to support the idea that “if ‘specially affected States’ do not accept the [customary] practice, it 
cannot mature into a rule of customary international law … .”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 
xxxviii.  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 36, 233; Leah M. Nicholls, The 
Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of 
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still remains to determine whether that practice or custom is followed out of sense of legal 
obligation. 
(B) Opinio Juris Sive Necessitatis 
The second component required for the formation of customary international law, a 
sense of legal obligation or opinio juris, is considered the subjective element,125 because of 
the difficulties inherent in identifying its existence.126  Nevertheless, opinio juris remains the 
essential element of customary international law,127 differentiating it from mere custom or 
                                                                                                                                                 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 240 (2006); Malcolm 
MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC 
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1223 (2005).  Of course, due to 
their broader interests and more frequent activities, “important States” are also more likely to be “specially 
affected” States.  CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 38.  At least two scholars claim 
that the United States is a “specially affected” State with regard to all of international humanitarian law.  
Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1232 (2005).  Moreover, 
“[i]f several ‘States whose interests are specially affected’ object to the formation of a custom, no custom can 
emerge.”  Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. 
Rts. 1, 13 ¶ 25 (2006).  See also Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development 
of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 
1217, 1232-33 (2005) (noting that “[an ICRC Study] rule would be hard, if not impossible, to regard as having 
taken on customary status were a State such as the United States opposed to it; the practice concerned could not 
be said to be representative.”).  Thus, it is possible to argue not only that customary international law norms 
may not form without the consensus or acquiescence of specially affected States, but that it may form with only 
the support of specially affected States.  Oscar Schachter, New Custom:  Power, Opinio Juris, and Contrary 
Practice, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 531, 536-37 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).  Therefore, it is possible to argue that 
customary international law formation relies only on “the behavior of only the more important states.”  George 
Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 555 (2005).  
See also Wrap Up Discussion I, Posting of John Bellinger to Opinio Juris, 
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1169328256.shtml (Jan. 20, 2007, 21:32) (noting that “[customary 
international] law develops largely from the practice of specially affected states, not from commentators, 
statements by non-governmental organizations, or the practice of states with little history of participation in the 
activities in question.”). 
125 DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 5-6; Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary 
International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 132 (2007).  See also THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 94, at 23 (noting that opinio juris is also sometimes called “the ‘psychological’ element”). 
126 See generally CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 130-33; THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 24 (positing that “[o]pinio juris is really a conclusion about a practice’s 
status as international law; it does not explain how a widespread and uniform practice becomes law.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
127 CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 18; THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
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comity:128 
a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free to 
disregard does not contribute to customary law.  A practice initially followed 
by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states 
generally come to believe that they are under a legal obligation to comply 
with it.129 
Thus the difficulty is in proving that the relatively consistent State practice is followed out of 
a sense of legal obligation, versus out of mere courtesy or habit.130 
The ICRC Study notes the difficulty of proving the subjective element of opinio juris: 
 During work on the study it proved very difficult and largely 
theoretical to strictly separate elements of practice and legal conviction.  More 
often than not, one and the same act reflects practice and legal conviction.…  
This is particularly so because verbal acts count as State practice and often 
reflect the legal conviction of the State involved at the same time. 
 When there is sufficiently dense practice, an opinio juris is generally 
contained within that practice and, as a result, it is not usually necessary to 
demonstrate separately the existence of an opinio juris.  Opinio juris plays an 
important role, however, in certain situations where the practice is ambiguous, 
                                                                                                                                                 
supra note 94, at 23. 
128 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at 23; THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 94, at 23.  Contra Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 
119, 128 (2007) (arguing that the only difference between custom and customary international law is that the 
latter has had its legal status recognized by a court).  A paradigmatic example of the difference between mere 
custom and customary international law is the difference between extending diplomatic courtesies to foreign 
dignitaries out of “considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition,” versus providing them with diplomatic 
immunity on the understanding that one’s own diplomatic envoys will likewise enjoy diplomatic immunity (i.e. 
a reciprocal duty).  See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 ¶ 77 (Feb. 
20); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.  See 
generally CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 88-105 (discussing the principle of 
reciprocity in customary international law).  But cf. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 54-
59 (positing that diplomatic immunity is based on a cooperative strategy between States, which is in their long-
term best interests, rather than out of a sense of legal obligation, and that this rational choice model better 
explains “the many deviations from the [diplomatic] immunity rule.”). 
129 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. c. 
130 See generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 reporters’ notes p. 30 (noting 
that the conceptual difficulty of having a sense of legal obligation before the custom has matured into 
customary international law has not prevented acceptance of norms of customary international law); Christiana 
Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 132 (2007) (describing 
customary international law’s “circularity problem”). 
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in order to decide whether or not that practice counts towards the formation of 
custom.131 
Thus, the ICRC Study largely ignores this essential element to the traditional 
formation of customary international law when it posits its 161 proposed rules.132  This is 
particularly troubling, since under the traditional theory, the burden of proving a new norm of 
customary international law is on the proponent of the new norm.133  Next we shall consider 
the degree to which non-State actors play a role in customary international law formation. 
                                               
131 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules,  at xl.  See also CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, 
supra note 21, at 136-41 (discussing the difficulties in separating State practice from opinio juris).  Thus, the 
ICRC Study appears to be following Dean Kirgis’ “sliding scale” of State practice versus opinio juris.  See  
infra note 237 and accompanying text (criticizing Dean Kirgis’ “sliding scale” approach to customary 
international law formation).  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that the 
ICRC Study uses a traditional approach to customary international law formation “until the issue of ambiguous 
practice arises. … [when] it then invokes Kirgis’s ‘sliding scale’ analysis.”).  See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, 
Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146 (1987). 
132 THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 24; DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 
(arguing that “[a] more rigorous approach to establishing opinio juris is required. … the practice volumes 
generally fall short of identifying the level of positive evidence of opinio juris that would be necessary to justify 
concluding that the rules advanced by the Study are part of customary international law and would apply to 
States even in the absence of a treaty obligation.”).  But see International Law Association, Final Report of the 
Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to 
the Formation of General Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf, 40-42 § 19 (2000) [hereinafter ILA Report on CIL] (arguing that 
“the more the [State] practice, the less the need for the subjective element [opinio juris].”); RESTATEMENT OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. c (noting that “[e]xplicit evidence of a sense of legal 
obligation (e.g. by official statements) is not necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from acts or omissions.”). 
133 See generally PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 34; CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT, THE POLITICS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (2004); Ian Brownlie and C.J. Apperley, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry:  Memorandum on 
the International Law Aspects, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 878, 894 (2000); BING BING JIA, THE REGIME OF 
STRAITS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (1998); Philip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law:  
The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 53, 55 (1995) (citing to the Lotus case for the basic 
proposition).  Cf. Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 243 
(2006) (noting that “there is some evidence that in relation to humanitarian law, the standards of proof in 
relation to customary law have been relaxed when compared with other areas of law, particularly by tribunals 
dealing with the matter.”); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 
820 (2005) (same); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 202 (2006) (arguing that “asserting custom without necessarily meeting the 
standards for proving its existence” conflates the lex lata [what the law is] with the lex ferenda [what the law 
ought to be]); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 26, 31 (Sep. 7); Peter Rowe, The Effect 
on National Law of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 165, 
168 (2006). 
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(C) Role of Non-State Actors in Formation of CIL 
The principal actors in international law remain States,134 although non-State actors 
(such as individuals and international organizations) are beginning to exert a great deal of 
influence,135 to assert rights,136 and to fulfill international obligations.137  The relevant 
question in the present context is to what extent non-State actors play a role in the formation 
of customary international law.138 
Since the traditional view still prevails that customary international law is formed by 
a general and consistent State practice followed out of a sense of legal obligation for the 
State,139 the role of non-State actors in the formation of customary international law would 
appear to be rather limited.140  Certainly individuals play a role in the formation of customary 
                                               
134 THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 13; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra 
note 21, at 16-17, 70-71; Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International 
Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 243-44 (2006); Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 4 ¶ 6 (2006).  See also infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing how 
international law is based on State sovereignty and consent).  Contra Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and 
Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 121, 151-168 (2007). 
135 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at 133. 
136 Id. at § 703; Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 
152-53 (2007). 
137 Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello:  The Impact of the ICRC Study 
on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 191-94, 197 (2006).  Note 
that Dieter Fleck was one of the “academic and governmental experts” invited by the ICRC to comment on two 
drafts before the ICRC Study was published.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxii, xxiii, l-li; 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, no. 857, 186 n. 32 (2005) ). 
138 The inverse question is to what extent customary international law can bind non-State actors.  See infra notes 
194, 216 and accompanying text (noting that custom may bind non-State actors to a greater extent than treaty 
law). 
139 Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The 
New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1231 (2005).  See 
supra notes 92-133 (explaining the traditional theory of how customary international law is formed). 
140 But see infra notes 182-188 (discussing the role of the ICRC Study in possibly establishing customary 
international law). 
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international law to the extent their statements and actions are accepted as evidence of State 
practice.141  “Non-governmental organisations have had a great deal of influence on the 
development of some customary rules, especially in the human rights field.”142  International 
(aka intergovernmental) organizations play a role in the formation of customary international 
law143 either to the extent that States express their official views (i.e. opinio juris)144 in 
discussions, debates, and votes on declarations and resolutions,145 or to the extent that the 
                                               
141 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text (discussing which government officials’ statements should 
be considered in evaluating State practice). 
142 CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 86.  But see id. (noting that non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) lack international legal personality, “and are therefore incapable of participating directly 
in the customary [international law formation] process.”  Instead, NGOs either mobilize public pressure to 
influence State practice, or NGOs persuade States directly.  Id.  Note that the ICRC, although a Swiss NGO, 
may be “in a class of its own” since the ICRC does possess international legal personality.  ICRC, The ICRC’s 
status:  in a class of its own, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5w9fjy?opendocument (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) (arguing 
that the ICRC is a hybrid between a “private association [i.e. NGO] formed under the Swiss Civil Code,” and an 
“intergovernmental organization … [because it has] an ‘international legal personality’ … [as well as] 
privileges and immunities”).  Therefore, the ICRC perhaps has a stronger basis for arguing that it can contribute 
directly to the formation of customary international law.  See infra note 305 (noting that the ICRC Study 
considers the “Practice of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement” on par with other 
categories of international practice in Volume II); Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  
The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 232 (2006) (arguing that “the ICRC creates customary law by encouraging 
states to act in a particular way, and then uses those state actions to justify labeling it as customary law.”).  But 
see Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 5 ¶ 
9 (2006) (commenting that despite the ICRC’s unique role in international humanitarian law, it remains a non-
governmental organization (NGO), and that “NGOs, whatever their standing, can never contribute directly 
through their own practice to the creation of customary norms. … The ICRC [may] play[] … the role of a 
catalyst for the evolution of State practice, but no more.”). 
143 Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the ICRC Study 
on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 194 (2006). 
144 CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 40, 135. 
145 See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. 
Rts. 1, 4 ¶ 8 (2006) (commenting that “Member States of an IGO may therefore contribute to State practice 
through their conduct and statements within the fold of the organization.”); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 reporters’ notes p. 31 (including “what states do in or through international 
organizations” as contributing to State practice); id. at § 103 cmt. c & reporters’ notes p. 38 (same); DUNOFF, 
RATNER & WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 74 
(2002) (including the following as evidence of State practice:  “diplomatic contacts and correspondence, public 
statements of government officials, legislative and executive acts, military manuals and actions by military 
commanders, treaties and executive agreements, decisions of international and national courts and tribunals, and 
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declarations and resolutions themselves constitute a compilation of State practice.146  
However, these examples should only serve to re-emphasize the limited, supporting or 
secondary role that non-State actors play in the formation of customary international law.147  
The international legal system is still generally State-centric.148  Less clear is the role of 
treaty law in the formation of customary international law. 
(D) Role of Treaty Law in Formation of CIL 
While it is not uncommon to consider treaty law as distinct from customary 
                                                                                                                                                 
decisions, declarations, and resolutions of international organizations.” 
146 CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 42, 156-57, 170; THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 23 (noting that “[e]ven more controversially, United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions and other nonbinding statements and resolutions by multilateral bodies are often viewed 
as evidence of customary international law.”); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2611 §§ 173-174 
(citing to U.N. General Assembly Resolutions appealing to governments to permit the ICRC to evacuate the 
wounded from areas of conflict).  Cf. Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 
VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 177-78 (2007) (arguing that General Assembly resolutions are at least a source of world 
public opinion, which in her view, should play a role in customary international law formation).  But see 
DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2 (criticizing the ICRC Study for relying on non-binding U.N. 
General Assembly Resolutions); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 254-55 ¶ 70 (July 8) (noting that while General Assembly Resolutions “are not binding, [they] may 
sometimes have normative value … [in] establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio 
juris.”).  However, this remains the practice of the States themselves, not the practice of the international 
organization.  See, e.g. Jan Klabbers, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 231-32 
(2002) (noting that the International Court of Justice came close in its 1971 Namibia opinion to recognizing the 
practice of the U.N. Security Council in treating an abstention as a “concurring vote” in terms of Article 27(3) 
of the U.N. Charter, as customary law, but avoided doing so because “then it would have had to pronounce 
itself on the possibility of customary law developing within the UN to begin with:  Article 108 (the amendment 
article) may militate against such a conclusion.”). 
147 CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 170 (noting that “[g]enerally speaking … 
international organisations remain far less important to the process of customary international law than 
States.”).  Contra Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 
121 (2007); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 400 § 419 (citing to an Amnesty International 
report). 
148 CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 86; Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian 
Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 243-44 (2006).  Contra Christiana Ochoa, 
The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 151 (2007) (criticizing the 
“Westphalian notions of state sovereignty” that underpin traditional customary international law doctrine); id. at 
169 (arguing that “individuals ought to be included in the process of CIL formation”) (emphasis added). 
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international law, 149 they are interrelated (or entangled)150 in a number of ways.151  Certainly, 
if there exist lacunae in a multilateral convention, either in terms of its substantive coverage 
or in terms of its geographic coverage (i.e. the prevalence of non-State parties),152 customary 
international law potentially fills the gaps.153  Customary international law can also serve as 
                                               
149 See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 8; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
supra note 21, at 18; Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional 
Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377, 415-16 (2006); CURTIS A. 
BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS xxiii (2003).  See also 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 526 (2006) (one of the ICRC Study’s authors noting that “[i]t may be true that custom and 
treaty law have a natural tendency to converge to some extent as custom gets codified in treaty form and new 
treaty rules may become customary over time.  But the two sources of international law obviously still remain 
distinct.”). 
150 Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 242 & n. 20 (2006). 
151 See generally ILA Report on CIL, supra note 132, at 42-54 §§ 20-27; DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, 
supra note 3, at 7-9. 
152 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
153 Jordan J. Paust, The Importance of Customary International Law During Armed Conflict, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 601, 603 (2006); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 235-36 (2006); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, 
May 31(3)(c), 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; infra note 209.  For example, aside from Common Article 3, the 
Geneva Conventions do not apply to non-international armed conflicts.  Although Additional Protocol II 
attempts to fill this gap, the U.S. is not a party to that convention.  See Parties to Additional Protocol II, 
available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Cf. 
Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 179-80 (2006) (arguing that 
the law of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts exceeds Common Article 3 and the few articles 
contained in Additional Protocol II).  Thus, customary international law remains relevant to the U.S. in terms of 
non-international armed conflicts.  See infra notes 190-240 and accompanying text (discussing the continued 
relevance of customary international law).  This ability of customary international law to fill the gaps in treaty 
law historically has also been the subject of the Martens Clause, which is often inserted as a sort of savings 
clause in law of war treaties.  See, e.g. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 at pmbl. ¶ 8; Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 63 ¶ 4; 
Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 62 ¶ 4; Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 142 ¶ 4; 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 158 ¶ 4; Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 1 ¶ 2; 
Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at pmbl. ¶ 4.  The ICRC Study avoided discussing the Martens Clause, 
saving it for a “future update.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxx.  At least one author argues 
that the Study’s exclusion of consideration of the Martens Clause “might indicate an underlying structural issue. 
… does the Study ignore the systemic location and the internal relationships between norms?”  PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 18-19.  See also id. at 44 (postulating that the Study’s exclusion of 
consideration of the Martens Clause may have limited “the Study’s ability to engage in a normative assessment 
of [State] practice”). 
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the impetus for negotiating certain treaty provisions,154 with the treaty law “inevitably 
sharpen[ing] the image” or lending “higher resolution” to the pre-existing customary 
international law.155  Yet the fact that customary international law norms have been 
embodied in multilateral conventions “does not mean that they cease to exist and to apply as 
principles of customary law, even as regards countries that are parties to such 
conventions.”156  Finally, treaties “may lead to the creation of customary international law 
when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely 
accepted.”157  As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted: 
There is no doubt that this process [of a treaty provision passing into 
customary international law] is a perfectly possible one and does from time to 
time occur:  it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new 
rules of customary international law may be formed.  At the same time this 
result is not lightly to be regarded as having been attained.158 
                                               
154 See, e.g., ILA Report on CIL, supra note 132, at 43-44 §§ 20-21; DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra 
note 3, at 7; Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 242 (2006).  Cf. 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 reporters’ notes p. 33 (arguing that a declaration 
in an international agreement “that it merely codifies preexisting rules of customary international law … is 
evidence to that effect but is not conclusive on parties to the agreement.”). 
155 DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 9. 
156 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 424 ¶ 73 (Nov. 26); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 93 ¶ 174 (June 27); Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 43, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).  The ICJ noted that “there are no grounds for holding 
that when customary international law is comprised of rules identical to those of treaty law, the latter 
‘supervenes’ the former, so that the customary international law has no further existence of its own.”  Military 
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 95 ¶ 177 (June 27).  See also CUSTOM, POWER AND 
THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 125-26, 171-72.  Cf. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 
21, at § 102 reporters’ notes p. 33 (arguing that “an [international] agreement is ordinarily presumed to 
supplement rather than to replace a customary rule” but that “[m]odification of customary law by agreement is 
not uncommon”). 
157 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102(3).  See also id. at § 102 cmts. f and i. 
158 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 ¶ 71 (Feb. 20); PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that “[t]he assumption that universal participation in a convention 
inescapably transmutes its provisions into customary law cannot lightly be accepted.”).  See also CUSTOM, 
POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 167; David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 203 (2006) (noting that “the 
Study seems to make the transition from treaty to custom – a process traditionally thought of as difficult to 
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Thus, the primary source of customary international law remains a consistent practice and 
opinio juris of States, versus treaty provisions passing into customary international law.159 
 In its 1969 judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case,160 the ICJ clarified two 
essential elements before a treaty provision can be considered to have passed into customary 
international law:  first, the treaty provision has to “be of a fundamentally norm-creating 
character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law.”161  Second, 
the convention must have “very widespread and representative participation … [especially by 
those] States whose interests were specially affected.”162  Moreover, the ICJ noted that: 
over half the States concerned … were or shortly became parties to the 
Geneva Convention, and were therefore presumably, so far as they were 
concerned, acting actually or potentially in the application of the Convention.  
From their action no inference could legitimately be drawn as to the existence 
                                                                                                                                                 
establish – rather too easily.”); id. at 206 (same). 
159 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29-30 ¶ 27 (June 3).  See also Military and Paramilitary 
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97 ¶ 183 (June 27); infra notes 221-222 (noting the difficulty of 
differentiating between State practice consistent with treaty law obligations and State practice which supports a 
new norm of customary international law).  But cf. CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, 
at 169 (arguing that “treaties would seem to be similar to resolutions and declarations [of international 
organizations] as instances of legally relevant State practice.”); THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
94, at 23 (noting that treaties “are often used as evidence of customary international law, but in an inconsistent 
way.”); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 242-44 (2006) 
(noting that although “there is no presumption that a treaty is reflective of customary international law at the 
time of its conclusion … [s]till, a very widely ratified treaty has a considerable ‘pull’ towards acceptance, as 
there is a feeling that if a treaty is very broadly ratified, it represents the general expectations of those states.  
That certainly appears to be the approach taken by international tribunals.”). 
160 The ICJ judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case is generally considered to be a watershed event in 
the consideration of customary international law.  See, e.g. Gulf of Maine (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 293 ¶ 
91 (Oct. 12). 
161 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-42 ¶ 72 (Feb. 20). 
162 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 ¶ 73 (Feb. 20).  See supra note 124 
(discussing the concept of specially affected States).  See also David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 206 (2006) (noting that “[t]he 
effect of the [ICJ’s] approach to this matter is to make it extremely difficult and exceptional for a rule of 
customary law to be created solely on the back of a treaty, without State practice and within a very short time of 
the treaty’s entry into force.”). 
  43 
of a rule of customary international law ….163 
Of course the greatest significance of a treaty provision passing into customary international 
law is its binding nature on all States, especially those States which are not parties to the 
convention, unless those States have persistently objected.164 
A related question is whether customary international law can trump treaty law.165  It 
is, of course, theoretically possible for subsequent customary international law to modify 
some existing treaty obligations,166 although arguably customary international law cannot 
limit provisions of the Geneva Conventions which provide protections to specific groups of 
persons affected by war.167  Moreover, the intention of a significant number of States to 
                                               
163 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 ¶ 76 (Feb. 20) (emphasis added).  
See also ILA Report on CIL, supra note 132, at 46-47 § 24 (same); CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF 
RULES, supra note 21, at 170 (same); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The 
Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 239, 244 (2006) (same); Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State 
(speaking in his personal capacity), Roundtable Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at 
the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of 
Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 
HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 14 (2006) (questioning “whether one can draw conclusions about customary humanitarian 
law from the practice of states, which is basically the implementation of a treaty obligation.”).  See infra notes 
221-222 and accompanying text (arguing that State actions in compliance with treaty obligations do not 
generally provide evidence of State practice in support of a related customary international law norm); note 333 
(discussing Ireland’s and Norway’s domestic legislation, which was passed within a few months before they 
ratified the Additional Protocols. 
164 See infra notes 173-189 (discussing persistent objection). 
165 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the perceived hierarchy between treaty law and 
customary international law). 
166 See generally CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 172-80; infra note 213 and 
accompanying text. 
167 Burrus Carnahan, Principal Contributor to the Report on US practice for the ICRC Study, Roundtable 
Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of 
Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an 
Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 15 (2006) (noting that “[i]f Rule 
108 [of the ICRC Study, denying “combatant or prisoner-of-war status” to mercenaries] is truly a rule of 
customary law, then it applies to all states, including parties to the Geneva Conventions who are not parties to 
Additional Protocol I.  Rule 108 thus implies that specific provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions can be 
altered not only through the amendment process of the conventions themselves, but also through subsequent 
customary practice.”); Burrus M. Carnahan, A “Restatement” of Customary Humanitarian Law?, (Sep. 28, 
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deviate from existing treaty law must be “clearly manifested.”168  State practice supporting 
this customary international law modification of treaty law would have to be sufficiently 
dense, and the concomitant opinio juris sive necessitatis169 would have to be sufficiently 
clear.170  Moreover, examples of customary international law modifying earlier treaty law are 
relatively rare.171  Another rarity is a State persistently objecting to a new norm of customary 
international law.172 
                                                                                                                                                 
2005) (unpublished manuscript at 2-3, on file with author) (arguing that this result “appears to be contrary to the 
fundamental spirit of the Geneva Conventions, which are, according to Common Article 1, to be respected ‘in 
all circumstances,’ and which specifically prohibit special agreements among the parties limiting the personal 
rights granted by the Conventions.”).  See also Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 6 (noting that “[n]o 
special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of [protected persons], as defined by the present 
Convention, not restrict the rights which it confers upon them.”); Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 6 
(same); Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 6 (same); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 21, at art. 7 
(same). 
168 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. j; PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, 
supra note 2, at 7. 
169 See supra notes 92-133 (explaining the traditional theory of customary international law formation).  To 
constitute a norm of international law, not only must there be a fairly consistent State practice, at least by a 
meaningful group of States, but these States must have complied with the practice out of a belief or sense that 
they were legally obligated to do so (i.e. opinio juris).  See, e.g. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra 
note 21, at § 102; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A 
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 75 (2002). 
170 See, e.g. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102. 
171 CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS (2003), at 
xxiv; Daniel Rice & John Dehn, Armed Humanitarian Intervention and International Law:  A Primer for 
Military Professionals, 2007 MIL. REV. 38, 44 (Nov.-Dec. 2007).  The clearest example is the customary 
international law recognizing 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones (based on the 1984 U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea).  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas arts. 55-58, Dec. 10, 1982, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; U.S. Department of State Bureau of 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas, No. 112, United States 
Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims, Mar. 9, 1992, pp. 6-7.  The 1984 U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea modified the earlier 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions, which did not recognize these zones.  
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. j, reporters’ notes p. 33 & Introductory 
Note to Part V.  See also CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 172-74 (discussing this 
and a few other possible examples of customary international law modifying earlier treaty law). 
172 See infra notes 173-189 (discussing persistent objection). 
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(E) Persistent Objection to Formation of CIL 
International law is based on State sovereignty, and hence the consent of States, either 
to enter into treaties, or to abide by customary international law vis-à-vis State practice or 
acquiescence.173  Therefore, “[a] principle of customary law is not binding on a state that 
declares its dissent from the principle during its development,”174 and continues to object to 
the new norm.175  However, “[h]istorically, such [persistent objection] and consequent 
                                               
173 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 10; THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 189; CUSTOM, POWER 
AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 7-8, 14, 88, 106, 142-43, 187-88; CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS xxiii-xxiv (2003); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 8; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 133 ¶ 263 
(June 27); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sep. 7); Leah M. Nicholls, The 
Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 243 (2006).  Cf. Yoram 
Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 12 ¶ 22 
(2006) (noting that “[i]t seems that the concept of consent is not an easy construct for the framers of the [ICRC] 
Study.”).  Contra Jordan Paust, Professor at the University of Houston Law Center, Roundtable Discussion at 
the North American launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 
28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important 
Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 15-16 (2006) (arguing that “customary 
international law is based on general patterns of expectation and practice, and not consent.”); THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 189-93 (arguing that consent is not a real requirement); CUSTOM, 
POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 188 (noting that the requirement of State consent does not 
apply to jus cogens norms, which apply to all States even without their consent, i.e. over their persistent 
objection); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that treaties cannot modify jus 
cogens norms).  See infra note 179 (discussing the interplay between persistent objection and jus cogens 
norms).  See also supra note 5 (discussing the potential that non-State parties could view the ICRC Study’s 
attempt to identify customary international law norms based on the Additional Protocols “as an attempt to 
circumvent the requirement of express consent necessary for a State to be bound by the treaty-based rule.”). 
174 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. b.  See also id. at 18, § 102 cmt. d; THE 
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 25; Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 13 ¶ 24 (2006).  This general rule of a State’s ability to opt 
out of a new norm of customary international law does not apply to jus cogens or peremptory norms, from 
which no derogation is permitted (e.g. genocide, slavery, torture, apartheid, and the U.N. Charter’s prohibition 
on the use of force).  See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53 & 64, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969); CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 12-13, 183-203; 
CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS xxiv (2003); 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmts. h and k, reporters’ notes pp. 33-34; 
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100-01 ¶ 190 (June 27); North Sea 
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-42 ¶ 72 (Feb. 20). 
175 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxix; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 
21, at 103, 143, 180-83; Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of 
International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 
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exemption from a principle that became general customary law has been rare,”176 and States 
eventually abandon their persistent objection claims.177 
The ICRC Study purports to “take[] no view as to whether it is legally possible to be 
a ‘persistent objector’ in relation to customary rules of international humanitarian law,”178 
although it does note that “many authorities believe that this is not possible in the case of 
rules of jus cogens,179 [and that] there are also authorities that doubt the continued validity of 
this doctrine.”180  However, “[t]he [ICRC] Study simply does not consider whether, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
1217, 1224 (2005).  Contra Jordan Paust, Professor at the University of Houston Law Center, Roundtable 
Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of 
Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an 
Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 15-16 (2006) (“disagree[ing] with 
the notion that countries could be ‘persistent objectors’ with respect to customary rules” since “customary 
international law is based on general patterns of expectation and practice, and not consent.”). 
176 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. d.  One possible reason for the relative 
absence of persistent objection is that “the objecting State [is] at a disadvantage, since it can neither freeze the 
state of general customary international law so as to benefit itself, nor take advantage of any benefits the new 
rule may offer.”  CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 103. 
177 CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 104 (discussing the reasons provided by the 
U.S., U.K. and Japan in abandoning their persistent objection to the development of a twelve nautical mile 
territorial sea); id. (discussing the Soviet Union’s abandonment of its persistent objection to the doctrine of 
restrictive State immunity); id. at 105 (noting that “[t]he principle of reciprocity … operates to discourage 
persistent objection” and “no State, not even the most powerful, persistently objects for an indefinite period of 
time.”); id. at 181 (revealing that “[t]here appears to be no evidence of any State having persistently objected to 
a customary rule for an indefinite period of time.”); Michael Matheson, Professor at the George Washington 
University Law School, Roundtable Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at the 
American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of 
Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 
HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 15 (2006) (declaring that “neither the United States, nor any other major military power, can 
effectively protect its interests or advance international law generally by confining itself to the role of a 
perpetual dissenter.”). 
178 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxix.  See David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 207 (2006) (arguing that the 
ICRC’s position on persistent objection “damages its credibility”). 
179  See supra note 179 (discussing jus cogens norms). 
180 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxix; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 
21, at 103 (noting that “many States appear reluctant to recognise the rights of persistent objectors.”).  See also 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that the ICRC Study gives short shrift to the 
concept of persistent objection because “some doubt is said to exist about the validity of the doctrine” despite 
“custom, as in the case of treaties, requir[ing] the consent of States.”); id. at 34 (same). 
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principle, States not party to Additional Protocol I could qualify as persistent objectors to any 
supervening customary law arising from its provisions.”181 
Considering the ICRC Study itself as a potential source of customary international 
law, the concepts of State consent and persistent objection intersect with the role of non-State 
actors in the formation of customary international law.182  Although the ICRC is 
presumptively a Swiss non-governmental organization (NGO),183 the ICRC Study may have 
a substantial impact on the formation of customary international law,184 especially if its rules 
                                               
181 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 34.  Cf. Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, 
An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1233 (2005) (noting that the U.S. and Israel have voiced their 
opposition to Article 44(3) of Additional Protocol I, and therefore presumably would also object to ICRC Study 
Rule 106).  But cf. DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, (objecting to ICRC Study Rules 31, 45, 78 and 157, 
but not to 106); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International 
Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1234 (2005) 
(arguing that one of the reasons States may not yet have officially responded to the ICRC Study is that they 
“may believe that if they object only to some of the rules but not to others, they will indirectly confirm the 
latter’s customary status, which status may rebound to the disadvantage of their national interest in some way 
later on.”) (emphasis in original). 
182 See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text (discussing the role of non-State actors in the formation of 
customary international law). 
183 See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that “the Study is fundamentally 
the work of a non-governmental institution.”); Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 5 ¶ 9 (2006) (commenting that despite the ICRC’s unique 
role in international humanitarian law, it remains a non-governmental organization (NGO), and that “NGOs, 
whatever their standing, can never contribute directly through their own practice to the creation of customary 
norms. … The ICRC [may] play[] … the role of a catalyst for the evolution of State practice, but no more.”).  
But see ICRC, The ICRC’s status:  in a class of its own, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5w9fjy?opendocument (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) (arguing 
that the ICRC is a hybrid between a “private association [i.e. NGO] formed under the Swiss Civil Code,” and an 
“intergovernmental organization … [because it has] an ‘international legal personality’ … [as well as] 
privileges and immunities”); Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International 
Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 227-28 (2006) (arguing that the ICRC “is a sort of monarch in the realm of IHL” because 
of the way in which it operates). 
184 See PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 17 (observing that “while the Study is not an 
‘official’ (State sponsored) codification of customary international humanitarian law, given the role and 
responsibilities of the ICRC in relation to international humanitarian law, it is undoubtedly a quasi-official 
codificatory text”). 
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are widely viewed as accurately reflecting norms of customary international law.185  If so, is 
the sole U.S. response186 to the ICRC Study sufficient to qualify the U.S. as a persistent 
objector, at least with regards to those few rules mentioned in the U.S. response?187  Or is the 
United States a “specially affected State” or perhaps an “important State,” without whose 
agreement the ICRC Study rules cannot crystallize into customary international law?188 
Next we shall consider the continued relevance of customary international law in the 
area of the law of armed conflict, aspects of which have been regulated since antiquity.189 
                                               
185 See infra notes 513-522 (discussing the inevitability that the ICRC Study will be used as a reference for 
customary international law).  Cf. Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 247 (2006) (noting that “[i]f the international community regards these [ICRC 
Study] rules as being a reasonable articulation of what IHL ought to be [lex ferenda], it will cite to them 
frequently, and over time, the ICRC’s list will probably become law through precedent.”). 
186 Although there have been a few articles written about the ICRC Study, and even a book offering its 
perspectives on the ICRC Study, as of the date of this writing, the United States is the only State to publicly 
respond to the ICRC Study.  See supra note 7 (discussing the articles written about the ICRC Study, as well as 
the book “Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law”).  See generally 
supra note 8 (discussing how the U.S. is the only State to thus far respond to the ICRC Study). 
187 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 1, attachment p. 7 (statements evidencing the intent of the U.S. to 
persistently object to the ICRC Study’s findings).  See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing 
whether or not the United States can qualify as a persistent objector to the ICRC Study rules depends on 
whether the ICRC Study’s publication of its 161 rules itself represents the crystallization of these new norms, in 
which case the U.S. objection may be considered timely, or whether the ICRC Study is correct that it merely 
represents a “‘photograph’ of customary international humanitarian law as it stands today,” in which case it is 
too late for the United States’ objections to the rules to qualify the United States as a persistent objector to 
them).  But see Posting of Marko Milanovic to Opinio Juris, 
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1178652249.shtml#3684 (May 9, 2007, 01:54) (arguing that the DOS/DoD 
letter does not raise persistent objection to the ICRC Study as much as it implies that certain rules do not exist 
whatsoever). 
188 Supra note 124 (noting that at least two scholars claim that the United States is a “specially affected” State 
with regard to all of international humanitarian law, and therefore that “[an ICRC Study] rule would be hard, if 
not impossible, to regard as having taken on customary status were a State such as the United States opposed to 
it; the practice concerned could not be said to be representative.”).  See supra notes 123-124, 162 (discussing 
the concepts of “specially affected States” and “important States”). 
189 Gregory P. Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 
176, 177 (2000).  See generally James P. Benoit, The Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 53 
NAVAL L. REV. 259, 264-310 (2006). 
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(F) Continued Relevance of CIL in the Area of the Law of War 
The law of armed conflict190 is an area of international law that is particularly well-
regulated by treaty.191  Yet customary international law retains its utility192 for at least six 
reasons. 
First, not all treaties enjoy universal adherence, such as the Geneva Conventions,193 
and customary international law binds all States, even non-parties,194 with the possible 
exception195 of States which have persistently objected.196  “Customary international law is 
therefore a means for achieving the universal application of principles of international 
                                               
190 See supra note 3 (explaining that the Law Of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is synonymous with the Law Of War 
(LOW), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and jus in bello (i.e. the regulation of the conduct of hostilities 
during the course of war). 
191 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 6. 
192 Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The 
New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1219 (2005).  See also 
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 21 (arguing that customary international law retains its 
important role, even in areas, like the laws of war, where treaties have proliferated, because “[i]t provides 
interpretive presumptions, it extends treaty norms to nonsignatories, and it influences efforts to expand treaty 
regimes.”); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing that even though “treaties 
encompass much of LOIAC [Law of International Armed Conflict] … no single treaty – and no cluster of 
treaties – purports to cover the whole span of LOIAC.  Hence, customary international law remains of immense 
significance.”); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 817 (2005) 
(observing “that, at least in the field of humanitarian law, customary law continues to thrive and to depend in 
significant measure on the traditional assessment of both state practice and opinio juris.”). 
193 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that every State has either ratified or acceded to the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949). 
194 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at x; PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 6-7; 
CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 4; THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 94, at 21; Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International 
Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1220 
(2005). 
195 See supra notes 178-180 (expressing the ICRC Study’s doubt regarding the continued validity of the 
persistent objection doctrine). 
196 See supra notes 173-189 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of persistent objection). 
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humanitarian law, and notably of those enshrined in the Additional Protocols.”197  Thus, 
States which are non-parties to the Additional Protocols198 will be especially affected by the 
crystallization of custom in this area,199 and therefore most affected by the ICRC Study’s 
proposed rules on customary international humanitarian law.200  These non-party States to the 
Additional Protocols, are a venerable “‘Who’s Who’ of many of the States that have been 
engaged in conflicts over the past 30 years.”201  Yet surprisingly, only the United States has 
yet to officially respond to the ICRC Study.202 
A second and related justification for the continued relevance of customary 
international law in this area is that while the rules for international armed conflict are 
                                               
197 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 6.  See supra note 34 (questioning whether this was the 
real impetus behind the ICRC conducting its Study). 
198 See infra note 201 (listing the non-parties to the Additional Protocols); ICRC Website, parties to Additional 
Protocol I, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 
2007); id., parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
199 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
200 Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The 
New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1220-21 (2005).  
Another, perhaps related, group of States which will be equally affected by the ICRC Study’s proposed rules are 
those States which continue to distinguish between the law of war applicable to international vs. non-
international armed conflicts, since the vast majority of the ICRC Study rules purport to apply equally to both 
types of conflict.  Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International 
Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1230-31 & 
n. 63 (2005); supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that the vast majority of the ICRC Study rules 
purport to apply equally to international and non-international armed conflicts). 
201 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 7.  Although 167 States as of the time of this writing 
are now party to Additional Protocol I, and 163 States are party to Additional Protocol II, there are some 
potentially important States which are not party to either, such as Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and the 
United States.  See George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on 
behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505 (2006); ICRC Website, 
parties to Additional Protocol I, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007); id., parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
202 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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particularly robust, the related rules for non-international armed conflict are not nearly so 
robust.203  Yet the ICRC claims that State practice (i.e. the objective element of customary 
international law)204 in non-international armed conflicts goes beyond the “most rudimentary 
set of rules” contained only in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol II.205  Thus, the ICRC would attempt to bootstrap all of the international law of 
armed conflict onto non-international armed conflicts by means of its study on customary 
                                               
203 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at x; PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 7; 
Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1221 (2005).  Cf. Dieter 
Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 179-80 (2006) (noting that 
the law of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts exceeds Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II, “but that specific problems of compliance and enforcement, in particular with respect to non-state 
actors, remain unsolved.”); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder 
to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as one of the co-authors of the ICRC 
Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether customary international law provides 
a more detailed framework for non-international armed conflicts.”). 
204 See supra notes 107-124 and accompanying text (discussing the State practice element of customary 
international law formation). 
205 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at x.  Common Article 3 itself is thought to represent customary 
international law.  Id. at 299, 306-19 (Rules 87 to 90); Jordan J. Paust, The Importance of Customary 
International Law During Armed Conflict, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 601, 601 (2006); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103-05 ¶¶ 218-220 (June 27).  Some authors argue that 
perhaps all of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions may reflect customary international law.  Theodor 
Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 819 (2005) (noting that “the 
customary law character of … practically [] the entire corpus of the Geneva Conventions, is now taken for 
granted and virtually never questioned.”); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an 
Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 506 
(2006) (noting that it is “impossible to suggest that the Protocol, like the 1949 Geneva Conventions, should be 
considered to represent as a whole a codification of customary international humanitarian law.”).  At least one 
author even considers the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to be jus cogens norms.  Burrus M. Carnahan, 
A “Restatement” of Customary Humanitarian Law?, (Sep. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript at 4, on file with 
author).  See supra note 179 (discussing jus cogens norms).  Contra PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra 
note 2, at 32 (doubting that the Geneva Convention III Article 119 duty to permit repatriated prisoners of war to 
carry 25 kilograms of personal effects and baggage, or the Article 26 duty to permit the use of tobacco have 
achieved customary international law norm status); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 455 (noting 
that customary international law deviates from Geneva Convention III in terms of not repatriating or releasing 
detained personnel until the ICRC can interview the protected persons in private to learn their wishes).  Cf. 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 28 (requiring “[c]anteens shall be installed in all camps, where 
prisoners of war may procure foodstuffs, soap and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily use.”); id. at arts. 60, 
62 (discussing pay given to prisoners of war in Swiss franc equivalents).   
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international humanitarian law.206 
The third and final reason for the continued relevance of customary international law 
offered by ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger207 in his introduction to the ICRC Study, is 
that customary international law can aid in the interpretation of treaty law.208  Thus, 
presumably customary international law either helps fill in the interstices in treaty law,209 or 
perhaps adds a gloss on treaty provisions over time. 
The recently published book “Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law”210 posits three additional reasons why customary 
international law remains relevant, as well as a number of caveats.  Thus, the fourth reason 
that customary international law remains relevant in the area of the law of armed conflict is 
                                               
206 See generally Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. 
Hum. Rts. 1, 3 ¶ 4, 14 (2006) (questioning whether the real impetus for the ICRC Study was an effort to claim 
that the provisions in Additional Protocol I had achieved the status of customary international law); David 
Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 201, 236 (2006) (same); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an 
Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505-06 
(2006) (same); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 833 (2005) 
(same); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2,  at 9 (noting that the ICRC Study rules rely heavily 
on the treaty provisions of Additional Protocol I).  Contra Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as 
one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether 
customary international law provides a more detailed framework for non-international armed conflicts.  In fact, 
the ICRC preferred to be mandated to prepare a report on non-international armed conflicts only but that was 
unacceptable to some States at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and so the 
organization was asked to look at both types of armed conflict…. The clarification of the customary status of 
the provisions of Additional Protocol I was therefore a less pressing need than the clarification of the customary 
rules applicable in non-international armed conflicts.”). 
207 ICRC, About the ICRC, Structure, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/icrc-
presidency-article-010106?opendocument (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
208 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at x; PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 7; 
CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 4; THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 94, at 21. 
209 David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 201, 235-36 (2006).  See also supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
210 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2. 
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that customary international law may be self-executing211 in the domestic sphere, whereas 
treaty law often requires subsequent domestic legislation implementing the treaty provisions 
in order to be effective within States.212 
A fifth reason that customary international law remains important is that customary 
international law theoretically may trump prior inconsistent treaty law.213  However, there is 
some disagreement as to whether treaty law is on a higher plane than customary international 
law.214  In any event, instances of customary international law superseding prior inconsistent 
treaty law are relatively rare.215 
The sixth proffered reason that customary international law remains significant is that 
custom may bind non-State actors to a greater extent than treaty law.216  Other reasons may 
                                               
211 Under the rubric of State consent, “it is ordinarily for the United States to decide how it will carry out its 
international obligations.  Accordingly, the intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to 
be self-executing in the United States or should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or 
administrative action.”  RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 111 cmt. h. 
212 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 7.  See also id. at 22 (arguing that “[t]he convergence of 
international humanitarian and international criminal law gives an additional reason for simplicity.  To respect 
the nullem crimen sine lege principle, a degree of clarity is required to enable those subject to the rules to know 
how to act within the law and thus avoid individual criminal responsibility.”).  But see id. at 9 (noting that 
imprecise customary international law “may be ill-suited to interpretation and application by municipal courts 
and as a foundation for individual criminal responsibility.”); Peter Rowe, The Effect on National Law of the 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 165, 170 (2006) (arguing 
that “it is difficult to accept that customary international law should, without more, establish crimes in common 
law states.”). 
213 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 7; Peter Rowe, The Effect on National Law of the 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 165, 173 (2006); supra note 
166 and accompanying text.  Cf. supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing how customary 
international law may not be able to limit protections given by the Geneva Conventions). 
214 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting the disagreement between whether treaty law and 
customary international law are on the same tier of international law or not).  One notable exception is jus 
cogens norms, which cannot be derogated from via treaty.  See supra note 179 (discussing jus cogens norms). 
215 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
216 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 8; Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An 
Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1220-21 (2005).  See supra notes 134-148 (discussing the role of 
non-State actors in the formation of customary international law).  Cf. Dieter Fleck, International 
  54 
exist for the continued relevance of customary international law in the area of the law of 
armed conflict, but these six certainly suffice as a justifiable basis for the ICRC conducting 
its Study of customary international humanitarian law,217 and for the present Article’s 
consideration of the three ICRC Study rules pertaining to the treatment of the wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked.218 
One caveat that flows from these six justifications for the continued relevancy of 
customary international law is that: 
we must be hesitant about engaging in the crystallisation of custom simply 
with the object of remedying the defect of the non-participation by States in a 
treaty regime.  If States have objections to particular treaty-based rules, those 
objections will subsist as regards the formulation of the rules in a customary 
format.219 
Thus, merely positing that a particular rule has become a norm of customary international 
law does not remove objections to provisions of particular treaties.220 
                                                                                                                                                 
Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 179-80 (2006) (noting that the law of war applicable to 
non-international armed conflicts exceeds Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, “but that specific 
problems of compliance and enforcement, in particular with respect to non-state actors, remain unsolved.”); 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s 
main interest … was precisely in seeing whether customary international law provides a more detailed 
framework for non-international armed conflicts.”). 
217 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 8.  See also CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF 
RULES, supra note 21, at 221. 
218 See supra notes 241-378 (evaluating proposed Rule 109:  Duty to Search For, Collect and Evacuate the 
Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked), supra notes 379-455 (evaluating proposed Rule 110:  Duty to Care 
For the Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked), and supra notes 456-497 (evaluating proposed Rule 111:  
Duty to Protect the Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked). 
219 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 7. 
220 See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that “[p]articularly when heavy 
reliance is placed on treaties to which a number of States are not parties, initiatives to derive customary rules 
may be seen as an attempt to circumvent the requirement of express consent necessary for a State to be bound 
by the treaty-based rule.”); id. at 9-10 (same).  Of course, this raises the question of whether a State’s expressed 
objections to particular treaty provisions survive as expressions of persistent objection against new norms of 
customary international law.  “Can States be expected to accept as customary that which they have rejected as a 
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 A second caveat to the study of customary international law norms vis-à-vis treaty 
law provisions is that it is difficult to argue that State practice consistent with treaty law 
supports a new norm of customary international law when that State is a party to the treaty 
and is merely effectuating its treaty law obligations:221  “the behaviour of [State parties], and 
the opinio juris which it might otherwise evidence, is surely explained by their being bound 
by the [treaty] itself.”222  The ICRC Study supposedly: 
                                                                                                                                                 
conventional obligation?”  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 34.  See supra note 173 and 
accompanying text (discussing how international law is based on State sovereignty, and hence the consent of 
States, either to enter into treaties, or to abide by customary international law vis-à-vis State practice or 
acquiescence); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that “custom, as in the case of 
treaties, requires the consent of States.”); notes 173-189 (discussing persistent objection); note 34 (discussing 
whether the real impetus for the ICRC Study was an effort to claim that provisions in the Additional Protocols 
had achieved the status of customary international law).  Contra Jordan Paust, Professor at the University of 
Houston Law Center, Roundtable Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at the American 
University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The 
Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 15-
16 (2006) (“disagree[ing] with the notion that countries could be ‘persistent objectors’ with respect to 
customary rules” since “customary international law is based on general patterns of expectation and practice, 
and not consent.”). 
221 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 8, 402; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & 
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 ¶ 76 (Feb. 20); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that “[r]eliance 
on provisions of military manuals designed to implement treaty rules provides only weak evidence that those 
treaty rules apply as a matter of customary international law in non-treaty contexts.”); supra note 163 and 
accompanying text.  See also ILA Report on CIL, supra note 132, at 46-47 § 24; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE 
POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 170; Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The 
Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 239, 244 (2006).  Contra ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xliv (noting that it did not 
limit “itself to the practice of States not party to the relevant treaties of international humanitarian law” because 
this “would not comply with the requirement that customary international law be based on widespread and 
representative practice.”); id., Vol. II:  Practice, at 2537 (explaining the ICRC Study’s decision not to examine 
State practice in treating captured combatants as prisoners of war “because the Third Geneva Convention is 
considered to be part of customary international law [presumably in toto]”).  See supra note 205 and 
accompanying text (discussing whether all of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions can be considered to 
also represent norms of customary international law as well). 
222 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 531 (June 27) (Jennings, J., dissenting).  
See also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 ¶ 76 (Feb. 20) (noting that for 
States which were acting consistent with their treaty obligations, “[f]rom their action no inference could 
legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary international law”); ILA Report on CIL, supra 
note 132, at 46-47 § 24; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 170; DOS/DoD Letter to 
ICRC, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that “one … must be cautious in drawing conclusions as to opinio juris from 
the practice of States that are parties to conventions, since their actions often are taken pursuant to their treaty 
obligations, particularly inter se, and not in contemplation of independently binding customary international law 
norms.”); id. at 5 n. 5 (“Even universal adherence to a treaty does not necessarily mean that the treaty’s 
provisions have become customary international law, since such adherence may have been motivated by the 
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takes the cautious approach that widespread ratification [of a treaty] is only an 
indication [of customary international law] and has to be assessed in relation 
to other elements of practice, in particular the practice of States not party to 
the treaty in question. … Contrary practice of States not party [to a treaty], 
however, has been considered as important negative evidence [of a lack of 
customary international law]. … 
This Study has not, however, limited itself to the practice of States not 
party to the relevant treaties of international humanitarian law.  To limit the 
study to a consideration of th[is] practice … would not comply with the 
requirement that customary international law be based on widespread and 
representative practice.223 
Thus the ICRC Study avoids the Baxter paradox224 by not limiting itself to consideration of 
the practice of non-State parties.225  In doing so, it deviates from the traditional approach to 
                                                                                                                                                 
belief that, absent the treaty, no rule applied.”).  Cf. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 
102 cmt. i (noting that State practice consistent with treaty based obligations arguably still constitutes State 
practice, and thus can contribute to customary international law, particularly for a multilateral treaty “designed 
for adherence by states generally, [which] is widely accepted, and is not rejected by a significant number of 
important states.”).  But see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99-100 ¶ 188 
(June 27) (deducing an opinio juris as to the Article 2(4) prohibition against the use of armed force from the 
attitude of U.N. State parties to General Assembly resolutions which restated this prohibition). 
223 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xliv (emphasis added).  Contra PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, at 33 (arguing that the ICRC Study’s logic is circular, since it assumes “that customary 
norms should conform to the provisions of the Protocols, and thus privileging the views of States parties who 
are, in any case, bound conventionally.”). 
224 The “Baxter Paradox” is that: 
[a]s the number of parties to a treaty increases, it becomes more difficult to demonstrate what 
is the state of customary international law dehors the treaty …  As the express acceptance of 
the treaty increases, the number of States not parties whose practice is relevant diminishes.  
There will be less scope for the development of international law dehors the treaty. 
Richard R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 27, 73 (1970).  See also id. at 64, 96 
(discussing the Baxter Paradox; PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 33 (same); Theodor 
Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 833 & nn. 118-119 (2005) (same); 
CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 170-71, 179 (same); George H. Aldrich, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 512 (2006) (noting that the authors of the ICRC Study “avoid conditions 
they find troubling [which] can only increase skepticism about their conclusions on other topics.”). 
225 Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 235 & n. 
82 (2006) (citing to Rule 108, which uses the Additional Protocol I definition of mercenaries, as revealing that 
“[t]he ICRC believes that some parts of [Additional] Protocol [I] state customary law even though there is a 
lack of practice in conformity with the Protocol by states who are not parties.”); Burrus Carnahan, Principal 
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customary international law formation, as followed by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf case.226 
A third caveat to the study of customary international law is that an imprecise227 norm 
of customary international law will necessarily rely on a related but more complex treaty 
provision.228  Aside from the issue of whether State practice consistent with the treaty can be 
used as evidence of State practice to support a customary international law norm,229 there 
exists the issue of how to interpret and apply a customary international law norm that differs 
from the related treaty provision.230  Has the new customary international law norm 
supplanted the inconsistent, but more complex treaty law provision?231  Or do the two 
different rules apply to different spheres of conduct depending on whether the particular 
                                                                                                                                                 
Contributor to the Report on US practice for the ICRC Study, Roundtable Discussion at the North American 
launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina 
Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International 
Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 15 (2006) (criticizing the ICRC Study for elevating a regional sub-
Saharan African policy that considers mercenaries as unlawful combatants “to the status of universal, customary 
law”); Burrus M. Carnahan, A “Restatement” of Customary Humanitarian Law?, (Sep. 28, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript at 1-3, on file with author) (same).  But see Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the 
Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 244 (2006) (arguing that because the statements of non-parties are especially 
relevant to whether treaty provisions have passed into customary international law, “US views on Additional 
Protocol I are of particular note.”). 
226 Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 10-
11 ¶ 19 (2006); supra note 163 and accompanying text.  See generally North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. 
Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).  Cf. Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 817, 833 (2005) (questioning the presence of “any alternative; consideration only of the practice of 
nonparties would be either meaningless or at least nonrepresentative of state practice generally.”). 
227 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
228 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 9. 
229 See supra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text. 
230 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 9. 
231 See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text. 
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State and the particular conduct in question is regulated by the treaty?232 
Although the ICRC Study generally posits the traditional theory of customary 
international law formation,233 at best “[t]he Study’s account of the concept of customary 
international law underlying its conclusions is almost telegraphically concise,”234 and at 
worst, it employs a far less stringent methodology.235  The ICRC Study’s relaxed 
methodology in determining the crystallization of customary international law is based on at 
least two intellectual shortcuts:236  first, the Study’s adoption of Dean Kirgis’ ‘sliding scale’ 
of opinio juris versus State practice,237 and second, the Study’s overemphasis on the practice 
                                               
232 See supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text (discussing the application of treaty provisions in the law of 
armed conflict to non-international armed conflicts vis-à-vis related customary international law norms). 
233 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxi-xlv.  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra 
note 2, at 24, 402.  Cf. id. at 26 (noting that the ICRC Study uses a traditional approach to customary 
international law formation “until the issue of ambiguous practice arises. … [when] it then invokes Kirgis’s 
‘sliding scale’ analysis.”).  See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146 
(1987). 
234 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 23. 
235 See supra note 55 (listing numerous criticisms of the ICRC Study’s methodology). 
236 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 27. 
237 Id. at 27-29.  Dean Kirgis essentially argues that seemingly irreconcilable ICJ opinions, which appear to 
fluctuate between stressing opinio juris at the expense of State practice and vice versa, “can be reconciled, 
however, if one views the elements of custom not as fixed and mutually exclusive, but as interchangeable along 
a sliding scale.”  Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 148-49 (1987).  Thus,  
[o]n the sliding scale, very frequent, consistent state practice establishes a customary rule 
without much (or any) affirmative showing of an opinio juris, so long as it is not negated by 
evidence of non-normative intent. As the frequency and consistency of the practice decline in 
any series of cases, a stronger showing of an opinio juris is required. At the other end of the 
scale, a clearly demonstrated opinio juris establishes a customary rule without much (or any) 
affirmative showing that governments are consistently behaving in accordance with the 
asserted rule. 
Id. at 149.  See also Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of 
International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 
1217, 1223 (2005).  Contra Rosalyn C. Higgins, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE 
USE IT 21 (1994) (arguing that Dean Kirgis’ approach raises the issue of “higher normativity,” which must rely 
on a sort of individual ethnocentrism, as well as on natural law).  Judge Rosalyn Higgins is presently the 
President of the ICJ.  International Court of Justice, The Court, Presidency, available at http://www.icj-
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of State parties to the relevant conventions.238 
The next section evaluates the three ICRC Study rules regarding the wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked against the traditional theory of customary international law formation as a 
benchmark.239  The discussion of even these three seemingly innocuous provisions reveals 
that the ICRC Study rules are not sustainable under the traditional theory of how customary 
                                                                                                                                                 
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=3 (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, 
supra note 2, at 28-29 (criticizing Dean Kirgis’ doctrine, because “[t]he normative canonization of propositions 
on the basis of restricted practice raises an obvious danger of the consolidation of norms whose implications 
have not been fully thought out or thought through.”); CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 
21, at 136-37 (calling Kirgis’ sliding scale explanations “flawed”); THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 94, at 24 (noting that the occasional practice of inferring opinio juris “from the existence of a widespread 
behavioral regularlity … makes opinio juris redundant with the state practice requirement, which, by 
assumption, is insufficient by itself to establish customary international law.”); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, 
supra note 3, at 2 (noting that “the Study tends to merge the practice and opinio juris requirements into a single 
test. …  We do not believe that this is an appropriate methodological approach. … we do not agree that opinio 
juris can be inferred from practice.”); Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State 
(speaking in his personal capacity), Roundtable Discussion at the North American launch of the ICRC Study at 
the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of 
Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International Humanitarian Law, 13 
HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 14 (2006) (expressing skepticism “whether one can rely heavily on the density of practice 
approach.”). 
238 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 29-36; supra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying 
text.  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 31 (noting that although “there is an 
increasing tendency by both governments and international lawyers to view multilateral treaty provisions as 
customary, the International Court [of Justice] has rejected the existence of a legal presumption to this effect.”); 
id. at 34 (arguing that “[t]he approach adopted by the Study appears to reverse the burden of proof of customary 
law, making the [Additional] Protocols presumptively customary as opposed to merely conventional.”).  Cf. 
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2537 (explaining the ICRC Study’s decision not to examine 
State practice in treating captured combatants as prisoners of war “because the Third Geneva Convention is 
considered to be part of customary international law [presumably in toto]”).  Thus, the ICRC Study claims that 
every element of every provision of the Geneva Convention III has crystallized into customary international 
law—a bold statement indeed.  See PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 32 (doubting that the 
Geneva Convention III Article 119 duty to permit repatriated prisoners of war to carry 25 kilograms of personal 
effects and baggage, or the Article 26 duty to permit the use of tobacco have achieved customary international 
law norm status); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 455 (noting that customary international law 
deviates from Geneva Convention III in terms of not repatriating or releasing detained personnel until the ICRC 
can interview the protected persons in private to learn their wishes).  Cf. Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, 
at art. 28 (requiring “[c]anteens shall be installed in all camps, where prisoners of war may procure foodstuffs, 
soap and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily use.”); id. at arts. 60, 62 (discussing pay given to prisoners of 
war in Swiss franc equivalents).  But see supra note 205 and accompanying text (arguing that the Geneva 
Conventions represent customary international law in toto). 
239 See supra notes 241-378 (evaluating proposed Rule 109:  Duty to Search For, Collect and Evacuate the 
Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked), supra notes 379-455 (evaluating proposed Rule 110:  Duty to Care 
For the Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked), and supra notes 456-497 (evaluating proposed Rule 111:  
Duty to Protect the Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked). 
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international law is formed.240 
 
IV. ICRC Rules Regarding the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
(A) Rule 109:  Duty to Search For, Collect and Evacuate the Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked 
Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement, 
each party to the conflict must, without delay, take all possible measures to 
search for, collect and evacuate the wounded, sick and shipwrecked without 
adverse distinction. 
The ICRC Study recognizes that the obligation espoused by proposed Rule 109 “is an 
obligation of means.  Each party to the conflict has to take all possible measures241 to search 
for, collect and evacuate the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.  This includes permitting 
humanitarian organizations to assist in their search and collection.”242  Thus the ICRC Study 
                                               
240 While some of the concerns raised below may appear to be prosaic, others may have serious consequences, 
especially if the ICRC Study rules become binding on non-parties to the Additional Protocols as norms of 
customary international law.  See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.  Cf. DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, 
supra note 3, at 1, attachment p. 7 (statements evidencing the intent of the U.S. to persistently object to the 
ICRC Study’s findings).  But see Posting of Marko Milanovic to Opinio Juris, 
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1178652249.shtml#3684 (May 9, 2007, 01:54) (arguing that the DOS/DoD 
letter does not raise persistent objection to the ICRC Study as much as it implies that certain rules do not exist 
whatsoever).  Moreover, even apparently prosaic concerns may either reveal persistent cracks in the Study’s 
methodology, or may widen into fault lines into which the purported rules disappear altogether. 
241 See infra notes 341-342 and accompanying text (discussing how the language “take all possible measures” is 
identical to that found in the related articles of the first and second Geneva Conventions.  Cf. ICRC STUDY, 
supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 with Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1 and Geneva 
Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1. 
242 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 398 (emphasis in original).  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, 
supra note 3, at attachment pp. 1-6 (questioning obligation of States to permit humanitarian organizations, such 
as the ICRC, to conduct their business without explicit permission).  But see ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  
Rules, at 398 (“It is clear that in practice humanitarian organizations will need permission from the party in 
control of a certain area to carry out such activities, but such permission must not be denied arbitrarily (see also 
commentary to Rule 55).”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 196-97, Vol. II:  Practice, at 1205 § 
539; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 527-28 (2006); ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 § 2805 (Claude Pilloud, Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987) [hereinafter AP COMMENTARY]. 
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has built into its proposed rule a notion of military feasibility.243  The ICRC Study also 
professes that this is a customary international law norm “applicable to both international and 
non-international armed conflicts.”244 
The key issues with regard to proposed Rule 109 would appear to be:  the obligations 
owed to combatants versus civilians;245 the obligations to search for and collect the wounded, 
sick and shipwrecked in non-international armed conflicts;246 the temporal distinction 
between when the obligation arises on land versus at sea to search for and collect the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked;247 the treatment of wounded, sick and shipwrecked without 
adverse distinction;248 and the claimed dearth of contrary State practice as support for the 
proffered norm.249  Each of these issues will be discussed in turn. 
International Armed Conflicts—Combatants vs. Civilians.  The first point of 
departure between the proposed Rule 109 and existing treaty law obligations is whether or 
not civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked are entitled to the same protections as combatant 
                                               
243 Although this nod to military feasibility is implicit in the ICRC Study, it is explicit in the Geneva 
Conventions.  See, e.g. Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at 
art. 18; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 16, ¶ 2.  See also PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra 
note 5, at 132 (noting that “the rescue of shipwrecked military personnel or civilians remains an obligation 
which can only be evaded because of military necessity or because material conditions make it impossible.”); 
PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 5, at 136-37 ¶ 2.1.B (“Army or Navy Medical Services … are 
bound to take military requirements into account.”). 
244 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396. 
245 See infra notes 250-283 and accompanying text. 
246 See infra notes 284-340 and accompanying text. 
247 See infra notes 341-359 and accompanying text. 
248 See infra notes 360-363 and accompanying text. 
249 See infra notes 364-368 and accompanying text. 
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wounded, sick and shipwrecked.250  The first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field251 by title and by design 
only deals with wounded and sick who are members of traditional categories of armed forces, 
militias that meet certain criteria, civilians who accompany the force, and levee en masse (i.e. 
combatants),252 and does not include noncombatant (i.e. civilian) wounded and sick.  The 
failure to include civilians within the definition of “wounded and sick in armed forces in the 
field,” who are entitled to special protections, is internally consistent since “the wounded and 
sick of a belligerent who fall into enemy hands shall be [considered] prisoners of war.”253  
                                               
250 The text of the proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study does not explicitly mention combatant versus civilian 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked, but merely provides protection for:  “the wounded, sick and shipwrecked ….”  
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396.  However the Commentary to Rule 109 provides that it is a 
rule applicable to both civilian and combatant wounded, sick and shipwrecked when it mis-cites military 
manuals as being “phrased in general terms covering all wounded, sick and shipwrecked, whether military or 
civilian.”  Id. (emphasis added).  See infra notes 271-275 and accompanying text.  Obviously this distinction 
vanishes for non-international armed conflicts, because one side of the conflict is generally comprised of 
civilians.  See, e.g. Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at 
art. 3(2); Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); 
Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 8. 
251 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24 (emphasis added). 
252 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 13.  Cf. Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 4 (using the 
same categories for determining who is entitled to prisoner of war status).  See also PICTET GENEVA 
CONVENTION I, supra note 5, at art. 16, p. 133 ¶ 1.1 (quoting the primogenitor 1864 Geneva Convention, which 
simply provided:  “Wounded or sick combatants, to whatever nation they may belong, shall be collected and 
cared for.” (emphasis added)).  Cf. PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 5, at art. 16, p. 136 ¶ 2.1A 
(noting that “[t]he [first and fourth Geneva Conventions] thus overlap [in allowing military hospitals to treat 
civilians and vice versa], which shows clearly that in both of them the human aspect takes precedence over the 
distinction normally drawn between civilians and members of the armed forces.”). 
253 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 14.  In contrast, civilians who fall into enemy hands are either 
released, or are interned for the duration of the conflict, but are not considered prisoners of war.  See generally 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at arts. 35-43, 79-135.  Further evidence of the distinction between 
combatant wounded and sick and their civilian counterparts is the fact that article 22 of the first Geneva 
Convention lists certain activities that do not “depriv[e] a medical unit or establishment of … protection,” 
including “[t]hat the humanitarian activities of medical units and establishments or of their personnel extend to 
the care of civilian wounded or sick.”  Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 22(5).  This clearly reveals 
that the treatment of civilian wounded and sick by military hospitals or units is an extraordinary event, albeit 
one that does not deprive them of their protected status.  Cf. Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 35(4) 
(similarly providing that the care of wounded, sick or shipwrecked civilians does not deprive hospital ships or 
sick-bays of vessels of their protection); THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, UK MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE (2004), at ¶ 7.3.2. 
  63 
The same can be said of the protections afforded under the second Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea.254  Protections for civilian wounded and sick are provided by the fourth 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,255 and are 
markedly different than those afforded wounded and sick soldiers in the field under the first 
Geneva Convention, or wounded, sick or shipwrecked sailors at sea under the second Geneva 
                                               
254 Geneva Convention II, supra note 24 (emphasis added). 
255 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24 (emphasis added).  With regard to civilian wounded and sick, States 
involved in an international armed conflict have committed to providing only the following ten protections: 
1) Consider establishing “hospital and safety zones … to protect from the effects of war, wounded, sick and 
aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven.”  Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 14. 
2) Consider proposing the establishment of “neutralized zones” designed to shelter “(a) wounded and sick 
combatants or non-combatants; (b) civilian persons who take no part in hostilities, and who, while they reside in 
the zones, perform no work of a military character.”  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 15. 
3) “As far as military considerations allow … search for the killed and wounded, to assist the shipwrecked 
and other persons exposed to grave danger, and to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment.”  Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 16. 
4) Attempt “to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, 
sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases … .”  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 
17. 
5) Not attacking “[c]ivilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and 
maternity cases … .”  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 18.  This remains true even though these 
civilian hospitals may treat “sick or wounded members of the armed forces.”  Geneva Convention IV, supra 
note 24, at art. 19. 
6) Not attacking “[c]onvoys of vehicles or hospital trains on land or specially provided vessels on sea, 
conveying wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases.”  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, 
at art. 21. 
7) Not attacking “[a]ircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick civilians, the infirm 
and maternity cases or for the transport of medical personnel and equipment … .”  Geneva Convention IV, 
supra note 24, at art. 22. 
8) Not transferring “[s]ick, wounded or infirm internees and maternity cases … if the journey would be 
seriously detrimental to them, unless their safety imperatively so demands.”  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
24, at art. 127. 
9) Releasing certain internees earlier than others, specifically “children, pregnant women and mothers with 
infants and young children, wounded and sick, and internees who have been detained for a long time.”  Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 132. 
10) Transmitting “information regarding the state of health of internees who are seriously ill or seriously 
wounded shall be supplied regularly and if possible every week” to an official Information Bureau.  Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 138. 
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Convention.256 
Specifically, the duties to search for, collect, and evacuate civilian wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked under the fourth Geneva Convention are limited to searching for the 
wounded,257 assisting the shipwrecked,258 and removing the wounded and sick from besieged 
or encircled areas.259  There are thus lacunae in the duties to search for, collect, and evacuate 
civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked under the fourth Geneva Convention.260  For 
example, there is no explicit mention of an obligation to search for or to collect sick civilians 
in either the fourth Geneva Convention or in its commentary.261  The following table 
illustrates the limited protections for civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked provided in the 
fourth Geneva Convention, as well as those Rule 109 protections which are missing: 
                                               
256 See generally infra Table 1 through Table 3, pp. T-1 to T-3. 
257 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 16. 
258 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 16. 
259 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 17. 
260 Yet the commentary to Rule 109 of the ICRC Study attempts to gloss over these lacunae when it claims that 
“[t]he application of this rule [109] to civilians was already the case pursuant to Article 16 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which applies to the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict ….”  ICRC STUDY, supra 
note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 399.  Article 16 of the Fourth Geneva Convention reads in its entirety: 
The wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant mothers, shall be the object of 
particular protection and respect. 
As far as military considerations allow, each Party to the conflict shall facilitate the steps 
taken to search for the killed and wounded, to assist the shipwrecked and other persons 
exposed to grave danger, and to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment. 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 16.  It would appear obvious that the proposed Rule 109 of the 
ICRC Study and article 16 of Geneva Convention IV are not coterminous. 
261 See generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at arts. 13-26; PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra 
note 5, at 118-98.  Cf. PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 5, at art. 16, p. 136 ¶ 2.1A (noting that 
article 16 of the fourth Geneva Convention includes the duty “to assist the shipwrecked and other persons 
exposed to grave danger” (emphasis added), with “[a] particular case which the Conference had in mind was 
civilians trapped in air-raid shelters.”).  Presumably assisting civilians trapped in air-raid shelters would involve 
at least a modicum of searching for them. 
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Duties for Civilian Wounded Sick Shipwrecked 
Search For “search for the … 
wounded (GC IV, art. 
16) 
  
Collect   “assist the 
shipwrecked” (GC IV, 
art. 16) 
Evacuate “remov[e] from 
besieged or encircled 
areas, of wounded” 
(GC IV, art. 17) 
“remov[e] from 
besieged or encircled 
areas, of … sick” (GC 
IV, art. 17) 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 make a clear 
distinction between the protections afforded to combatant wounded, sick and shipwrecked, 
versus those given to civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked.262  Article 8 of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I expressly includes civilians in the definitions of wounded and sick, and 
shipwrecked persons who are entitled to protection.263  However, the official ICRC 
Commentary to Article 8 of Additional Protocol I recognizes that this article deviates from 
the earlier Geneva Conventions by: 
not retain[ing] the distinction made between [civilians and soldiers] by the 
Conventions as regards the wounded and sick. … even though, at the same 
time, there would be a significant difference in the status which applies to the 
one and the other if they fell into enemy hands (particularly that of prisoner of 
war for a combatant).264 
 
The ICRC Commentary to Article 8 of Additional Protocol I also recognizes that the 
inclusion in its protections of shipwrecked civilians “constitutes an important innovation in 
                                               
262 See supra notes 251-256 and accompanying text.  See generally infra Table 1 through Table 3, pp. T-1 to T-
3. 
263 Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 8(1) & (2).  Article 8(1) provides a three-part test for whether 
someone qualifies for the protections afforded to the wounded and sick:  (1) “persons, whether military or 
civilian, who, because of trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or disability, [(2)] are in need of 
medical assistance or care and [(3)] who refrain from any act of hostility.”  Id., at art. 8(1) (emphasis added). 
264 AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at § 304. 
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relation to the [four 1949 Geneva] Conventions.”265  There can be no doubt that including 
civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked within the protections afforded under the proposed 
Rule 109 of the ICRC Study would reflect a new norm of customary international law, one 
that deviates from the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, but one which embraces the 
admittedly innovative rule contained in Additional Protocol I.266 
As previously mentioned, a proponent of a new norm of customary international law 
that purports to modify an earlier treaty-based obligation would have to show sufficiently 
dense State practice with sufficiently clear opinio juris.267  The materials in the ICRC Study 
which accompany proposed Rule 109 arguably support extending the obligation to search for 
and collect shipwrecked civilians.268  However, the ICRC Study materials cited in support of 
                                               
265 Id. at § 312. 
266 See generally Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. 
Hum. Rts. 1, 3 ¶ 4, 14 (2006) (questioning whether the real impetus for the ICRC Study was an effort to claim 
that the provisions in Additional Protocol I had achieved the status of customary international law); David 
Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 201, 236 (2006) (same); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an 
Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505-06 
(2006) (same); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 833 (2005) 
(same); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 9-10 (noting that the ICRC Study rules rely 
heavily on the treaty provisions of Additional Protocol I, which may “be seen simply as an attempt to get 
around the non-application of the treaty to certain States.”). 
267 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a 
significant number of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
268 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 16 (requiring “[a]s far as military considerations allow … assist 
the shipwrecked”); PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 132 (noting that “the rescue of 
shipwrecked military personnel or civilians remains an obligation which can only be evaded because of military 
necessity or because material conditions make it impossible.”); Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 8(2) 
(including civilians within the definition of shipwrecked); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 42, at ¶ 47.58 
(same); NWP 1-14M, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 11-4 ¶ 11.6 (2007) 
(same); NWP 1-14M, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS 11-4 to 11-6 § 11.4 (1997) (same); PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 86-87 (same).  
Cf. infra note 344 (discussing the obligation to search for and collect wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea as 
being different from the corresponding obligations on land). 
  67 
extending these obligations to wounded and sick civilians is surprisingly thin.269   
The commentary270  to proposed Rule 109 merely mentions that the military manuals 
it cites as State practice in support of the proposed rule “are phrased in general terms 
covering all wounded, sick and shipwrecked, whether military or civilian.”271  Yet, for 
example, the U.S. military manuals cited as supporting this proposition not only have the 
                                               
269 See PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that the evidence relied upon by the 
ICRC Study is often “either equivocal on its face as regards the Rule in question or the quoted extracts are 
insufficient to allow weight to be placed upon it reliably.”). 
270 Because the rules are often oversimplified, they “should not be read on their own, without regard to the 
Commentary.  A publication which contained only the Rules would give a misleading account of customary 
international humanitarian law, for this reason alone.”  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 
405-06.  See also Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 262 
(2006) (noting the ICRC Study “rules themselves cannot be seen as self-contained. … the rules in the Study 
have to be read with their commentaries.”); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 (noting “how the 
Study’s methodological flaws undermine the ability of States to rely, without further independent analysis, on 
the rules the Study proposes.”); Jamieson L. Greer, A Critique of the ICRC’s Customary Rules Concerning 
Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity, 192 MIL. L. REV. 116, 120 
(2007) (noting that “the ICRC’s commentary is much more helpful as a description of the current state of affairs 
than the rule [131] is as a representation of customary law.”).  Contra Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 527 (2006) (one 
of the ICRC Study’s authors arguing that “only the black letter rules are identified as part of customary 
international law, and not the commentaries to the rules.  The commentaries may, however, contain useful 
clarifications with respect to the application of the black letter rules and this is sometimes overlooked by 
commentators.”).  Moreover, overreliance should not be placed on the practice in Volume II, because 
apparently only the State practice referenced in the commentary was used to formulate the rules.  PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 45 (citing a personal communication with Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
one of the ICRC Study’s authors).  But see Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 
AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 693 (2007) (book review) (describing the “capsule explanations and the briefest of 
summations of practice in the first volume” of the ICRC Study).  Thus the commentary to the rules would 
appear to be more important than either the rules by themselves, or the State practice cited in Volume II.  But 
see Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (noting that 
“[i]n what may be symptomatic of future practice, the [ICTY] appeals chamber cited indications of practice 
demonstrated by the [ICRC] study, rather than the black-letter rule that the study’s authors based on those 
indications.  In my view, this approach is prudent.”); George H. Aldrich, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505 (2006) (noting the ICRC Study’s “importance rests on its being used as a basis for 
further work, and as a spur to such works, rather than on its conclusions.”).  Nevertheless, the present article 
will not confine itself to only examining the practice cited in the commentary, because this limitation was not 
made clear in the Study itself, as it should have been.  Id.  See also Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 6 ¶ 11 (2006) (noting that the editors of the 
ICRC Study “opted, to be on the safe side, to predicate the Rules more on legislative Codes and military 
Manuals than on any other single source of practice.”). 
271 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 399. 
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usual weaknesses as evidence of U.S. State practice,272 but they also make no mention that 
their rules apply to wounded or sick civilians.273  In fact, in at least one section not cited by 
the ICRC Study, the foundational U.S. Army Field Manual on “The Law of Land Warfare” 
differentiates between the treatment of wounded and sick civilians versus wounded and sick 
combatants.274  This same overgeneralization or mischaracterization appears to have been 
made with regard to at least nine other States’ military manuals erroneously cited for this 
sweeping proposition.275 
                                               
272 See supra notes 49, 114 and accompanying text (noting the weaknesses of citing to military manuals as 
evidence of State practice); infra notes 317, 328, 394 and accompanying text (same). 
273 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397 n. 5, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2598 §§ 72-74, 2609 §§ 158-161, 
4206-07.  See also U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-2, YOUR CONDUCT IN COMBAT UNDER THE LAW OF WAR 
(1984), p. 17; Army FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956), §§ 11, 216 and 219; USAF Pamphlet 110-
31, JUDGE ADVOCATE, GENERAL ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND 
AIR OPERATIONS (1976) §§ 12-2 and 12-3.  Cf. Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 8(2) (including 
civilians within the definition of shipwrecked); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 42, at ¶ 47.58 (same); NWP 1-
14M, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 11-4 ¶ 11.6 (2007) (same); NWP 1-
14M, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 11-4 
to 11-6 § 11.4 (1997) (same); PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 86-87 (same). 
274 Compare Army FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956), § 208 (noting that wounded and sick 
combatants are covered by the first Geneva Convention versus other wounded and sick, who are governed by 
the fourth Geneva Convention) with ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396-97 n. 5, 399 n. 25, Vol. 
II:  Practice, at 2598 § 72 & n. 76 (citing to sections 11, 216 and 219 of Army FM 27-10, but not to section 
208).  See also U.S. Army FM 4-02, FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 4-3 ¶ 4-4.a(1)(e) 
(2003) (noting that “[w]ounded and sick civilians have the benefit of the safeguards of the GC.”); U.S. Army 
FM 4-02.6, THE MEDICAL COMPANY A-5 ¶ A-4 (2002) (explaining that “[c]ivilians who are injured … as a 
result of military operations may be collected and provided initial medical treatment in accordance with theater 
policies.  If treated, treatment will be on the basis of medical priority only and they shall be transferred to 
appropriate civil authorities as soon as possible.”) (emphasis added). 
275 See, e.g., ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2593 § 26 (noting that Benin’s Military Manual 
requires collecting the wounded and sick “whether friend or foe,” which would appear to refer specifically to 
combatants) (emphasis added), 2594 § 35 (noting that Colombia’s Soldiers’ Manual requires collecting 
“wounded enemy combatants”) (emphasis added), 2594 § 39 (noting that Croatia’s Soldiers’ Manual “instructs 
soldiers to search for and collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the adversary’s armed 
forces.”) (emphasis added), 2595 § 47 (noting that Italy’s LOAC Elementary Rules Manual instructs soldiers to 
collect “wounded enemy combatants”) (emphasis added), 2595 § 49 (noting that “Lebanon’s Teaching Manual 
instructs members of the armed forces to search for and collect enemy wounded”) (emphasis added), 2596 § 55 
(noting that “[t]he IFOR Instructions of the Netherlands instructs soldiers to ‘collect the wounded … whether 
friend or foe’.”) (emphasis added), 2596 § 60 (noting that Nigeria’s Soldiers’ Code of Conduct limits its 
obligations to collecting “wounded enemy”) (emphasis added), 2596 § 61 (noting that “[t]he Soldier’s Rules of 
the Philippines instruct soldiers to ‘care for the wounded and sick, be they friendly or foe’.”) (emphasis added), 
2596 § 62 (noting that “Romania’s Soldiers’ Manual requires that wounded and sick enemy combatants be 
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There are only three instances of cited State practice that are specifically supportive 
of extending the same protections to wounded and sick civilians as their combatant 
counterparts:  “Canada’s Code of Conduct,”276 “Kenya’s LOAC Manual,”277 and the “Report 
on the Practice of the Philippines.”278  Even aside from the inherent weaknesses of 
referencing military manuals as evidence of State practice,279 and the propriety of citing to a 
working draft of the Study itself which is not generally available for examination,280 it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
collected.”) (emphasis added).  Yet these nine military manuals are all cited as supporting the commentary to 
Rule 109’s sweeping proposition that the cited military manuals “are phrased in general terms covering all 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked, whether military or civilian.”  Id., Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 (emphasis added), 
396-97 n. 5, 399 n. 25.  See also id., Vol. II:  Practice, at 2595 § 50 (noting that while Madagascar’s Military 
Manual instructs its soldiers to collect “wounded enemy combatants,” it also instructs them to search for and 
collect “the wounded [and] shipwrecked,” which is ambiguous whether or not it is restricted to combatants), 
2597 § 69 (same ambiguity under Togo’s Military Manual), 2598 § 75 (same ambiguity under “[t]he YPA 
Military Manual of the SFRY (FRY)”); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 40 (noting that 
“[a]t times it is clear that the [ICRC] Study demonstrates a lack of discernment in its assessment of [State] 
practice.”). 
276 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2593 § 31.  But cf. id. at 2593 § 30 (noting that Canada’s 
LOAC Manual obliges parties “to take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick and 
shipwrecked” without any reference to civilians). 
277 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2595 § 48. 
278 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice at 2601 § 101.  The Republic of the Philippines is one of the 
few States which is a party to Additional Protocol II, but not to Additional Protocol I.  Compare ICRC Website, 
parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007) with id., parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Thus, at least the 
practice of the Republic of the Philippines (with regards to extending the same protections to civilian wounded, 
sick and shipwrecked) appears to extend beyond its treaty-based obligations, since it is not a party to Additional 
Protocol I. 
279 See supra notes 49, 114 and accompanying text (noting the weaknesses of citing to military manuals as 
evidence of State practice); infra notes 317, 328, 394 and accompanying text (same). 
280 The ICRC Study cites to the “Reports on the Practice of” eight States:  Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Iran, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, the United States, and Zimbabwe.  See ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  
Practice at 2600-02, 2610-11 §§ 97, 99-101, 103-104, 169, 171.  These are the working documents the ICRC 
asserts to have already consolidated into “Volume II:  Practice” of the ICRC Study.  See id., Vol. I:  Rules, at 
xlv, xlvii-xlviii.  Thus, the ICRC Study is essentially citing to an earlier draft of itself as authority!  Moreover, 
these research “Reports on the Practice of” particular States have neither been published separately, nor are they 
generally available for review, and thus their support for the proposed rule cannot be tested readily.  But see 
supra note 49 (examining the Report on US Practice); infra notes 308, 438, 489 (same).  Although these 
working reports have not been published separately, fortunately Professor Burrus Carnahan, who supervised the 
U.S. “national research team” for the ICRC Study, donated a copy of the Report on US practice to the 
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difficult to argue that the practice of three States is sufficient to support a new norm of 
customary international law,281 particularly one that modifies earlier treaty law that is 
universally accepted.282  Thus, the State practice cited by the ICRC Study does not support 
the new norm of customary international humanitarian law espoused in the proposed Rule 
109 that ignores the distinction made by the first and second Geneva Conventions between 
the obligations owed to wounded and sick combatants, versus the obligations owed to their 
civilian counterparts.283 
Non-international armed conflicts.  The second key issue with regard to the proposed 
Rule 109 relates to a State’s obligation to search for, collect and evacuate the wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked in non-international armed conflicts.  Given that all States are now party to 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,284 there are general treaty law (versus customary 
international law)285 obligations under Common Article 3286 of the four Geneva Conventions 
                                                                                                                                                 
University of Virginia Law Library.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xix-xxi; CARNAHAN, REPORT 
ON U.S. PRACTICE, supra note 49. 
281 See DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at attachment p. 21 (noting that the “[t]he practice of six States 
is very weak evidence of the existence of a norm of customary international law.”). 
282 See supra note 32 (noting that all States are now party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949). 
283 See supra note 268 (citing references that include civilians within the definition of shipwrecked persons 
entitled to protection under the second Geneva Convention). 
284 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining the two types of international legal obligations based 
on treaty law and customary international law). 
286 Common Article 3 reads: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions: 
 
     (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including … those placed ‘hors de combat’ by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
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of 1949, for all States in non-international armed conflicts287 to collect and care for the 
wounded, sick288 and shipwrecked,289 and to treat the wounded and sick humanely.290  
Although the obligation under Common Article 3 is similar to that proposed by Rule 109 of 
the ICRC Study for non-international armed conflicts, the protections afforded to the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked under the former are much more circumspect than those 
pursuant to the latter.291 
                                                                                                                                                 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. … 
     (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. … 
Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3; Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3.  The second Geneva Convention adds “shipwrecked” to the list of who 
should be collected and cared for.  Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3. 
287 See supra notes 205, 286 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of Common Article 3).  Aside 
from Common Article 3, the Geneva Conventions do not apply to non-international armed conflicts.  Although 
Additional Protocol II attempts to fill this gap, the U.S. is not a party to that convention.  See Parties to 
Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2007).  Cf. Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of 
the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 179-180 
(2006) (agreeing that the law of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts exceeds Common Article 3 
and the few articles contained in Additional Protocol II). 
288 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3(2).  See also ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2590 § 3. 
289 Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(2).  See also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 
2590 § 3. 
290 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3(1); Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(1); Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3(1); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3(1).  See infra notes 
430-432 (discussing the Common Article 3 obligation to care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and to 
treat them humanely). 
291 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he 
ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether customary international law provides a more detailed 
framework for non-international armed conflicts.  In fact, the ICRC preferred to be mandated to prepare a report 
on non-international armed conflicts only but that was unacceptable to some States at the International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and so the organization was asked to look at both types of armed 
conflict.”). 
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Common Article 3 “merely provides for the application of the principles of the 
Convention and not for the application of specific provisions ….”292  Thus, unlike the 
proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study, Common Article 3 has no temporal component,293 no 
explicit obligation to search for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and no obligation to 
evacuate them.294  In fact, the only point of agreement between the proposed Rule 109 of the 
ICRC Study and Common Article 3 would appear to be the duty in non-international 
conflicts to collect the wounded and sick.295 
The lack of commonality between the proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study and 
Common Article 3 is not surprising, since the former appears to be based on Article 8 of 
Additional Protocol II,296 which provides:  “Whenever circumstances permit and particularly 
after an engagement, all possible measures shall be taken, without delay, to search for and 
collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, 
[and] to ensure their adequate care … .”297  The official ICRC commentary to Article 8 of 
                                               
292 PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 5, at 48 ¶ “GENERAL” (emphasis added). 
293 See infra notes 341-359 and accompanying text. 
294 PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 5, at 38-61.  See also AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at § 
4649. 
295 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396, with Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 
3(2); Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3(2).  Common Article 3 is broader than the proposed Rule 109 of 
the ICRC Study in its obligation to “collect[] and care for” the wounded and sick.  Geneva Convention I, supra 
note 24, at art. 3(2 Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at 
art. 3(2); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3(2).  This obligation is contained in the proposed Rule 
110 of the ICRC Study.  See infra notes 379-455 and accompanying text.  See generally infra Tables 1 through 
3, pp. T-1 to T-3. 
296 See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as 
one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether 
customary international law provides a more detailed framework for non-international armed conflicts.”). 
297 Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 8. 
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Additional Protocol II confirms that it further develops (i.e. expands) the principles 
enunciated in Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.298  Yet proposed 
Rule 109 of the ICRC Study goes even further than Article 8 of Additional Protocol II by 
adding a requirement to evacuate the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, which was 
“considered … to be rather unrealistic in the context of a non-international armed conflict” 
by the framers of the Additional Protocols.299  The fact that the ICRC Study Rule 109 
expands even on the language of the Additional Protocols is particularly troubling.300 
Thus, once again301 the ICRC Study proposes a rule of customary international 
humanitarian law that expands upon the treaty obligations contained in the four universally 
subscribed to Geneva Conventions of 1949,302 and even from the more expansive language of 
Additional Protocol II.  As indicated supra,303 this departure from treaty obligations will be 
recognized under international law if there is sufficiently dense State practice with 
sufficiently clear opinio juris in support of the new rule.  In support of this new norm of 
customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, 
besides Article 8 of Additional Protocol II, the ICRC Study cites to:  (1) a “number of other 
instruments pertaining also to non-international armed conflicts,” (2) “a number of military 
                                               
298 AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at § 4649. 
299 Id.  Cf. id. at § 4655 (Adequate “care includes ensuring the transport of the wounded to a place where they 
can be adequately cared for.”).  See generally infra Table 1, p. T-1. 
300 See infra note 349 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of an unexplained deviation from 
treaty language). 
301 See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a 
significant number of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
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manuals,”304 and (3) domestic legislation.305  In addition, although conspicuously absent from 
                                               
304 See supra notes 49, 114 and accompanying text (noting the weaknesses of citing to military manuals as 
evidence of State practice); infra notes 317, 328, 394 and accompanying text (same). 
305 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397.  The ICRC Study also provides that “[n]o official contrary 
practice was found ….”  Id. at 398.  See infra notes 364-368 and accompanying text (discussing the logical 
fallacy of arguing a lack of contrary State practice in support of a proposed norm of customary international 
law).  Finally, the ICRC Study notes that “[t]he ICRC has called on parties to both international and non-
international armed conflicts to respect this rule.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 398.  This 
relatively mild statement belies the fact that the ICRC Study lists “Practice of the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement” on par with other categories of international practice in Volume II.  Id. Vol. II:  
Practice, at 2602-03, 2613-14 §§ 109-115, 184-189.  This is hubris writ large!  See, e.g. Yoram Dinstein, The 
ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 5 ¶ 9 (2006) (commenting 
that despite the ICRC’s unique role in international humanitarian law, it remains a non-governmental 
organization (NGO), and that “NGOs, whatever their standing, can never contribute directly through their own 
practice to the creation of customary norms. … The ICRC [may] play[] … the role of a catalyst for the 
evolution of State practice, but no more.”); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2 (claiming that the 
ICRC “Study gives undue weight to statements by non-governmental organizations and the ICRC itself”); 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 44 (questioning the appropriateness of considering 
“confidential communications made to the ICRC as evidence of State practice.”); id. at 45 (arguing that “non-
State materials” are “better seen as secondary, rather than primary, evidence of State practice”).  But see id. 
(citing a personal communication with Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, one of the ICRC Study’s authors, “that only 
some of the practice detailed in Volume II was taken into account in formulating the Rules contained in Volume 
I, namely that identified in the commentaries to the Rules.  In particular, materials emanating from non-
governmental organisations were not used to support any Rules”) (emphasis added); Yoram Dinstein, The 
ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 6 ¶ 11 (2006) (noting that 
the editors of the ICRC Study “opted, to be on the safe side, to predicate the Rules more on legislative Codes 
and military Manuals than on any other single source of practice.”); Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 175-76 ¶ 97 (July 9) (considering the opinion of the 
ICRC in interpreting the Geneva Convention IV because of its “special position with respect to execution of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention”); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 109 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (deciding that “[t]he practical results the ICRC has 
thus achieved in inducing compliance with international humanitarian law ought therefore to be regarded as an 
element of actual international practice; this is an element that has been conspicuously instrumental in the 
emergence or crystallization of customary rules.”).  Contra Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy 
Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 240 (2006) (opining that “[t]he ICTY’s point [in Tadic] 
seems to be that the impetus for state action counted as customary law could come from the ICRC, not that the 
ICRC’s activities themselves could be considered state practice.”).  Certainly, State practice may include what 
actions States take in international organizations.  RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 
102 reporters’ notes p. 31.  See, e.g. ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2611 §§ 173-174 (citing to 
U.N. General Assembly Resolutions appealing to governments to permit the ICRC to evacuate the wounded 
from areas of conflict).  But see DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2 (criticizing the ICRC Study for 
relying on non-binding U.N. General Assembly Resolutions); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-55 ¶ 70 (July 8) (noting that while General Assembly 
Resolutions “are not binding, [they] may sometimes have normative value … [in] establishing the existence of a 
rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.”); supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text (discussing the role of 
international organizations in the formation of customary international law).  However, this remains the practice 
of the States themselves, not the practice of the international organization.  See, e.g. Jan Klabbers, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 231-32 (2002) (noting that the International Court of 
Justice came close in its 1971 Namibia opinion to recognizing the practice of the U.N. Security Council in 
treating an abstention as a “concurring vote” in terms of Article 27(3) of the U.N. Charter, as customary law, 
  75 
the commentary306 to Rule 109, Volume II provides a rare cite to five instances of “battlefield 
practice”307 in support of the proposed rule in non-international armed conflicts.308 
                                                                                                                                                 
but avoided doing so because “then it would have had to pronounce itself on the possibility of customary law 
developing within the UN to begin with:  Article 108 (the amendment article) may militate against such a 
conclusion.”).  Moreover, as Professor Dinstein mentions above, the ICRC is not even an international 
organization, but merely a Swiss NGO.  Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 5 ¶ 9 (2006).  But see ICRC, The ICRC’s status:  in a class of its own, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5w9fjy?opendocument (last visited Dec. 16, 
2007) (arguing that the ICRC is a hybrid between a “private association [i.e. NGO] formed under the Swiss 
Civil Code,” and an “intergovernmental organization … [because it has] an ‘international legal personality’ … 
[as well as] privileges and immunities”). 
306 Because the rules are often oversimplified, they “should not be read on their own, without regard to the 
Commentary.  A publication which contained only the Rules would give a misleading account of customary 
international humanitarian law, for this reason alone.”  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 
405-06.  See also Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 262 
(2006) (noting the ICRC Study “rules themselves cannot be seen as self-contained. … the rules in the Study 
have to be read with their commentaries.”); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 (noting “how the 
Study’s methodological flaws undermine the ability of States to rely, without further independent analysis, on 
the rules the Study proposes.”); Jamieson L. Greer, A Critique of the ICRC’s Customary Rules Concerning 
Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity, 192 MIL. L. REV. 116, 120 
(2007) (noting that “the ICRC’s commentary is much more helpful as a description of the current state of affairs 
than the rule [131] is as a representation of customary law.”).  Contra Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 527 (2006) (one 
of the ICRC Study’s authors arguing that “only the black letter rules are identified as part of customary 
international law, and not the commentaries to the rules.  The commentaries may, however, contain useful 
clarifications with respect to the application of the black letter rules and this is sometimes overlooked by 
commentators.”).  Moreover, overreliance should not be placed on the practice in Volume II, because 
apparently only the State practice referenced in the commentary was used to formulate the rules.  PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 45 (citing a personal communication with Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
one of the ICRC Study’s authors).  But see Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 
AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 693 (2007) (book review) (describing the “capsule explanations and the briefest of 
summations of practice in the first volume” of the ICRC Study).  Thus the commentary to the rules would 
appear to be more important than either the rules by themselves, or the State practice cited in Volume II.  But 
see Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (noting that 
“[i]n what may be symptomatic of future practice, the [ICTY] appeals chamber cited indications of practice 
demonstrated by the [ICRC] study, rather than the black-letter rule that the study’s authors based on those 
indications.  In my view, this approach is prudent.”); George H. Aldrich, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505 (2006) (noting the ICRC Study’s “importance rests on its being used as a basis for 
further work, and as a spur to such works, rather than on its conclusions.”).  Nevertheless, the present article 
will not confine itself to only examining the practice cited in the commentary, because this limitation was not 
made clear in the Study itself, as it should have been.  Id.  See also Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 6 ¶ 11 (2006) (noting that the editors of the 
ICRC Study “opted, to be on the safe side, to predicate the Rules more on legislative Codes and military 
Manuals than on any other single source of practice.”). 
307 See supra notes 47, 55 (criticizing the ICRC Study for a lack of citations to actual battlefield behavior versus 
verbal acts as State practice). 
  76 
Specifically with regard to the first category of support for the new norm of 
customary international law in non-international armed conflicts, the commentary to the 
ICRC Study lists four instruments purportedly supportive of the proposed Rule 109—the first 
three are agreements between parties to the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
                                                                                                                                                 
308 Specifically, Volume II refers to an unnamed opposition group “express[ing] its acceptance of the 
fundamental principles of IHL as formulated by the ICRC” in 1980 (ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  
Practice, at 2603 § 116); the evacuation of wounded from East Timor by Indonesian forces in 1984 (id. at 2614 
§ 190); Iran evacuating wounded Iraqi soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War in accordance with Sharia Law (id. at 
2611, § 171); the French government soliciting international support in 1987 for the evacuation of wounded 
from besieged Palestinian camps (id. at 2610-11 § 170); and the Commanding General of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Army instructing subordinate Corps Commanders regarding the evacuation of the wounded and 
sick in 1993 (id. at 2610 § 169).  But see PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 45 (citing a 
personal communication with Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, one of the ICRC Study’s authors, “that only some of 
the practice detailed in Volume II was taken into account in formulating the Rules contained in Volume I, 
namely that identified in the commentaries to the Rules.  In particular, materials emanating from non-
governmental organisations were not used to support any Rules”) (emphasis added); id. (noting that “the Study 
claims not to have relied on the practice of armed opposition groups” despite the numerous references to this 
practice in Volume II); id. at 44 (questioning the appropriateness of considering “confidential communications 
made to the ICRC as evidence of State practice.”).  But see Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 7 ¶ 14 (2006) (remembering that “[e]verybody hoped that 
the research [into the otherwise inaccessible IRCR archives] would yield a trove of inaccessible State practice.  
In [any] event, the results have been quite disappointing.”).  Although not expressly cited by the commentary to 
Rule 109, Volume II refers to the Report on US Practice that “it is the opinio juris of the US that, whenever 
circumstances permit, all possible measures should be taken to search for the wounded and sick in accordance 
with Article 8 AP II.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2601 § 103 n. 109 (citing to Report on 
US Practice, 1997, Chapter 5.1).  Since the ICRC Study cites to Additional Protocol II, this “opinio juris of the 
US” is presumably limited to non-international armed conflicts, which is consistent with the caveats contained 
in the Report on US Practice itself.  CARNAHAN, REPORT ON U.S. PRACTICE, supra note 49, at iv, 5-2 § 5.0.  
However, although the Report on US Practice supports a customary international law requirement “to search for 
the wounded, dead and missing in action,” it neither contains a temporal component, nor does it recognize an 
obligation to evacuate them.  Id. at 5-3 § 5.1.  Moreover, the Report on US Practice admits that: 
Since an internal armed conflict has not occurred on U.S. territory in this century, primary 
reliance for United States practice has been on … 
(1) The 1973 Agreements to end the war in Viet-Nam. … 
(2) Documents from 1987 submitting Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions to the 
U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. 
Id. at 5-2 § 5.0 (internal citations omitted).  The present author is not so sanguine that the excerpts from these 
two sources provided in the Report on US Practice support this proposition, let alone that they carry sufficient 
weight.  Id. at Chapter 5, Annexes 8 and 9.  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 134 
n. 12 (noting that the ICRC Study “editors were constrained by the comprehensiveness (or lack thereof) of State 
practice reports provided by the national research teams.”). 
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Yugoslavia (SFRY).309  The fourth is an agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines.310  However, 
Common Article 3 expressly provides that “[t]he Parties to the conflict should further 
endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other 
provisions of the present Convention.”311  Even if these special agreements deviate 
significantly from the principles of Common Article 3, which they do not,312 it is difficult to 
argue that the special agreements of two States313 is sufficiently dense State practice to justify 
                                               
309 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2592, 2605 §§ 16-18, 123-125. 
310 Id., Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2592, 2608 §§ 19, 149.  See also Comprehensive Agreement 
on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Between the Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, Mar. 16, 1998, available at 
http://www.philsol.nl/A03a/CARHRIHL-mar98.htm; National Democratic Front of the Philippines, available at 
http://home.casema.nl/ndf/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
311 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3(2). 
312 For example, of the two provisions cited from the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights 
and International Humanitarian Law Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the 
National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the first one repeats the obligation under Common Article 3 
almost verbatim:  “The wounded and the sick shall be collected and cared for by the party to the armed conflict 
which has them in its custody or responsibility.”  Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National 
Democratic Front of the Philippines, Mar. 16, 1998, Part IV, art. 4(2), available at 
http://www.philsol.nl/A03a/CARHRIHL-mar98.htm.  The second provision cited from this agreement provides:  
“[e]very possible measure shall be taken, without delay, to search for and collect the wounded, sick and missing 
persons and to protect them from any ha[r]m and ill treatment, to ensure their adequate care and to search for 
the dead, prevent despoliation and mutilation and to dispose of them with respect.”  Id. at art. 9.  Although this 
is consistent with the language in proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study, it is also consistent with article 8 of 
Additional Protocol II, to which the Republic of the Philippines acceded on December 11, 1986.  See ICRC, 
State Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Thus, it appears 
that by entering the agreement with the separatist group, the Republic of the Philippines was simply abiding by 
its treaty obligations under Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as Additional 
Protocol II.  Absent additional evidence of opinio juris, it would be difficult to argue that by this act the 
Republic of the Philippines was evincing State practice in support of a new norm of customary international 
law. 
313 This list of two States (Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) does not include the Republic of the 
Philippines, as it was merely abiding by its treaty obligations.  See supra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying 
text.  However, Croatia apparently signed the special agreement with the SFRY in 1991, before it acceded to 
Additional Protocol II on May 11, 1992.  Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2592 § 16 
with ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
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a new norm of customary international humanitarian law.314 
Besides these special agreements, the commentary to proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC 
Study also cites to “a number of military manuals which are applicable in or have been 
applied in non-international armed conflicts.”315  Aside from the inherent weaknesses of 
overly relying on military manuals as expressions of State practice or policy,316 Volume II of 
the ICRC Study admits that at least the Belgium, Kenyan, U.K.317 and U.S. military manuals 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Similarly, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina apparently signed the special agreement before it acceded to Additional Protocol II on 
December 31, 1992.  Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2592 § 18 with ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  See also supra note 281 (noting similar concerns about the State practice of only a 
few States being insufficient upon which to base a new norm of customary international law). 
314 Acceptance of a new norm of customary international law does not require universal acceptance, but 
sufficiently widespread acceptance, particularly by those States especially affected by the proposed norm.  See 
generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. b.  See also DUNOFF, RATNER & 
WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 75 (2002); 
supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary international 
law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a significant number 
of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
315 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397. 
316 See supra notes 49, 114 and accompanying text; infra notes 317, 328, 394.  Cf. W. Hays Parks, The ICRC 
Customary Law Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208, 209 (2005) 
(distinguishing between government statements that represent policy decisions versus “a government’s 
declaration of its interpretation of its law of war obligations”); Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal Adviser to the 
U.S. Department of State (speaking in his personal capacity), Roundtable Discussion at the North American 
launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina 
Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International 
Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 14 (2006) (noting that “States place rules in manuals for a variety of 
reasons, not always because they believe they are legally obligated to do so ….  Often practice that is reflected 
in the manuals is based on a policy of including a certain rule, rather than a sense that the rule flows from a 
legal obligation.”). 
317 The Achilles' heel of the putative State practice cited by the ICRC Study is not only its reliance on military 
manuals, but its reliance on out-of-date military manuals, when more current manuals are readily available.  
See, e.g., ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 883 n. 175, 4207 (citing to the 1993 edition of the 
U.S. Army JAG School OPLAW Handbook, which is published annually); id. at 2597 §§ 70-71 (citing to the 
1958 UK Military Manual and the 1981 UK LOAC Manual, at least the former of which was replaced by THE 
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (2004).  Cf. Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 7 ¶ 13 (2006) (noting that there is 
no 1981 edition of the UK LOAC Manual, but that the 2004 edition replaced the 1958 edition); THE MANUAL 
OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE at vii (2004) (confirming that the 2004 edition of 
the UK LOAC Manual replaced the 1958 edition, with no mention of a 1981 edition).  The 2004 UK LOAC 
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refer expressly to provisions in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,318 and not to the 
Additional Protocols, from which the proposed Rule 109 borrows its language.319  Moreover, 
of the remaining military manuals cited by the ICRC Study in support of the proposed Rule 
109, most of the manuals use language remarkably similar to provisions in the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and not to the Additional Protocols.320  Of those military manuals 
which do appear to support the expanded language of Article 8 of Additional Protocol II, and 
hence much of the language of the proposed Rule 109, the manuals of eight States are all 
merely consistent with their treaty obligations, as they all became parties to Additional 
Protocol II before the publication of the military manuals cited.321  As difficult as it is to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Manual, in fact, refers to the Additional Protocols, for example by including civilian wounded and sick within 
its definition, citing to article 8(a) of Additional Protocol I.  Id. at ¶¶ 7.2, 7.3.2.  This makes sense, of course, 
since the UK ratified the Additional Protocols on January 28, 1998, after both of the UK military manuals 
erroneously cited by the ICRC Study.  This fact would move the UK from the category of “merely refer[ring] to 
provisions in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,” (see infra note 318 and accompanying text), to that of 
“merely consistent with their treaty obligations” (see infra note 321 and accompanying text).  Another example 
might include Argentina’s 1969 Law of War Manual (Argentina acceded to the Additional Protocols in 1986, 
and hopefully updated its Law of War Manual subsequently), ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 
2592, 2605 §§ 21, 127.  But see U.S. Army FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956) (still authoritative, 
although under revision for a number of years); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xlvi (noting that 
the ICRC Study strove to “be as up-to-date as possible and would, to the extent possible, take into account 
developments up to 31 December 2002.”); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
– A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 531 (2006) (one of the ICRC Study’s authors citing 
to the 2004 version of the UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict).  But see Dino Kritsiotis, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 694 (2007) (book review) (questioning the ICRC 
Study’s timeliness, when it excluded any mention of President Bush’s February 7, 2002 announcement that 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay would be treated humanely from the State practice cited by Rule 87, humane 
treatment for civilians). 
318 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2592, 2595, 2597-98 §§ 24, 48, 70-74.  
See also id., Vol. II:  Practice, at 2605-06, 2609 §§ 123-124, 138, 158-159. 
319 See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text. 
320 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2592-98 §§ 21-22 (Argentina), § 23 
(Australia), § 26 (Benin), §§ 32-35 (Colombia), § 41 (Ecuador), §§ 42-43 (France), § 44 (Germany), § 46 
(Indonesia), § 47 (Italy), § 49 (Lebanon), § 57 (Nicaragua), § 62 (Romania), § 63 (Russia), § 64-65 (Senegal), § 
66 (Spain), § 68 (Switzerland), § 69 (Togo), § 75 (Yugoslavia). 
321 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2592-96 § 27 (Burkina 
Faso), §§ 30-31 (Canada), § 36 (Congo), § 45 (Hungary), § 50 (Madagascar), §§ 53-55 (the Netherlands), § 56 
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discern opinio juris, it is doubly difficult when the State practice cited is merely consistent 
with existing treaty law obligations.322 
Finally, assuming that any credence can be given to military manuals as evidence of 
State practice,323 Cameroon, Croatia, Mali,324 and Morocco stand out as the four sole 
supporters of a new norm of customary international law, as their military manuals cited in 
support of the proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study either predate their accession to the 
Additional Protocols,325 or they are not party to the Additional Protocols at all (which is the 
case for Morocco).326  Of course, this begs the question whether their compliance with an 
arguably new norm of customary international law was subsumed by their subsequent 
accession to the Additional Protocols327 (except for Morocco, of course).328  Moreover, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
(New Zealand), §§ 58-60 (Nigeria), with ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  See also 
DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at attachment p. 10 (making a similar complaint about proposed Rule 
45 of the ICRC Study).  Two of the military manuals cited are ambiguous because they mix terms from both the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Additional Protocols.  See, e.g. ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  
Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2593, 2606 § 25 (Belgium), § 140 (India). 
322 See supra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text.   
323 See supra notes 49, 114, 317 and accompanying text; infra notes 328, 394 and accompanying text. 
324 Mali’s Army Regulations apparently even refer to “the laws and customs of war.”  Mali, Army Regulations 
(1979), art. 36, cited in ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2595 § 51. 
325 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2593-95 §§ 28-29, 37-40, 
51 with ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
326 See ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2595 § 52.  See generally ICRC, 
State Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
327 As questionable as it is whether subsequent customary international law can alter pre-existing treaty 
obligations, it is clear that the reverse is true:  that treaty law can alter pre-existing customary international law, 
unless, perhaps, it is a jus cogens norm.  See supra note 179.  See generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. j.  But cf. supra note 156 (discussing the ICJ’s opinion in the 
Nicaragua case, that customary international law can continue to exist alongside an identical treaty norm). 
328 Another limiting variable is whether the cited military manuals intended to support a new norm of customary 
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previously stated, it is difficult to argue that the military manuals of four States is sufficiently 
dense State practice upon which to base a new norm of customary international humanitarian 
law, especially in non-international armed conflicts,329 the rules for which are inherently 
more controversial.330 
The third and final category of support for the new norm of customary international 
law in Rule 109 of the ICRC Study, applicable to non-international armed conflicts, is 
domestic legislation.331  The ICRC Study does not cite separately to domestic legislation that 
                                                                                                                                                 
international law (i.e. the requisite opinio juris), or whether they just happened to use language that deviated 
from the existing treaty law obligations, e.g. “whenever circumstances permit” instead of “after an engagement 
… take all possible measures.”  Compare Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 8 with Geneva 
Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15.  See generally infra Table 1, p. T-1. 
329 See supra notes 281, 313 and accompanying text. 
330 Anthony Cullen, The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 12 U. 
MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 191-92 (2004).  Cf. David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 208-09 (2006) (noting that “the law in 
non-international armed conflicts is very much less specific and less developed than that applicable in 
international armed conflicts.”).  One reason the law applicable to non-international armed conflicts is so “very 
much less specific and less developed” is not because there are fewer non-international armed conflicts (just the 
contrary), but because States cannot agree (in multilateral treaties or in customary practice) on the application of 
the law of armed conflict in the realm of non-international armed conflicts.  See, e.g., Malcolm MacLaren & 
Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1228 (2005) (noting that States have not 
regulated non-international armed conflicts out of concern for “their sovereignty and protection of their national 
interests”); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 506-07 (2006) (same). 
331 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2598-600, 2609-10 §§ 76-95, 163-
167.  Domestic legislation is of limited utility as evidence of a new norm of customary international law, at least 
vis-à-vis the four universally subscribed Geneva Conventions of 1949, which require all State-parties to 
penalize “grave breaches” of the Conventions, and to “take measures necessary for the suppression” of other 
violations.  Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 50; 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 146.  For 
example, the United States fulfilled its commitment to criminalize “grave breaches” and to suppress other 
violations of the Geneva Conventions by finally enacting the War Crimes Act in 1996.  War Crimes Act, 18 
USC § 2441 (2006).  The War Crimes Act penalizes grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, as 
well as violations of Common Article 3.  18 USC § 2441(c)(1) and (3) (2006) (respectively).  For a list of 
potential examples of grave breaches that might constitute war crimes, see NWP 1-14M, COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 6-5 to 6-6 ¶ 6.2.6 (2007) (including offenses against the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked, deliberate attack on medical facilities, etc.).  See also id. at 6-7 to 6-9 ¶ 6.3 
(listing examples of incidents that need to be reported as potential law of war violations under the Department 
of Defense Law of War Program, including offenses against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, failure to 
search or care for wounded, sick and shipwrecked “when military interests do permit,” deliberate attacks on 
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putatively supports its proposed rule in non-international conflicts than that cited in support 
of the proposed rule in international armed conflicts.332  The only domestic legislation that 
specifically criminalizes violations of the Additional Protocols (including Article 8 of 
Additional Protocol II, upon which Rule 109 of the ICRC Study appears to be based), are 
Ireland and Norway, whose domestic legislation was amended ten and six months 
respectively before they ratified the Additional Protocols.333  Following the ICJ’s reasoning 
                                                                                                                                                 
medical transports or medical establishments, etc.).  Thus, unless domestic legislation goes well beyond 
penalizing “grave breaches” of the Conventions, or suppressing other violations, it is difficult to argue that it 
supports a new norm of customary international law, since it is merely effectuating treaty obligations under the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949.  See supra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text.  The “for the 
suppression” of other violations of the Geneva Conventions language is sufficiently broad to cover a variety of 
domestic legislation, including that cited by the ICRC Study in support of its new proposed Rule 109.  ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2598-600, 2609-10 §§ 76-95, 163-167.  Only 
two of the domestic laws cited by the ICRC Study (Ireland’s’ and Norway’s) specifically criminalize behavior 
covered either by the proposed rule or by the Additional Protocols, and not just by the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949.  Id. at 2599-600 §§ 85, 89.  See infra note 333 (discussing the timing of Ireland’s and Norway’s 
domestic legislation, which was passed ten and six months respectively before they ratified the Additional 
Protocols).  Even more surprisingly, the ICRC Study cites to draft legislation from El Salvador and Nicaragua.  
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2599-600 §§ 83, 88.  As tenuous as citing to domestic 
legislation is in this area, citing to draft legislation is sheer folly, because the draft legislation may have been 
introduced for political purposes, may undergo substantial revision, or may simply have no chance of ever 
passing into law.  For example, draft legislation is regularly proposed before the U.S. Congress to reinstitute the 
military draft, even though its proponents realize that the legislation has little to no chance of ever passing a 
congressional vote.  See, e.g. Rangel promotes plan to reinstitute draft, CNN.COM, Jan. 27, 2003, CNN.com, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/27/rangel.draft/. 
332 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2598-600, 2609-10 §§ 76-95, 163-
167.  See supra note 61 (criticizing Volume II of the ICRC Study for failing to distinguish between State 
Practice supporting the particular rule in international versus non-international armed conflicts, unlike the 
commentary to the rules in Volume I). 
333 Only two of the domestic laws cited by the ICRC Study (Ireland’s and Norway’s) specifically criminalize 
behavior covered either by the proposed rule or by the Additional Protocols, and not just by the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2599-600 §§ 85, 89.  “Ireland’s Geneva 
Conventions Act as amended” punishes minor breaches of the Geneva Conventions as well as of the Additional 
Protocols.  Ireland, Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act as amended (1998), §§ 4(1) & (4), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1998/en/act/pub/0035/print.html; ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, 
at 2599 § 85.  Ireland signed the Additional Protocols on December 12, 1977.  ICRC, State Parties to 
Additional Protocol I, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Ireland revised its 
statutes to criminalize violations of the Additional Protocols on July 13, 1998.  Ireland, Geneva Conventions 
(Amendment) Act as amended (1998), §§ 4(1) & (4), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1998/en/act/pub/0035/print.html.  Ireland then ratified the Additional Protocols 
on May 19, 1999.  ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
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in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, when Ireland and Norway amended their domestic 
legislation shortly before ratifying the Additional Protocols, they were “acting actually or 
potentially in the application of the [Additional Protocols].  From their action no inference 
could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary international law 
….”334  Therefore, the domestic legislation cited by the ICRC Study does not support its 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Although Ireland’s ratification of the Additional Protocols was subsequent to its 
criminalizing violations of them, the timing is such that it would appear that Ireland was merely complying with 
its treaty obligations to do so, albeit ten months prematurely.  See Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 
85(1).  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 36 (making a similar argument that 
France’s military manual “was promulgated in the same year as it ratified Additional Protocol I:  one might 
expect some caution in viewing this as anything other than the declaration of its obligations under the 
Additional Protocol.”); Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. 
Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 10-11 ¶ 19 (2006) (interpreting the ICJ’s opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case as 
not considering relevant for customary international law formation purposes “not only the practice of 
Contracting Parties among themselves but even the practice among States that shortly would become 
Contracting Parties”); supra  note 163 and accompanying text (citing the relevant language from the ICJ’s 
opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case).  “Norway’s Military Penal Code as amended” similarly 
includes criminal penalties for violations of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, “[and in] the two additional 
protocols to these Conventions” (emphasis added).  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2600 § 89; 
Militaer Straffelov of 22 May 1902, No. 13, Art. 108(b) p. 17 (as incorporated by the law of 26 November 1954, 
No. 6, and amended by the law of 12 June 1981, No. 65), available at 
http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/Norway.pdf.  See also ICRC, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in Non-International Armed Conflicts, ICRC, Mar. 31, 1998, note 
56, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JP4L.  Norway signed the Additional 
Protocols on December 12, 1977.  ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Norway revised its military penal code to criminalize violations of the Additional 
Protocols on June 12, 1981.  Militaer Straffelov of 22 May 1902, No. 13, Art. 108(b) p.17 (as incorporated by 
the law of 26 November 1954, No. 6, and amended by the law of 12 June 1981, No. 65), available at 
http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/Norway.pdf.  See also ICRC, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in Non-International Armed Conflicts, ICRC, Mar. 31, 1998, note 
56, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JP4L.  Norway then ratified the Additional 
Protocols on December 14, 1981.  ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  Like Ireland, Norway’s ratification of the Additional Protocols was subsequent to 
its criminalizing violations of them, but the timing is such that it would appear that Norway was merely 
complying with its treaty obligations to do so, albeit six months prematurely.  See Additional Protocol I, supra 
note 24, at art. 85(1).  Curiously, the ICRC Study eliminates the reference to criminalizing violations of the 
additional protocols when it cites the same Norwegian statute later in support of a duty to evacuate the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2610 § 167. 
334 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 ¶ 76 (Feb. 20) (emphasis added).  
See also ILA Report on CIL, supra note 132, at 46-47 § 24; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra 
note 21, at 170.  See infra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text (arguing that State actions in compliance 
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proposed norm of customary international law. 
Thus, even when considered collectively the special agreements of two States,335 the 
military manuals of four States,336 and the domestic legislation of two additional States337 is 
not sufficiently dense State practice338 with sufficiently clear opinio juris upon which to base 
a new norm of customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international 
armed conflicts,339 particularly one that deviates from the universally subscribed Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.340 
International Armed Conflicts—Temporal Distinction.  The third point of departure 
between the proposed Rule 109 and existing treaty law provisions relates to when the 
obligation arises to search for and collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.  For the 
wounded and sick on land, all States have agreed to “[a]t all times, and particularly after an 
engagement … take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick 
….”341  For similar persons at sea,342 all States have agreed to “[a]fter each engagement … 
                                                                                                                                                 
with treaty obligations do not generally provide evidence of State practice in support of a related customary 
international law norm); supra note 333 (discussing Ireland’s and Norway’s domestic legislation, which was 
passed within a few months before they ratified the Additional Protocols. 
335 See supra notes 309-314 and accompanying text. 
336 See supra notes 315-330 and accompanying text. 
337 See supra notes 331-334 and accompanying text. 
338 See supra notes 281, 313, 329 (noting similar concerns about the State practice of only a few States being 
insufficient upon which to base a new norm of customary international law). 
339 See also DOS DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 (criticizing the ICRC Study for asserting that 
certain rules have become customary international law binding in non-international armed conflicts 
“notwithstanding the fact that there is little evidence in support of those propositions.”). 
340 See supra note 32 (noting that all States are now party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949). 
341 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
342 Cf. Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 1 (explaining coverage of the second Geneva 
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take all possible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick 
….”343  Therefore, treaty law recognizes a temporal distinction between the obligation to 
search for and collect the wounded and sick on land (i.e. to do so “[a]t all times, and 
particularly after an engagement,”) versus the obligation to search for and collect the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea (i.e. to do so only “[a]fter each engagement.”)344  
                                                                                                                                                 
Convention as protected persons “who are at sea and who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked”) (emphasis 
added) with Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 1 (explaining coverage of the first Geneva 
Convention as protected persons “who are wounded or sick” with no mention of their physical location).  
However, it is clear that once protected persons are landed (i.e. put ashore), the provisions of Geneva 
Convention I apply.  See, e.g., Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 20, ¶ 2 (explaining that once “dead 
persons are landed, the provisions of the [first] Geneva Convention … shall be applicable.”); id. at art. 37, ¶ 3 
(explaining that once retained personnel are landed, the provisions of the first Geneva Convention apply); 
PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 88 (“wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons on land are 
protected by the corresponding provisions in the First Convention”). 
343 Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).  See also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, 
Vol. II:  Practice, at 2590 § 2. 
344 PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 132 (noting that:  “The words ‘after each engagement’ with 
which the paragraph opens were already included in the corresponding provision of the 1907 text, which had 
taken them from the Geneva Convention of 1906.  In the First Convention, the 1949 Conference replaced the 
phrase by the words ‘at all times, and particularly after an engagement’, but left the old wording in the Second 
Convention, thus tacitly accepting the view of the Government experts, who had met in 1947, that the words 
‘after each engagement’ were better suited to the special conditions prevailing at sea.”) (emphasis added).  See 
also AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at §§ 4650-4651, 4653 (same); NWP 1-14M, COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 8-9 to 8-10 ¶ 8.6.1 (2007) (same); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 143-44 (exploring the differences between the duty to search for and collected the 
wounded and sick under the First and Second Geneva Conventions).  See generally infra Table 1, p. T-1.  There 
is a long tradition of coming to the aid of mariners in distress from perils of the sea.  See, e.g., PICTET GENEVA 
CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that:  “as long ago as the XVIIth century, noble and generous 
gestures were made in behalf of the wounded and shipwrecked.  It was not until the beginning of the XIXth 
century, however, when Nelson ordered that as a general rule the crews of enemy ships set on fire were to be 
rescued, that there was a definite alleviation of the sometimes implacable nature of war at sea.”  (footnotes 
omitted)).  However, there is also an implicit recognition that such requirement only exists after the engagement 
(i.e. there is no requirement to risk one’s vessel or the safety of one’s crew to rescue shipwrecked sailors during 
the heat of battle).  See also Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 21, ¶ 1 (“Parties to the conflict may 
appeal to the charity of commanders of neutral merchant vessels, yachts or other craft, to take on board and care 
for wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons, and to collect the dead.”); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  
Practice, at 2591 § 8; PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 131 (noting that:  “Of course, one cannot 
always require certain fighting ships, such as fast torpedo-boats and submarines, to collect in all circumstances 
the crews of ships which they have sunk, for they will often have inadequate equipment and insufficient 
accommodation. Submarines stay at sea for a long time and sometimes they neither wish nor are able to put in 
at a port where they could land the persons whom they have collected. Generally speaking, one cannot lay down 
an absolute rule that the commander of a warship must engage in rescue operations if, by so doing, he would 
expose his vessel to attack.”); NWP 1-14M, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 8-
12 ¶ 8.7 (2007) (noting that "[t]o the extent that military exigencies permit, submarines are also required to 
search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded, and sick following an engagement,” but that if “such 
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Thus, the treaty law obligation for soldiers345 to search for and collect the wounded and sick 
would appear to begin earlier in the engagement (i.e. during the heat of the land battle, if 
“possible,”346 perhaps during a lull in fighting),347 versus sailors, who are permitted to wait 
for the naval battle to have ended before doing so.348 
The ICRC Study glosses over this temporal distinction349 by adopting a more generic 
                                                                                                                                                 
humanitarian efforts would subject the submarine to undue additional hazard or prevent it from accomplishing 
its military mission, the location of possible survivors should be passed at the first opportunity to a surface ship, 
aircraft, or shore facility capable of rendering assistance.”) (emphasis added); id. at 8-13 to 8-14 ¶ 8.8 (similar 
requirement for military aircraft “to search for the shipwrecked, wounded, and sick following an engagement at 
sea.”).  Having been the recipient of such largesse at sea, the author can attest to the fact that this is more than 
the naval equivalent of the civilian population coming to the aid of wounded and sick on land.  See generally 
Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 18; Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 17; Additional 
Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 18(1); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2591.  As the age-old 
adage goes, “the sea is a harsh mistress.” 
345 The author’s use of the terms “soldiers” versus “sailors” is admittedly a proxy for the duty on land versus at 
sea.  There are obviously soldiers who operate at sea, (see, e.g., Go.Army.com, Careers & Jobs, Watercraft 
Operator (88K), available at http://www.goarmy.com/JobDetail.do?id=183 (last visited Dec. 16, 2007)) and 
sailors who operate on land (see, e.g., Navy.com, Careers, Special Ops, available at 
http://www.navy.com/careers/enlisted/specialops/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2007)). 
346 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1. 
347 Spain’s Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) Manual adds the requirement to do so “during combat.”  Spain, 
LOAC Manual (1996), Vol. I, § 7.5.a, cited in ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2597 § 66.  
“Cameroon’s Instructors’ Manual provides that evacuation of wounded and sick can take place during combat, 
after combat or during a cease-fire.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2606 § 134 (emphasis 
added). 
348 Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1.  See also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, 
at 2590 § 7.  See generally infra Table 1, p. T-1. 
349 The ICRC Study cites the different language in the first and second Geneva Conventions, but does not make 
note of the temporal distinction.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2591 §§ 5, 7.  Cf. NWP 1-
14M, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 11-4 ¶ 11.6 (2007) (similarly glossing 
over the temporal distinction between land and naval warfare, but by applying the “after each engagement” 
standard to both the duty “to search for and collect the wounded and sick on the field of battle” and the duty “to 
search for and rescue the shipwrecked.”).  By deviating from the treaty language with neither explanation nor 
discussion of its importance, Rule 109 raises the level of uncertainty as to which language prevails.  See supra 
notes 166-171 (discussing whether a subsequent norm of customary international law can modify earlier treaty 
language).  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that “if the customary 
formulation diverges from the treaty language without any apparent reason. … questions may arise as to which 
formulation reflects the normative content of the Rule.  This carries risks of uncertainty and perhaps even of a 
lowering of standards of protection.”); id. at 13, 406 (same); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An 
Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1225 (2005) (same); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 
2, at 10 (noting that the ICRC Study rules have varying degrees of deviation from existing treaty law provisions, 
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“whenever circumstances permit” standard in its proposed Rule 109,350 applicable to all 
wounded and sick (whether on land or at sea), and to the shipwrecked.351  This 
                                                                                                                                                 
with neither explanatory reasons therefor nor any discussion as to the importance of these deviations, be they 
minor or significant); id. at 11-12 (noting the omissions in the language of the ICRC Study rules versus the 
supporting treaty language for the principle of taking precautions against the effects of attacks, and the principle 
of distinction); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 259-60 (2006) 
(noting that the ICRC Study deviates from the language of Additional Protocol I in favor of that used by the 
Rome Statute, but without explaining why).  Cf. ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxix (arguing that 
the ICRC Study “may also be helpful in reducing the uncertainties and the scope for argument inherent in the 
concept of customary international law.”).  At the very least, unexplained deviations from treaty language raises 
a number of questions:  “Why?  What are the implications …?  Which formulation is to be preferred?”  
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 11.  The fact that these questions go unanswered, leaves 
one “with a degree of uncertainty about the normative centre of gravity of the particular Rule.”  Id. at 12.  But 
see id. at 17 (noting that “the inevitability of progressive development” is endemic in any codification simply 
“through the elimination of ambiguity and discarding of anomalous cases, and the systemisation of a field of 
law.”); Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 246-
47 (2006) (arguing that the ICRC Study’s progressive formulation of customary international law norms “is not 
unique in the arena[] of IHL” where judges are guided more by lex ferenda [what the law ought to be] than lex 
lata [what the law is]); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of 
International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 
1217, 1236-37 (2005) (noting that the end result of the ICRC Study “may be a progressive development of the 
law.”); Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the ICRC 
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 181 (2006) (arguing 
that “[w]here there are gaps in existing positive law, states should be encouraged to use the ICRC Study with a 
view to closing such gaps, rather than criticizing progressive statements made in the Study, or taking advantage 
of legal lacunae in a spirit of advocating freedom of operations”).  Contra David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC 
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 202 (2006) 
(criticizing the ICRC Study for its progressive development and for “the suppression of the anomalies and 
inconsistencies inherent to customary law, with a view to arriving at a clear statement of the contemporary law” 
with the attendant “danger of unduly sanitizing the law by seeking to reconcile the irreconcilable.”). 
350 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 (emphasis added).  This language is remarkably similar to 
that in article 8 of Additional Protocol II, which deals with non-international armed conflicts:  “Whenever 
circumstances permit and particularly after an engagement, all possible measures shall be taken, without delay, 
to search for and collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, 
[and] to ensure their adequate care … .”  Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 8 (emphasis added).  See 
also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 397, Vol. II:  Practice, 2591 § 13.  However, State practice in 
non-international armed conflicts consistent with article 8 of Additional Protocol II could not be directly cited 
as support for the proposed Rule 109 in international armed conflicts, except by analogy.  The evacuation 
language is apparently borrowed from the second paragraphs of the relevant articles in the first and second 
Geneva Conventions, which discuss arranging for an armistice, suspension of fire, or local arrangements to 
permit the removal of the wounded.  See Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 2; Geneva 
Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 2. 
351 This glossing over of the temporal distinction between land and naval warfare by the ICRC Study’s proposed 
Rule 109 is not saved by adding the “take all possible measures” language, which is also found in the related 
articles of the first and second Geneva Conventions.  Cf. ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 with 
Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1 and Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1.  
Under the rules of statutory (or treaty) construction, one may not assume that two different phrases in the same 
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oversimplification352 fails to recognize that within the law of armed conflict,353 the law of 
naval warfare is a particularly specialized lex specialis.354 
                                                                                                                                                 
article have the same meaning.  Translating the legal language of Rule 109 of the ICRC Study into laymen’s 
terms might be fairly characterized as:  “do what you can when you can for the wounded and sick.”  These are 
obviously two different, albeit related concepts, since what you can do for the wounded and sick often depends 
on when you are trying to do it. 
352 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (criticizing the ICRC Study for oversimplifying complex and 
nuanced rules). 
353 See supra note 3 (explaining that the Law Of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is synonymous with the Law Of War 
(LOW), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and jus in bello (i.e. the regulation of the conduct of hostilities 
during the course of war). 
354 The Latin maxim lex specialis derogat lex generali (or in the plural form lex specialis derogat legi generali, 
both usually abbreviated lex specialis) is loosely translated as meaning that the more specific rule derogates 
from (or prevails over) the more general rule (or rules).  This rule of interpretation may also be expressed as 
“‘generalia specialibus non derogant’, meaning, general things do not derogate from special.  The other rule of 
interpretation meaning the same thing is – ‘specialia generalibus derogant’ – special things derogate from the 
general one.”  Martin Shroeder & Co. v. Major & Co., [1989] 84 N.S.C.C. 1986 (Nigeria), available at 
http://www.nigeria-law.org/Martin%20Shroeder%20&%20Co%20v%20Major%20&%20Co.htm.  See, e.g., 
PIERRE-ANDRE COTE, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 312 (3d ed. 2000).  However, at least 
since the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons, in which the World Court used the 
maxim to describe the law of armed conflict, the maxim has taken on a slightly different connotation.  Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 ¶ 25 (July 8).  See also 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 ¶ 106 
(July 9) (same).  Lex specialis is commonly used today to indicate that the law of war is a particularly 
specialized area of the law, to which the general norms of international law may not apply, especially human 
rights norms.  See, e.g., John T. Rawcliffe, Changes to the Department of Defense Law of War Program, 2006 
ARMY LAW. 23, 29 n. 39 (2006) (noting that the traditional view is that human rights law is preempted during 
armed conflict); Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello:  The Impact of the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 191 (2006) 
(same; see note following this string citation); Michael J. Dennis, AGORA: ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory:  Application of Human Rights Treaties 
Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 132-33 (2005) 
(same); Heike Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 265, 266 (2006) (same); DINSTEIN, 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 3, at 22-25 (explaining that while “[n]ot all peacetime human rights are 
derogable in wartime” that “most of the substantive protection of human rights in the course of an international 
armed conflict stems from LOIAC [Law of International Armed Conflict] and not from the continued operation 
of non-derogable (peacetime) human rights.”); Louise Doswald-Beck, co-author of ICRC Study, Professor of 
Public International Law and Director of the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law at the 
Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Roundtable Discussion at the North American launch of 
the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in Sabrina 
Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International 
Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 13 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he distinction between humanitarian and 
human rights law … has become less clear over time, and it is now impossible to create purely humanitarian 
rules when examining behaviors that reflect both human rights and humanitarian legal norms.”).  Note that 
Dieter Fleck was one of the “academic and governmental experts” invited by the ICRC to comment on two 
drafts before the ICRC Study was published.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxii, xxiii, l-li; 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, Vol. 87, no. 857, 186 n. 32 (2005).  But see PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
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The ICRC Study’s oversimplification (of the temporal distinction between when the 
obligation to search for and collect the wounded and sick begins on land versus at sea) 
                                                                                                                                                 
ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 41-42 (noting that “there is substantial authority to support the proposition that, 
in general, the outbreak of hostilities at most only suspends the operation of a  multilateral treaty in relations 
between the opposing States”).  This article postulates that the law of naval warfare is a particularly specialized 
area of the law of war, or lex specialis specialis.  See, e.g. Canada, Law of Armed Conflict Manual (1999), 9-1 
§ 10 (cited by ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2606 § 132) (differentiating between the rules 
regarding the evacuation of the wounded and sick during land versus sea engagements); New Zealand, Military 
Manual (1992), §§ 314(2), 1003(1) (cited by ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2607 § 145) 
(same); NWP 1-14M, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2-1 ¶ 2.1 (2007) 
(explaining the sovereign immunity of naval vessels); id. at 12-2 ¶ 12.3.3 (explaining that “[t]he law of armed 
conflict applicable to land warfare has no rule of law analogous to that which permits belligerent warships to 
display neutral colors.  Belligerents engaged in armed conflicts on land are not permitted to use the flags, 
insignia, or uniforms of a neutral nation to deceive the enemy.”); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra 
note 3, at 206 (same).  This view is also somewhat supported by the ICRC Study’s decision “not to research 
customary law applicable to naval warfare as this area of the law was recently the subject of a major 
restatement, namely the San Remo Manual on Naval Warfare.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 
xxx.  The historic origin of this distinction between land and naval warfare relates “to the special conditions 
prevailing at sea.”  PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 132.  See supra note 344.  Naval warfare 
is, by definition, a more fluid battlefield than land warfare.  Unlike land warfare, which is conducted in a fixed 
territory typically controlled by one of the combatants, naval warfare typically occurs in international waters, 
which are controlled by no one.  UNCLOS, supra note 171, at art. 87.  Thus, the concept of “battlespace” at sea 
is less well-defined.  See, e.g., 2007 U.S. Maritime Strategy 7, available at 
http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf (noting that “[t]he sea is a vast maneuver space”).  
Moreover, naval warfare tends to drift more than land warfare, with the risk of maneuvering into a third State’s 
sovereign territorial seas.  A case in point is Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR, pronounced “sea sar”), which 
is greatly simplified on land versus on the sea.  The location of a downed airman or the crew of a disabled 
vehicle on land is generally either known, or more readily verifiable than a downed airman or the crew of a 
disabled small boat at sea.  Moreover, the former tend to drift less than the latter, which are subject to the 
prevailing winds and to sea currents.  Interview with LCDR Jason Krajewski, U.S. Coast Guard, The Judge 
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, in Charlottesville, Va. (Aug. 28, 2007).  Whereas it may be 
possible to send a small CSAR team to search for and collect a downed airman or the crew of a disabled vehicle 
on land with a calculated risk to themselves of succumbing to enemy fire, the risk of doing so at sea rises 
exponentially; the crew of the small boat sent on the CSAR mission could never be assured of successfully 
rendezvousing with its mother ship afterwards, particularly during the intense maneuvering of a naval battle.  
Moreover, a small boat would potentially need to contend with a myriad of associated risks, such as a high sea 
state, the risk of being swamped or capsizing, the risk of being lost at sea, the risk of running aground, etc.  The 
higher natural threat environment of naval warfare would preclude a military commander from assessing the 
reward of such an endeavor to be worth the tremendous risks involved.  But see Scott T. Price, The U.S. Coast 
Guard at Normandy, http://www.uscg.mil/history/h_normandy.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) (detailing the 
heroic efforts of the USCG Rescue Flotilla Onew (aka “matchbox fleet) during the D-Day invasion of 
Normandy on June 5, 1944).  One final point of distinction, is the role of civilians in the search and rescue 
effort.  Civilians may play a permissive role in search and rescue on land.  Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, 
at art. 18.  Thus, civilians would not be expected to enter the land battlespace to search for persons requiring 
assistance, absent an armistice, suspension of fire, or local arrangements.  See Geneva Convention I, supra note 
24, at art. 15, ¶ 2; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 2.  However, civilians at sea are obligated 
to render assistance to persons in distress, wherever they may find them (i.e. even in the naval battlespace).  See 
generally Craig H. Allen, The Maritime Law Forum:  Australia's Tampa Incident:  The Convergence of 
International and Domestic Refugee and Maritime Law in the Pacific Rim:  The Tampa Incident:  IMO 
Perspectives and Responses on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 143, 148-53 
(2003). 
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conflates two different legal obligations under the first and second Geneva Conventions.  The 
ICRC Study’s “whenever circumstances permit” standard departs from the treaty law 
standard under the first Geneva Convention by lowering the land warfare standard of “[a]t 
all times.”355  It simultaneously departs from the treaty law standard under the second 
Geneva Convention by raising the naval warfare standard of “[a]fter each engagement”356 to 
perhaps earlier in the engagement if “circumstances permit.”357 
As previously mentioned, a proponent of a new norm of customary international law 
that purports to modify an earlier treaty-based obligation would have to show sufficiently 
dense State practice with sufficiently clear opinio juris.358  Unfortunately, neither the 
commentary to proposed Rule 109 in Volume I, nor the related State practice in Volume II of 
the ICRC Study addresses this temporal distinction between land and naval warfare 
whatsoever.359  Thus, the State practice cited by the ICRC Study does not support the new 
                                               
355 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).  For example, a properly advised 
Army commander might feel obligated to send a squad of soldiers to search for and collect wounded and sick 
earlier in the land battle if he is advised that the requirement is to do so “[a]t all times, and particularly after an 
engagement,” versus if he is advised that the requirement is the less rigorous “whenever circumstances permit” 
standard of the proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study.  Cf. Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1 
with ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396.  See generally infra Table 1, p. T-1. 
356 Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).  See also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, 
Vol. II:  Practice, at 2590 § 7. 
357 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 (emphasis added).  For example, a properly advised Navy 
commander might feel obligated to send a small boat to search for and collect wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
earlier in the naval battle if she is advised that the requirement is the more rigorous “whenever circumstances 
permit” standard of Rule 109 of the ICRC Study versus if she is advised that the requirement is to do so “[a]fter 
each engagement.”  Cf. ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 with Geneva Convention II, supra 
note 24, at, art. 18, ¶ 1.  See generally infra Table 1, p. T-1. 
358 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a 
significant number of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
359 See generally ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396-99, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2590-614.  Cf. NWP 
1-14M, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 11-4 ¶ 11.6 (2007) (similarly glossing 
over the temporal distinction between land and naval warfare, but by applying the “after each engagement” 
standard to both the duty “to search for and collect the wounded and sick on the field of battle” and the duty “to 
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norm of customary international humanitarian law espoused in the proposed Rule 109 that 
ignores the temporal distinction made by the first and second Geneva Conventions (between 
when the obligation to search for and collect the wounded and sick on land arises versus 
when to do so for those at sea). 
International Armed Conflicts—Without Adverse Distinction.  The one aspect of the 
proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study which is consistent with the Geneva Conventions is 
that the wounded, sick and shipwrecked must be treated “without adverse distinction” based 
on any non-medical grounds.360  In other words, it is permissible to discriminate among the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked in terms of care provided, but the only grounds for doing so 
must be medical ones.361  However, this begs the question whether the prohibition against 
adverse distinction among wounded, sick and shipwrecked is followed by States pursuant to 
a general sense of legal obligation,362 or pursuant to treaty obligations under the Geneva 
                                                                                                                                                 
search for and rescue the shipwrecked.”). 
360 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396.  See also id. at 308-11; Geneva Convention I, supra note 
24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at 
art. 10(2); AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at §§ 452-453.  Although the wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
must not be discriminated against on the basis of any non-medical reason, the protections afforded civilian 
versus combatant wounded, sick and shipwrecked remain.  See supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text.  
Put alternatively, a group of civilian wounded, sick or shipwrecked can only be sorted using medical triage 
principles, but not according to nationality.  Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Geneva 
Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3.  See also PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 5, at 55 ¶ 2.A 
(citing to 1864, 1906 and 1929 Geneva Conventions’ use of terminology “whatever the nation to which they 
belong” and “without distinction of nationality”).  Nevertheless, civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked can be 
segregated from combatant wounded, sick and shipwrecked.  See, e.g. THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (2004), at ¶ 7.3.2 (noting that “[t]here is no absolute obligation on the 
part of the military medical services to accept civilian wounded and sick—that is to be done only so far as it is 
practicable to do so. … Once the treatment of a civilian patient has commenced, however, discrimination 
against him on other than medical grounds is not permissible.”).  See generally infra Table 1, p. T-1. 
361 See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 
12, ¶ 3.  Another way to put this obligation towards the wounded, sick and shipwrecked is that it is not 
derogable on the basis of any non-medical reason (e.g. “sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any 
other similar criteria”).  Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 
24, at art. 12, ¶ 3. 
362 See Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 819 (2005) (noting 
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Conventions.363 
Claimed dearth of “official contrary [State] practice.”  The final substantive point to 
be made regarding the proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study is the Study’s reliance on a lack 
of “official contrary [State] practice” as being supportive of the proposed rule.364  Just as 
consistent State practice done out of a sense of legal obligation supports a new norm of 
customary international law,365 “[c]ontrary practice of States … has been considered as 
important negative evidence [of a lack of customary international law].”366  However, the 
converse is not true that the absence of contrary State practice necessarily supports the 
existence of a customary international law norm—two negatives do not make a positive.367  
                                                                                                                                                 
that “the customary law character of … practically [] the entire corpus of the Geneva Conventions, is now taken 
for granted and virtually never questioned.”). 
363 See supra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ’s admonition to not consider 
lightly the possibility of treaty law passing into customary international law); supra note 205 (arguing that the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions have become customary international law in toto). 
364 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 398. 
365 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
366 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xliv (emphasis added).  Although certainly a violation of a 
customary international law norm “[does] not prove its non-existence, if the violation is met by protestations 
from observer nations about the illegality of the action.”  Legitimate Conquests?, Posting of Eugene 
Kontorovich to Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1185508439.shtml (July 27, 2007 11:31).  See, 
e.g. Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 820 (2005) (same); 
DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 2 (arguing that the ICRC Study gives inadequate weight to negative 
practice); id. at attachment p. 9 (noting that the ICRC Study Rule 45 mischaracterizes France, the U.K., and the 
U.S. as merely being persistent objectors to a customary international law norm against the use of nuclear 
weapons (because the use of nuclear weapons may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment), when in fact “these three States are not simply persistent objectors, but 
rather [provide contrary State practice] that the rule has not formed into a customary rule at all.”); 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 36, 41, 233 (same); Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 13-14 ¶ 13 (2006) (same).  Contra Posting of 
Dapo Akande to Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1178652249.shtml#3680 ¶ 3 (May 8, 2007, 
18:16) (arguing that no State is a specially affected State with regard to nuclear weapons, since their potential 
use affects all States erga omnes). 
367 See David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 210 (2006) (“Positive affirmation of the existence of a customary rule, in 
international law, demands strict proof; to extrapolate the existence of a rule from a lack of State practice to the 
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The absence of contrary State practice is not the equivalent of consistent State practice, and 
thus cannot ipso facto imply that a new norm of customary international law exists.368 
Summary.  Proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study postulates a new norm of 
customary international humanitarian law that deviates from existing treaty obligations in at 
least three significant ways.  First, it conflates the protections owed to combatant versus 
civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked.369  Second, it seeks to extend the obligations to 
search for, collect and evacuate wounded, sick and shipwrecked in toto to non-international 
armed conflicts.370  Third, it ignores the temporal distinction between land and naval warfare 
                                                                                                                                                 
contrary is, at the very least, wrong as a matter of doctrine.”).  Cf. id. at 227 (arguing that “the fact that there is 
no State practice to support the use of a given weapon does not ipso facto mean that there is a rule of customary 
international law prohibiting that weapon’s use.”).  The ICRC Study’s argument that a lack of contrary State 
practice supports a new norm of customary international law is logically fallacious for at least three reasons.  
First, the ICRC argument attempts to shift the burden of proof to an opponent to disprove a proposed norm, 
rather than for the proponent to prove its existence, as is the standard.  See supra note 133 and accompanying 
text.  Any proponent of a new norm of customary international law, however farfetched (see infra note 368), 
could argue that a lack of contrary State practice supports the new norm.  If this were the standard, the burden 
would then shift to an opponent of the proposed norm to rally evidence to the contrary.  The ICRC approach 
thus turns the formation of customary international law on its head!  See supra notes 92-133 (discussing the 
traditional understanding of how customary international law is formed).  Second, the argument assumes that 
there are only two possible choices:  either for or against the proposed norm, as formulated and in its entirety.  
However, there are a myriad of other possible choices.  See, e.g., DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 1 
(noting that “particular rules or elements of those rules may well be applicable in the context of some categories 
of armed conflict.”) (emphasis added).  For example, with regard to Rule 109, State A could generally support 
the proposed norm, but not its application to civilians.  State B could agreed with the proposed rule, but think 
that there is a paucity of State practice in support of it, and thus that it had not yet ripened into a norm of 
customary international law.  Presumably the practice of neither State A nor State B would be contrary to the 
proposed rule, yet neither would support it as a new norm of customary international law in its entirety, at least 
not at this time.  The third logical fallacy with the ICRC argument is that it ignores the opinio juris requirement.  
Even supposing that a lack of contrary practice somehow qualifies as State practice, it still must be done out of 
a sense of legal obligation.  Interview with MAJ Jose Cora, U.S. Army, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal 
Center and School, in Charlottesville, Va. (Aug. 6, 2007).  See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.  
However, proving a negative (i.e. that a State refrains from a particular practice out of a sense of legal 
obligation) is very difficult indeed. 
368 There are sufficient wild claims of the existence of customary international law norms without adding to the 
clutter by proving a customary international law norm by the absence of contrary State practice.  See, e.g. Justin 
L. Koplow, Assessing the Creation of a Duty Under International Customary Law Whereby the United States of 
America Would be Obligated to Defend a Foreign State Against the Catastrophic but Localized Damage of an 
Asteroid Impact, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 273 (2005). 
369 See supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text. 
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regarding when to search for and collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.371 
  The State practice cited for the proposed new norm is either surprisingly thin,372 or 
nonexistent.373  Nor can the absence of contrary State practice support a new norm of 
customary international law.374  The only two aspects of the proposed Rule 109 which appear 
to be supportable as norms of customary international law are that the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked must be treated “without adverse distinction” based on any non-medical 
grounds,375 and that shipwrecked civilians are entitled to the same protections as shipwrecked 
combatants.376  However, since the former obligation is required by the first and second 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which every State is a party,377 the ICRC Study poses the 
paradox of attempting to use State practice consistent with treaty-based obligations to support 
a subsequent norm of customary international law.378 
                                                                                                                                                 
370 See supra notes 284-340 and accompanying text; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as 
one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether 
customary international law provides a more detailed framework for non-international armed conflicts.”). 
371 See supra notes 341-359 and accompanying text. 
372 See supra note 281 (discussing the relatively thin State practice cited in support of the application of 
obligations to civilians); supra notes 313, 329, 338 (discussing the relatively thin State practice in support of the 
application of obligations in non-international armed conflicts).  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 
3, at 2 (noting that “for many rules proffered as rising to the level of customary international law, the State 
practice cited is insufficiently dense to meet the ‘extensive and virtually uniform’ standard generally required to 
demonstrate the existence of a customary rule.”); id. at attachment p. 21 (noting that the “[t]he practice of six 
States is very weak evidence of the existence of a norm of customary international law.”). 
373 See supra note 359 (discussing the complete lack of State practice addressing the temporal distinction). 
374 See supra notes 364-368. 
375 See supra notes 360-363 and accompanying text. 
376 See supra note 268. 
377 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
378 See supra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text. 
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(B) Rule 110:  Duty to Care For the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
The wounded, sick and shipwrecked must receive, to the fullest extent 
practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention 
required by their condition.  No distinction may be made among them 
founded on any grounds other than medical ones. 
Proposed Rule 110 of the ICRC Study requires that the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked be treated humanely, which is “the fundamental principle underlying the four 
Geneva Conventions.”379  However, similarly to Rule 109, the ICRC Study recognizes that 
the obligation espoused by Rule 110 “is an obligation of means.”380  Similarly, whereas the 
obligation under Rule 109 is “to take all possible measures381 to search for, collect and 
evacuate the wounded, sick and shipwrecked,”382 the obligation under Rule 110 is to provide 
care “to the fullest extent practicable,”383 or in other words, “[e]ach party to the conflict must 
use its best efforts to provide … care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.”384  This 
includes “permitting humanitarian organisations to provide for their protection and care.”385  
                                               
379 PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 5, at 52 ¶ 2.A.  See also Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at 
art. 10(2). 
380 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 402. 
381 See supra note 341-342 and accompanying text (discussing how the language “take all possible measures” is 
identical to that found in the related articles of the first and second Geneva Conventions.  Cf. ICRC STUDY, 
supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 with Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1 and Geneva 
Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1. 
382 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396. 
383 Id. at 400 (emphasis added). 
384 Id. at 402 (emphasis added). 
385 Id.  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at attachment pp. 1-6 (questioning obligation of States 
to permit humanitarian organizations, such as the ICRC, to conduct their business without explicit permission).  
But see ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 402 (“It is clear that in practice these [humanitarian] 
organizations need permission from the party in control of a certain area to provide protection and care, but 
such permission must not be denied arbitrarily (see also commentary to Rule 55).”; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 527-
28 (2006); AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at § 2805. 
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Thus, once again the ICRC Study has built into its proposed rule a notion of military 
feasibility or practicability.386  The ICRC Study also again professes that this is a customary 
international law norm “applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.”387 
Similar to those with regard to Rule 109, the key issues with regard to proposed Rule 
110 would appear to be:  the obligations owed to combatants versus civilians;388 the 
obligations to care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in non-international armed 
conflicts;389 the treatment of wounded, sick and shipwrecked without adverse distinction;390 
and the claimed dearth of contrary State practice as support for the proffered norm.391  Each 
of these issues will be discussed in turn. 
International Armed Conflicts—Combatants vs. Civilians.  Unlike the proposed Rule 
109, Rule 110 of the ICRC Study does not expressly include civilians within the duty to care 
for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.392  Nevertheless, the commentary393 to Rule 110 
                                               
386 See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the military feasibility implicit in Rule 109 of the 
ICRC Study). 
387 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400.  See also id. at 402. 
388 See infra notes 392-429 and accompanying text. 
389 See infra notes 430-440 and accompanying text. 
390 See infra notes 441-445 and accompanying text. 
391 See infra notes 446-447 and accompanying text. 
392 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 396 with id. at 400. 
393 Because the rules are often oversimplified, they “should not be read on their own, without regard to the 
Commentary.  A publication which contained only the Rules would give a misleading account of customary 
international humanitarian law, for this reason alone.”  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 
405-06.  See also Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 262 
(2006) (noting the ICRC Study “rules themselves cannot be seen as self-contained. … the rules in the Study 
have to be read with their commentaries.”); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 (noting “how the 
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intimates that civilians arguably may be included because it:  (1) cites military manuals as 
being “phrased in general terms covering all wounded, sick and shipwrecked,”394 and (2) 
cites to Article 10 of Additional Protocol I, which repeats the “[a]ll the wounded, sick and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Study’s methodological flaws undermine the ability of States to rely, without further independent analysis, on 
the rules the Study proposes.”); Jamieson L. Greer, A Critique of the ICRC’s Customary Rules Concerning 
Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity, 192 MIL. L. REV. 116, 120 
(2007) (noting that “the ICRC’s commentary is much more helpful as a description of the current state of affairs 
than the rule [131] is as a representation of customary law.”).  Contra Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 527 (2006) (one 
of the ICRC Study’s authors arguing that “only the black letter rules are identified as part of customary 
international law, and not the commentaries to the rules.  The commentaries may, however, contain useful 
clarifications with respect to the application of the black letter rules and this is sometimes overlooked by 
commentators.”).  Moreover, overreliance should not be placed on the practice in Volume II, because 
apparently only the State practice referenced in the commentary was used to formulate the rules.  PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 45 (citing a personal communication with Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
one of the ICRC Study’s authors).  But see Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 
AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 693 (2007) (book review) (describing the “capsule explanations and the briefest of 
summations of practice in the first volume” of the ICRC Study).  Thus the commentary to the rules would 
appear to be more important than either the rules by themselves, or the State practice cited in Volume II.  But 
see Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (noting that 
“[i]n what may be symptomatic of future practice, the [ICTY] appeals chamber cited indications of practice 
demonstrated by the [ICRC] study, rather than the black-letter rule that the study’s authors based on those 
indications.  In my view, this approach is prudent.”); George H. Aldrich, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505 (2006) (noting the ICRC Study’s “importance rests on its being used as a basis for 
further work, and as a spur to such works, rather than on its conclusions.”).  Nevertheless, the present article 
will not confine itself to only examining the practice cited in the commentary, because this limitation was not 
made clear in the Study itself, as it should have been.  Id.  See also Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 6 ¶ 11 (2006) (noting that the editors of the 
ICRC Study “opted, to be on the safe side, to predicate the Rules more on legislative Codes and military 
Manuals than on any other single source of practice.”). 
394 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400 (emphasis added).  See supra notes 273-275 (criticizing the 
ICRC Study for its overgeneralization and mischaracterization of U.S. and at least nine other military manuals, 
which, in fact, differentiate between the treatment owed to military and civilian wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked).  See also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2634-35 §§ 357, 371 (noting that 
Australia’s 1994 Defence Force Manual and New Zealand’s 1992 Military Manual provide that “’there is no 
absolute obligation to accept civilian wounded and sick,” but that “once civilian patients have been accepted, 
discrimination against them, on any grounds other than medical, is not permissible’.”).  Australia’s 1994 
Defence Force Manual and New Zealand’s 1992 Military Manual would appear to be at odds with the 
provisions of the Additional Protocols to care for wounded, sick and shipwrecked combatants and civilians 
alike.  Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 10(2) and Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 7(2).  
Yet Australia acceded to the Additional Protocols three years before it published its 1994 Defence Force 
Manual, and New Zealand acceded to them four years before it published its 1992 Military Manual!  ICRC, 
State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  This is an excellent example of why not to overly rely on military manuals as 
evidence of State practice. 
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shipwrecked” language,395 with these groups being defined earlier in Article 8 of Additional 
Protocol I as including “persons, whether military or civilian.”396  Moreover, the language of 
Rule 110 is substantially similar to that used in Article 10(2) of Additional Protocol I and 
Article 7 of Additional Protocol II, both of which include civilians within their protections.397  
Thus, just as Rule 109 expressly seeks to extend the duty to search for, collect and evacuate 
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked to include civilians, 398 Rule 110 implicitly extends the 
duty to care for wounded, sick and shipwrecked combatants to include caring for their 
civilian counterparts. 
Including civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked within the protections afforded 
under the proposed Rule 110 of the ICRC Study proposes a new norm of customary 
international law that deviates from the four Geneva Conventions, and that embraces the 
admittedly innovative rule contained in the Additional Protocols.399  As previously 
mentioned, a proponent of a new norm of customary international law that purports to 
                                               
395 Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 10(1). 
396 Id. at art. 8(1) & (2). 
397 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400 with Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 
10(2) and Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 7.  See also AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at § 
4639.  See generally infra Table 1, p. T-1. 
398 See supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text (analyzing how Rule 109 extends protections beyond the 
Geneva Conventions to include civilians). 
399 See supra notes 264-266 and accompanying text (citing to the ICRC Commentary to the 1977 Additional 
Protocols as recognizing that the rules were an innovation vis-à-vis the four Geneva Conventions of 1949).  See 
generally AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242; Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 3 ¶ 4, 14 (2006) (questioning whether the real impetus for 
the ICRC Study was an effort to claim that the provisions in Additional Protocol I had achieved the status of 
customary international law); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 236 (2006) (same); George H. Aldrich, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505-06 (2006) (same); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 833 (2005) (same); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 9-10 (noting 
that the ICRC Study rules rely heavily on the treaty provisions of Additional Protocol I, which may “be seen 
simply as an attempt to get around the non-application of the treaty to certain States.”). 
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modify an earlier treaty-based obligation would have to show sufficiently dense State 
practice with sufficiently clear opinio juris.400  The materials cited by the ICRC Study in 
support of proposed Rule 110 do neither.401 
The commentary to proposed Rule 110 cites to military manuals and domestic 
legislation in support of the new norm of customary international law.402  However, the vast 
majority of the military manuals403 cited by Rule 110 are consistent with existing treaty 
obligations under the Geneva Conventions (i.e. they do not extend their protections to 
civilians).404  Of those military manuals which do appear to support the expanded language 
of the Additional Protocols, and hence the language of the proposed Rule 110, the manuals of 
six States are all merely consistent with their treaty obligations, as they all became parties to 
one or both of the Additional Protocols before the publication of the military manuals 
                                               
400 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a 
significant number of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
401 The ICRC Study once again lists “Practice of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement” in 
support of its proposed Rule 110.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2630-32, 2638-39 §§ 328-
340, 396-400.  See supra note 305 and accompanying text (criticizing the hubris of the ICRC for citing to itself, 
a Swiss NGO, as evidence of State Practice in support of a proposed norm of customary international law). 
402 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400. 
403 See supra notes 49, 114, 317, 328, 394 and accompanying text (noting the weaknesses of citing to military 
manuals as evidence of State practice). 
404 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2617-25 §§ 216-217 (Australia), §§ 218-219 (Belgium), § 
220 (Benin), § 221 (Bosnia and Herzegovina), § 222 (Burkina Faso), §§ 223-224 (Cameroon), §§ 227-229 
(Colombia), § 230 (Congo), §§ 231-233 (Croatia), § 234 (Ecuador), §§ 236-238 (France), §§ 239-240 
(Germany), § 241 (Hungary), § 244 (Indonesia), § 245 (Israel), § 246 (Italy), § 247 (Kenya), § 248 (Lebanon), § 
249 (Madagascar), § 250 (Mali), § 251 (Morocco), § 255 (New Zealand), § 256 (Nicaragua), § 265 (Romania), 
§ 266 (Russia), § 268 (Senegal), § 270 (Spain), § 273 (Switzerland), § 274 (Togo), §§ 276-277 (U.K.), §§ 278-
281 (U.S.).  Of course, the fact that these military manuals do not extend their protections to civilians also 
argues against the ICRC Study’s characterization of them as being in “general terms covering all wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked.”  Id., Vol. I:  Rules, at 400 (emphasis added).  See also supra notes 273-275 and 
accompanying text (discussing the ICRC Study’s mischaracterization of military manuals of the U.S. and at 
least nine other States with regard to Rule 109); ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2635 §§ 241, 
366 (noting that Hungary’s Military Manual “makes an explicit reference to GC I as being the regime 
applicable to the wounded and sick.” 
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cited.405  This, once again, raises the difficulty of discerning opinio juris from State practice 
that is merely consistent with existing treaty law obligations.406 
This leaves El Salvador, India, Nigeria, Sweden and Uganda as the five sole 
supporters of a new norm of customary international law, as their military manuals cited in 
support of the proposed Rule 110 of the ICRC Study either are undated,407 predate their 
accession to the Additional Protocols,408 or they are not party to the Additional Protocols at 
all (which is the case for India).409  However, as previously noted, it is difficult to argue that 
the military manuals of five States constitute sufficiently dense State practice upon which to 
base a new norm of customary international humanitarian law.410 
                                               
405 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2617-19, 2621-23 §§ 214-
215 (Argentina), §§ 225-226 (Canada), §§ 252-254 (the Netherlands), §§ 261-264 (Philippines), § 267 
(Rwanda), § 269 (South Africa), with ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at attachment p. 10 (making a 
similar complaint about proposed Rule 45 of the ICRC Study); supra note 275 (making a similar complaint 
about proposed Rule 109 of the ICRC Study). 
406 See supra notes 163, 221-222.   
407 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2619 § 235 (El Salvador). 
408 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, 2622, 2624 §§ 257-260 
(Nigeria), §§ 271-272 (Sweden), §  275 (Uganda) with ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available 
at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  “Sweden’s IHL Manual, in particular, identifies Article 10 of Additional Protocol I 
as a codification of customary international law.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400.  This once 
again begs the question whether these five States’ compliance with an arguably new norm of customary 
international law was subsumed by their subsequent accession to the Additional Protocols (except for India, of 
course).  See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
409 See ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2620-21 §§ 242-243.  See 
generally ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
410 See supra notes 281, 313, 329, 338, 359 (discussing the paucity of State practice cited by the ICRC Study in 
support of new norms of customary international law).  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra 
note 2, at 202 (noting that “[t]he paucity and reliance on recent practice is a continuing problem with the 
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The commentary to proposed Rule 110 also cites to domestic legislation in support of 
the new norm of customary international law.411  As for Rule 109,412 Rule 110 cites to the 
domestic legislation of Ireland and Norway, which specifically criminalize violations of the 
Additional Protocols.413  Yet their domestic legislation was amended only months before 
their respective ratifications of the Additional Protocols, and thus “[f]rom their action no 
inference could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary international 
law ….”414  In addition, Colombia’s Penal Code criminalizes the failure to provide care to 
“protected persons,” which it defines as including those protected by the Additional 
Protocols.415  However, Colombia likewise was merely complying with its treaty obligations, 
since it had ratified the Additional Protocols in 1993 and 1995 respectively.416 
                                                                                                                                                 
Study”); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 208 (2006) (noting “the paucity of the evidence cited in support of [the ICRC 
Study’s] contentions”). 
411 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2625-26 §§ 282-298.  Once again, the 
ICRC Study cites to draft legislation from Argentina and El Salvador.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  
Rules, at 401, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2625-26 §§ 282, 289.  As tenuous as citing to domestic legislation is in this 
area, citing to draft legislation is sheer folly.  See supra note 331. 
412 See supra note 333. 
413 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2626, 2637 §§ 291-292, 389-390. 
414 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 ¶ 76 (Feb. 20) (emphasis added).  
See also ILA Report on CIL, supra note 132, at 46-47 § 24; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra 
note 21, at 170.  See infra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text (arguing that State actions in compliance 
with treaty obligations do not generally provide evidence of State practice in support of a related customary 
international law norm); supra note 333 (discussing Ireland’s and Norway’s domestic legislation, which was 
passed within a few months before they ratified the Additional Protocols. 
415 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2625 § 286; Colombian Law 
599/2000 (New Penal Code), art. 135, available at http://www.wihl.nl/finals/Colombia/CO.L-
PC.Title%20II%20(New%20Col.%20Penal%20Code)%20Trans.pdf. 
416 ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  See Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 85(1). 
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The only “battlefield practice” cited by the ICRC Study for extending the duty to care 
for civilians are instructions given to French armed forces during a French military 
simulation in 1995.417  However, since the commentary to the ICRC Study did not mention 
this “battlefield” practice, it was presumably not considered in developing Rule 110.418  The 
only additional State practice cited as being supportive of extending the same protections to 
civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked as their combatant counterparts is the “Report on the 
Practice of the Philippines.”419  Once again we must question the propriety of citing to a 
working draft of the Study itself which is not generally available for examination.420 
Thus even taken altogether, the State practice cited in support of Rule 110’s new 
norm of customary international humanitarian law, extending the duty to care for wounded, 
sick and shipwrecked civilians, is not sufficiently dense upon which to base a new norm of 
customary international law.421 
                                               
417 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2627 § 303. 
418 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 45 (citing a personal communication with Dr. Jean-
Marie Henckaerts, one of the ICRC Study’s authors, that apparently only the State practice referenced in the 
commentary was used to formulate the rules.).  See also Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 6 ¶ 11 (2006) (noting that the editors of the ICRC Study 
“opted, to be on the safe side, to predicate the Rules more on legislative Codes and military Manuals than on 
any other single source of practice.”).  But see Dino Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 
AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 693 (2007) (book review) (describing the “capsule explanations and the briefest of 
summations of practice in the first volume” of the ICRC Study). 
419 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2628, § 309.  See also supra note 278 and accompanying 
text (referencing the same portion of the report of the practice of the Republic of the Philippines).  But see supra 
note 280 and accompanying text (criticizing the ICRC Study for citing to these “Reports” of State practice as 
further evidence of State practice, when they merely represent a working draft of the ICRC Study itself, and 
they are not generally available for examination). 
420 See supra note 280 and accompanying text (questioning the propriety of citing to a working draft document 
of the ICRC Study, which is not generally available for review). 
421 Although not presented by the ICRC Study, a viable argument could be made that the requirement under 
Article 16 of Geneva Convention IV to “assist the shipwrecked” is sufficiently broad to include caring for them.  
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 16.  See also supra note 268 (citing references that include 
civilians within the definition of shipwrecked persons entitled to protection). 
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Nevertheless, there exists additional relevant U.S. “battlefield practice” regarding 
providing medical treatment to wounded civilians that was not considered by the ICRC 
Study.422  However, it is important to distinguish in this context between official recognition 
of legal obligations, U.S. Department of Defense policy, and actual battlefield practice.423 
U.S. Army field manuals and other documents officially recognize that there is no 
legal obligation to treat wounded civilians.424  Yet at least one Army field manual and a 
Department of Defense instruction recognize the policy of possibly providing initial 
treatment to civilians injured by U.S. military operations.425  This possible provision of initial 
                                               
422 See infra notes 426-428 and accompanying text. 
423 See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L 
L. PROC. 208, 209 (2005) (distinguishing between government statements that represent policy decisions versus 
“a government’s declaration of its interpretation of its law of war obligations”); Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal 
Adviser to the U.S. Department of State (speaking in his personal capacity), Roundtable Discussion at the North 
American launch of the ICRC Study at the American University Washington College of Law (Sep. 28, 2005), in 
Sabrina Balgamwalla, Review of Conference:  The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of 
International Humanitarian Law, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 14 (2006) (noting that “States place rules in manuals 
for a variety of reasons, not always because they believe they are legally obligated to do so ….  Often practice 
that is reflected in the manuals is based on a policy of including a certain rule, rather than a sense that the rule 
flows from a legal obligation.”). 
424 Army FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956), § 208 (noting that wounded and sick combatants are 
covered by the first Geneva Convention versus other wounded and sick, who are governed by the fourth Geneva 
Convention); U.S. Army FM 4-02, FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 4-3 ¶ 4-4.a(1)(e) 
(2003) (noting that “[w]ounded and sick civilians have the benefit of the safeguards of the GC.”); CTR. FOR 
LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, FORGED IN THE 
FIRE:  LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS (1994-2006) 30 (2006) (noting that 
“[g]enerally, during combat operations non-coalition personnel were not entitled to full medical care by the U.S. 
military.”). 
425 U.S. Army FM 4-02.6, THE MEDICAL COMPANY A-5 ¶ A-4 (2002) (explaining that “[c]ivilians who are 
injured … as a result of military operations may be collected and provided initial medical treatment in 
accordance with theater policies.  If treated, treatment will be on the basis of medical priority only and they 
shall be transferred to appropriate civil authorities as soon as possible.”) (emphasis added); Department of 
Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces 19 ¶ 6.3.8 
(Oct. 3, 2005) (mentioning the possible provision of “resuscitative care, stabilization, hospitalization …, and 
assistance with patient movement” for “contingency contractor personnel”).; Department of Defense Instruction 
3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces 24 ¶ E2.1.3 (Oct. 3, 2005) 
(defining “Contingency Contractor Personnel” as “including U.S. citizens, U.S. legal aliens, TCNs [Third 
Country Nationals], and citizens of HNs [Host Nations] who are authorized to accompany U.S. military forces 
in contingency operations or other military operations”). 
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treatment to wounded civilians was limited as a matter of policy during OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 
to “local nationals” employed by either the United States or by a U.S. defense contractor,426 
and “only for injuries that threatened their life, limbs, or eyesight.”427  However, the actual 
battlefield practice was that “U.S. military medical personnel ordinarily treated individuals 
[i.e. civilians] injured by coalition forces, regardless of their injuries [and presumably 
regardless of whether they were employees of the U.S. or of a U.S. defense contractors].”428  
Thus, this additional relevant U.S. “battlefield practice” does not support the proposed rule 
either, due to the number of caveats and limitations on its application.429 
Non-international armed conflicts.  The treaty law obligation under Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions is simply for all States in non-international armed conflicts to 
collect and care for the wounded, sick430 and shipwrecked,431 and to treat them humanely.432  
                                               
426 CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, 
FORGED IN THE FIRE:  LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS (1994-2006) 200-01 (2006); 
Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed 
Forces 19 ¶ 6.3.8 (Oct. 3, 2005). 
427 CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, 
FORGED IN THE FIRE:  LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS (1994-2006) 30, 31 (2006); 
Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed 
Forces 19 ¶ 6.3.8 (Oct. 3, 2005). 
428 CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, 
FORGED IN THE FIRE:  LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS (1994-2006) 30 (2006). 
429 Thus, while no civilian could be assured of receiving emergency medical treatment from military personnel, 
a civilian employee (of either the U.S. or of a U.S. defense contractor) could hope to be treated if she was 
injured as a result of coalition operations (no pre-existing conditions), and her injuries were sufficiently serious 
that they were either life-threatening, or she risked losing one or more limbs or her eyesight.  Then, perhaps, she 
would get initial treatment sufficient to stabilize her medical condition long enough to transfer her to a civilian 
hospital.  It would be difficult to argue that this was a relatively consistent State practice by the United States, 
let alone that it was performed out of a sense of legal obligation.  See supra notes 107-133 and accompanying 
text (discussing these traditional elements of customary international law). 
430 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3(2); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3(2).  See also ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2615 § 192. 
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The ICRC Study departs from this universal standard when it borrows language from the 
Additional Protocols:  “must receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least 
possible delay.”433  Yet the ICRC Study provides no discussion, analysis or support for using 
the more expansive language of the Additional Protocols either in the commentary to Rule 
110 in Volume I, or in the related State practice in Volume II, other than pro forma citations 
to the Additional Protocols as “codifying” this proposed norm.434 
Moreover, the sole domestic case,435 and all seven of the military manuals cited by 
the ICRC Study in support of Rule 110’s application to non-international armed conflicts 
either expressly refer to Common Article 3, or use language remarkably similar to provisions 
in the Geneva Conventions, and not to the Additional Protocols.436  Only the single piece of 
                                                                                                                                                 
431 Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(2).  See also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 
2615 § 192. 
432 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3(1); Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3(1); Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3(1); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3(1).  See supra notes 
286-290 (discussing the Common Article 3 obligation to collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked). 
433 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400 with Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 
10(2) and Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 7(2).  This language even extends beyond the obligation 
owed to wounded, sick and shipwrecked in international armed conflicts under the Geneva Conventions:  
“without delay, take all possible measures.”  Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1; Geneva 
Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1.  See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as 
one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether 
customary international law provides a more detailed framework for non-international armed conflicts.”). 
434 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400-01 nn. 28 & 33, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2615-16 §§ 199, 201.  
See generally ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400-03, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2615-39.  See also AP 
COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at §§ 451, 4645 (discussing the addition of this language to Article 10(2) of 
Additional Protocol I, and to Article 7(2) of Additional Protocol II, respectively). 
435 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 401, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2626 § 299; Argentina, National 
Court of Appeals, Military Junta case, Judgement, 9 Dec. 1985. 
436 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2618, 2620-24, 2635 §§ 218 
(Belgium), § 243 (India), §§ 252, 369 (Netherlands), § 255 (New Zealand), § 256 (Nicaragua), §§ 262-264 
(Philippines), § 277 (U.K.).  The ICRC Study also references a 1997 statement by “a senior officer of the RPF 
[Rwanda Police Force] … that civilians caught in crossfire were being brought to hospital by members of the 
RPF in order to receive care.”  Id.,Vol. II:  Practice, at 2628 § 311.  However, this brief description raises more 
questions than it answers.  Was this simply an isolated police action, or part of the Rwandan Civil War?  In any 
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domestic legislation (from Azerbaijan) cited by Rule 110 in support of its application to non-
international armed conflicts uses language which is arguably similar to that of Rule 110 and 
the Additional Protocols.437  The only additional source of State practice cited by the ICRC 
Study to support a new norm of customary international law is remarkably the unpublished 
“Report on US Practice.”438 
Once again, it is extremely difficult to argue that the domestic legislation of one State 
(and an unpublished summary from another State) constitutes sufficiently dense State 
practice upon which to support a new norm of customary international law, particularly one 
that modifies earlier treaty law that is universally accepted.439  Thus, the minimal State 
                                                                                                                                                 
event, bringing civilians to a presumably civilian hospital during a non-international armed conflict would 
appear to be consistent with the duty under Common Article 3 to care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.  
Moreover, Rwanda acceded to the Additional Protocols in 1984, and thus was simply abiding by its treaty 
obligations if it cared for “civilians caught in crossfire” in 1997.  See generally ICRC, State Parties to 
Additional Protocol I, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
437 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2625, 2637 § 283 (Azerbaijan).  
Article 25 of the 1995 Azerbaijan “Law concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons and the Rights of 
Prisoners of War” apparently “provides that, in both international and non-international armed conflicts, ‘the 
Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic … shall ensure [in all circumstances and with the least possible 
delay] medical assistance and care needed for the wounded and sick’.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  
Practice, at 2625 § 283 (bracketed language in original; emphasis added). 
438 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2628 § 313.  See also CARNAHAN, REPORT ON U.S. 
PRACTICE, supra note 49, at 5-3 § 5.1.  Once again, the present author is not so confident that the excerpts from 
the two sources provided in the Report on US Practice support this proposition, let alone that they carry 
sufficient weight.  Id. at Chapter 5, Annexes 8 and 9.  See supra notes 49, 308 (examining the sources cited in 
the Report on US Practice); infra note 489 (same); supra note 280 and accompanying text (criticizing the ICRC 
Study for citing to these “Reports” of State practice as further evidence of State practice, when they merely 
represent a working draft of the ICRC Study itself, and they are not generally available for examination).  See 
also The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International 
Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L & POLICY 419 (1987); W. Hays Parks, et al., Memorandum for 
Mr. John H. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel (International), OSD, subject: 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implications (8 May 1986).  But see John T. Rawcliffe, 
Changes to the Department of Defense Law of War Program, 2006 ARMY LAW. 23, 31 n. 56 (2006) (noting that 
lawyers “should be cautious of overreliance on these documents as expressions of current U.S. policy”). 
439 See supra note 32 (noting that all States are now party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949). 
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practice cited in support of Rule 110’s new norm of customary international law applicable to 
non-international armed conflicts fails to reveal sufficiently dense State practice with 
sufficiently clear opinio juris to justify a State departing from its treaty-law obligations under 
the Geneva Conventions.440 
International Armed Conflicts—Without Adverse Distinction.  The least contentious 
element of the proposed Rule 110 of the ICRC Study is that “[t]he duty to care for wounded 
and sick combatants without distinction is a long-standing rule of customary international 
law ….”441  This principle is consistent with the Geneva Conventions,442 which recognize 
that it is only permissible to make a beneficial distinction (e.g. treating the most urgent 
patients first).443  However, this consistency between the proposed rule and existing treaty 
provisions once again begs the question whether the prohibition against making adverse 
distinctions among wounded, sick and shipwrecked is followed by States pursuant to a 
general sense of legal obligation (which could support a norm of customary international 
law),444 or merely pursuant to their treaty obligations under the Geneva Conventions.445 
                                               
440 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a 
significant number of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
441 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 400, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2632-39 §§ 344-402.  See also 
commentary to Rule 88 of the ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 308-11, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2024-
61 (prohibition on adverse distinction); 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2 (prohibiting adverse 
distinction for any fundamental human rights contained therein); supra notes 360-363 (analyzing the principle 
of no adverse distinction vis-à-vis Rule 109). 
442 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3.  See 
also Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 10(2); AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at §§ 452-453. 
443 See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 
12, ¶ 3; ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 402.  Another way to put this obligation towards the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked is that it is not derogable on the basis of any non-medical reason (e.g. “sex, 
race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria”).  Geneva Convention I, supra note 
24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3. 
444 See Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 819 (2005) (noting 
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Claimed dearth of “official contrary [State] practice.”  The final point to be made 
regarding the proposed Rule 110 is the Study’s reliance once again on a lack of “official 
contrary [State] practice” as being supportive of the proposed rule.446  As previously 
discussed, it is not true that the absence of contrary State practice necessarily supports the 
existence of a customary international law norm—two negatives do not make a positive.447 
Summary.  The ICRC Study’s Rule 110 proposes a new norm of customary 
international law that deviates from existing treaty obligations in at least two significant 
ways.  First, it implicitly conflates the protections owed to combatant versus civilian 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked.448  Second, it seeks to extend the obligations to care for 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked in toto to non-international armed conflicts.449   
The State practice cited for the proposed new norm is once again surprisingly thin.450  
                                                                                                                                                 
that “the customary law character of … practically [] the entire corpus of the Geneva Conventions, is now taken 
for granted and virtually never questioned.”). 
445 See supra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in separating State practice 
done out of a sense of legal obligation versus State practice done in accordance with existing treaty obligations).  
Cf. Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 249 (2006) (arguing that the 
ICRC Study overemphasizes the number of parties to a treaty, probably because of the controversial portions of 
Additional Protocol I).  Contra ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2628 § 316 (citing to the Report 
on the Practice of Zimbabwe:  “’Zimbabwe seems to regard as customary, the rules of international practice 
codified in the Geneva Conventions as regards the … care of the wounded’.”). 
446 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 401. 
447 See supra notes 364-368 (discussing the logical fallacy of relying on an absence of contrary State practice in 
support of a proposed norm of customary international law). 
448 See supra notes 392-429 and accompanying text. 
449 See supra notes 430-440 and accompanying text; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as 
one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether 
customary international law provides a more detailed framework for non-international armed conflicts.”). 
450 See supra notes 410, 421 (discussing the relatively thin State practice cited in support of the application of 
obligations to civilians); supra note 439 (discussing the relatively thin State practice in support of the 
application of obligations in non-international armed conflicts).  See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 
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Nor can the absence of contrary State practice support a new norm of customary international 
law.451  The only aspect of the proposed Rule 110 which appears to be supportable as a norm 
of customary international law is that the wounded, sick and shipwrecked must be treated 
“without adverse distinction” based on any non-medical grounds.452  However, since this 
obligation is required by the first and second Geneva Conventions of 1949,453 to which every 
State is a party,454 the ICRC Study poses the paradox of attempting to use State practice 
consistent with treaty-based obligations to support a subsequent norm of customary 
international law.455 
(C) Rule 111:  Duty to Protect the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Each party to the conflict must take all possible measures to protect the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked against ill-treatment and against pillage of 
their personal property. 
This proposed rule is based, not on the general principle of “respect and protect,” 
which is found throughout the Geneva Conventions,456 but rather on the specific requirement 
to protect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked from the “hyena[s] of the battlefield.457  Like 
                                                                                                                                                 
3, at 2 (noting that “for many rules proffered as rising to the level of customary international law, the State 
practice cited is insufficiently dense to meet the ‘extensive and virtually uniform’ standard generally required to 
demonstrate the existence of a customary rule.”). 
451 See supra notes 446-447. 
452 See supra notes 441-445 and accompanying text. 
453 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 12, ¶ 3. 
454 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
455 See supra note 163, 221-222 and accompanying text. 
456 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at arts. 12, 19, 24, 25, 35; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at arts. 
12, 22, 27, 36, 37 ; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at arts. 18, 20, 21. 
457 PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 5, at 152 ¶ 1.C; PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5, at 
133 ¶ 1; PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 5, at 137 ¶ 2.2.  See also Geneva Convention I, supra 
note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
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Rules 109 and 110, the ICRC Study has built into its proposed Rule 111 a notion of military 
feasibility or practicability,458 by limiting the duty to protect the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked to merely “tak[ing] all possible measures.459  The ICRC Study once again 
professes that this is a customary international law norm “applicable in both international and 
non-international armed conflicts.”460 
Similar to those with regard to Rules 109 and 110, the key issues with regard to 
proposed Rule 111 would appear to be:  the temporal distinction between when the 
obligation arises on land versus at sea to protect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked from 
pillage and ill-treatment;461 the obligations to so protect them in non-international armed 
conflicts;462 and the claimed dearth of contrary State practice as support for the proffered 
norm.463  Each of these issues will be discussed in turn. 
International Armed Conflicts—Temporal Distinction.  Unlike proposed Rule 109, 
which glosses over the temporal distinction between land and naval warfare by adopting a 
more generic “whenever circumstances permit” standard,464 Rule 111 omits any timing 
                                                                                                                                                 
24, at art. 16, ¶ 2.  See generally infra Table 3, p. T-3. 
458 See supra notes 243, 386 and accompanying text (discussing the military feasibility implicit in Rules 109 
and 110 of the ICRC Study, respectively). 
459 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 403.  See supra notes 341-342 and accompanying text 
(discussing how the language “take all possible measures” is identical to that found in the related articles of the 
first and second Geneva Conventions.  Cf. ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 403 with Geneva 
Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1 and Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1. 
460 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 403. 
461 See infra notes 464-478 and accompanying text. 
462 See infra notes 479-493 and accompanying text. 
463 See infra notes 494-495 and accompanying text. 
464 See supra notes 341-359 and accompanying text. 
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requirement whatsoever.465  Yet for the wounded and sick on land, all States have agreed to 
“[a]t all times, and particularly after an engagement … take all possible measures … to 
protect [the wounded and sick] against pillage and ill-treatment ….”466  For similar persons 
at sea, all States have agreed to “[a]fter each engagement … take all possible measures … to 
protect [the wounded and sick] against pillage and ill-treatment ….”467  Thus, treaty law 
recognizes the same temporal disparity between the obligation to protect the wounded and 
sick on land (i.e. to do so “[a]t all times, and particularly after an engagement,”) versus at 
sea (i.e. to do so only “[a]fter each engagement.”), as it does for the duty to search for and 
collect them.468 
However, Rule 111 of the ICRC Study ignores this distinction in timing,469 and fails 
to adopt even the more lenient “whenever circumstances permit” standard of Additional 
Protocol II,470 as it did for Rule 109.471  Instead, the proposed Rule 111 simply removes any 
suggestion that this duty may have a temporal component.472  Neither the commentary473 to 
                                               
465 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 403. 
466 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
467 Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
468 See supra notes 341-359 and accompanying text. 
469 The ICRC Study cites the different language in the first and second Geneva Conventions, but does not make 
note of the temporal distinction.  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2640 §§ 405, 406. 
470 Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 8 (emphasis added).  See also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. 
I:  Rules, at 403, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2640 § 409. 
471 See supra note 350 and accompanying text. 
472 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 403. 
473 Because the rules are often oversimplified, they “should not be read on their own, without regard to the 
Commentary.  A publication which contained only the Rules would give a misleading account of customary 
international humanitarian law, for this reason alone.”  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 
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proposed Rule 111 in Volume I, nor the related State practice in Volume II of the ICRC 
Study addresses either the distinction between land and naval warfare, or the absence of a 
time element.474 
As discussed previously, it is possible for subsequent customary international law to 
modify existing treaty obligations.475  However, a proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law that purports to modify an earlier treaty-based obligation would have to 
                                                                                                                                                 
405-06.  See also Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 262 
(2006) (noting the ICRC Study “rules themselves cannot be seen as self-contained. … the rules in the Study 
have to be read with their commentaries.”); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 (noting “how the 
Study’s methodological flaws undermine the ability of States to rely, without further independent analysis, on 
the rules the Study proposes.”); Jamieson L. Greer, A Critique of the ICRC’s Customary Rules Concerning 
Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity, 192 MIL. L. REV. 116, 120 
(2007) (noting that “the ICRC’s commentary is much more helpful as a description of the current state of affairs 
than the rule [131] is as a representation of customary law.”).  Contra Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 527 (2006) (one 
of the ICRC Study’s authors arguing that “only the black letter rules are identified as part of customary 
international law, and not the commentaries to the rules.  The commentaries may, however, contain useful 
clarifications with respect to the application of the black letter rules and this is sometimes overlooked by 
commentators.”).  Moreover, overreliance should not be placed on the practice in Volume II, because 
apparently only the State practice referenced in the commentary was used to formulate the rules.  PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 45 (citing a personal communication with Dr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
one of the ICRC Study’s authors).  Thus the commentary to the rules would appear to be more important than 
either the rules by themselves, or the State practice cited in Volume II.  But see Dino Kritsiotis, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 693 (2007) (book review) (describing the “capsule 
explanations and the briefest of summations of practice in the first volume” of the ICRC Study); Theodor 
Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (noting that “[i]n what 
may be symptomatic of future practice, the [ICTY] appeals chamber cited indications of practice demonstrated 
by the [ICRC] study, rather than the black-letter rule that the study’s authors based on those indications.  In my 
view, this approach is prudent.”); George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an 
Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505 
(2006) (noting the ICRC Study’s “importance rests on its being used as a basis for further work, and as a spur to 
such works, rather than on its conclusions.”).  Nevertheless, the present article will not confine itself to only 
examining the practice cited in the commentary, because this limitation was not made clear in the Study itself, 
as it should have been.  Id.  See also Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 6 ¶ 11 (2006) (noting that the editors of the ICRC Study “opted, to be on the 
safe side, to predicate the Rules more on legislative Codes and military Manuals than on any other single source 
of practice.”). 
474 See generally ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 403-05, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2640-54. 
475 See supra notes 166-171 and accompanying text.  See generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
supra note 21, at § 102 cmt. j (“A new rule of customary [international] law will supersede inconsistent [treaty] 
obligations created by earlier agreement if the parties so intend and the intention is clearly manifested.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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show sufficiently dense State practice with sufficiently clear opinio juris.476  Yet, there is 
absolutely no State practice cited by the ICRC Study to support the absence of a temporal 
component in the new norm of customary international law espoused by the proposed Rule 
111.477  The ICRC Study just oversimplified the temporal component out of existence.478 
Non-international armed conflicts.  Although Common Article 3 lists certain acts 
which are prohibited against “those placed hors de combat by sickness [or] wounds,”479 there 
is no specific treaty obligation under the Geneva Conventions to protect the wounded, sick or 
shipwrecked from pillage or ill treatment in non-international armed conflicts.480  This 
requirement was added by Article 8 of Additional Protocol II in 1977 with language that 
generally tracks that used in the first and second Geneva Conventions for international armed 
conflicts.481 
                                               
476 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a 
significant number of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
477 See generally ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 403-05, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2640-54.  The ICRC 
Study cites to draft legislation from Argentina.  Id., Vol. II:  Practice, at 2643 § 445.  See supra note 331 and 
accompanying text (criticizing citations to draft legislation). 
478 See also DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4, attachment p. 6 (criticizing the ICRC Study for its 
tendency to oversimplify complex and nuanced rules:  “many rules are stated in a way that renders them 
overbroad or unconditional, even though State practice and treaty language on the issue reflect different, and 
sometimes substantially narrower, propositions.”); supra note 76 and accompanying text (criticizing the ICRC 
Study for oversimplifying complex and nuanced rules); supra note 349 (discussing the problems with a 
customary international law norm that deviates from a related treaty provision). 
479 Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3; Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3. 
480 See generally Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 3; 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 24, at art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, at art. 3. 
481 Compare Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 8 with Geneva Convention I, supra note 24, at art. 15, 
¶ 1 and Geneva Convention II, supra note 24, at art. 18, ¶ 1.  See also AP COMMENTARY, supra note 242, at § 
4654; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law – A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich, 76 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 525, 525-26 (2006) (explaining, as one of the co-authors of the ICRC Study, that “[t]he 
ICRC’s main interest … was precisely in seeing whether customary international law provides a more detailed 
framework for non-international armed conflicts.”). 
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Thus, to claim that there now exists a customary international law norm that imposes 
this obligation in non-international armed conflicts on States which are not party to 
Additional Protocol II would require fairly dense State practice and fairly clear opinio 
juris.482  Yet the State practice cited by the ICRC Study is, once again, remarkably thin.  The 
ICRC Study cites to three military manuals that specifically support the new norm, but all 
three of these States were merely complying with their existing treaty obligations, since they 
had already either ratified or acceded to Additional Protocol II.483 
Of the four domestic laws484 cited by the ICRC Study in support of this new norm, 
Tajikistan’s legislation also merely complies with its existing treaty obligations since it had 
already acceded to Additional Protocol II.485  The three remaining domestic laws cited by the 
ICRC Study were passed by Azerbaijan (which is not a party to the Additional Protocols),486 
Ireland and Norway,487 with the latter two being amended within months of their respective 
                                               
482 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a 
significant number of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
483 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2641-42 § 419 (Canada), § 431 (Netherlands), § 
432 (New Zealand) with ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).  See also supra 
notes 49, 114, 317, 328, 394 and accompanying text (noting the weaknesses of citing to military manuals as 
evidence of State practice). 
484 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2644, 2646, 2648, 2649 § 448 (Azerbaijan), § 475 (Ireland), 
§ 493 (Norway), § 503 (Tajikstan). 
485 Compare ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2649 § 503 (Tajikstan) with State Parties to 
Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
486 See generally ICRC, State Parties to Additional Protocol I, available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) and ICRC, State 
Parties to Additional Protocol II, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
487 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2646, 2648, 2652-53 §§ 475, 493, 537, 538. 
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ratifications of the Additional Protocols, and thus “[f]rom their action no inference could 
legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary international law ….”488   
The only two additional sources of State practice cited by the ICRC Study to support 
a new norm of customary international law are remarkably the unpublished “Report on US 
Practice,”489 and a rare instance of battlefield practice in Yugoslavia.490  Thus, even when 
considered collectively, Azerbaijan’s legislation, the unpublished “Report on US Practice, 
and one instance of battlefield practice is not sufficiently dense State practice491 with 
sufficiently clear opinio juris upon which to base a new norm of customary international 
humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts,492 particularly one that 
deviates from the universally subscribed Geneva Conventions of 1949.493 
Claimed dearth of “official contrary [State] practice.”  The final point to be made 
regarding the proposed Rule 111 is the Study’s reliance once again on a lack of “official 
                                               
488 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 ¶ 76 (Feb. 20) (emphasis added).  
See also ILA Report on CIL, supra note 132, at 46-47 § 24; CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra 
note 21, at 170.  See infra notes 163, 221-222 and accompanying text (arguing that State actions in compliance 
with treaty obligations do not generally provide evidence of State practice in support of a related customary 
international law norm); supra note 333 (discussing Ireland’s and Norway’s domestic legislation, which was 
passed within a few months before they ratified the Additional Protocols. 
489 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2650 § 518.  See also CARNAHAN, REPORT ON U.S. 
PRACTICE, supra note 49, at 5-3 § 5.1.  Once again, the present author is not so optimistic that the excerpts from 
the two sources provided in the Report on US Practice support this proposition, let alone that they carry 
sufficient weight.  Id. at Chapter 5, Annexes 8 and 9.  See supra note 280 and accompanying text (criticizing the 
ICRC Study for citing to these “Reports” of State practice as further evidence of State practice, when they 
merely represent a working draft of the ICRC Study itself, and they are not generally available for 
examination). 
490 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. II:  Practice, at 2650 § 519. 
491 See supra notes 281, 313, 329, 338, 359, 410, 421, 439 (noting similar concerns about the State practice of 
only a few States being insufficient upon which to base a new norm of customary international law). 
492 See also DOS DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 (criticizing the ICRC Study for asserting that 
certain rules have become customary international law binding in non-international armed conflicts 
“notwithstanding the fact that there is little evidence in support of those propositions.”). 
493 See supra note 32 (noting that all States are now party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949). 
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contrary [State] practice” as being supportive of the proposed rule.494  As previously 
discussed, it is not true that the absence of contrary State practice necessarily supports the 
existence of a customary international law norm—two negatives do not make a positive.495 
Summary.  The ICRC Study’s Rule 111 proposes a new norm of customary 
international law that deviates from established treaty obligations in at least two significant 
ways.  First, Rule 111 omits any temporal reference to its duty to protect wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked from pillage and ill-treatment.496  Second, the proposed Rule 111 claims to 
apply to non-international armed conflicts, yet it has, at best, only five instances of State 
practice in support.497 
 
V. Conclusions 
The ICRC Study is an enormous achievement,498 if only in terms of its compilation of 
a wealth of State practice.499  Moreover, some of the ICRC Study rules “undoubtedly [are] 
                                               
494 ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 404. 
495 See supra notes 364-368 (discussing the logical fallacy of relying on an absence of contrary State practice in 
support of a proposed norm of customary international law). 
496 See supra notes 464-478 and accompanying text. 
497 See supra notes 479-493 and accompanying text. 
498 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (admiring the ICRC Study). 
499 See PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 411 (noting that the State practice in Volume II of 
the ICRC Study “will, perhaps, be quite as useful as the exact wording of the Rules themselves.”); Dino 
Kritsiotis, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 692 (2007) (book review) 
(commenting that the ICRC Study “is an undeniable embarrassment of empirical riches”); George H. Aldrich, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 523-24 (2006) (arguing that “the vast collection of backup material in 
Volume II is irreplaceable”); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 201 (2006) (noting that “[b]y any standards, it has to 
be regarded as a massive work of legal scholarship.”); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian 
Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 833 (2005) (noting that “[n]o restatement of international law has eve[r] tried to 
amass such a rich collection of empirical data.”). 
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part of the corpus of customary international law.”500  However, some of the ICRC Study 
rules are unsustainable under the traditional theory of customary international law 
formation,501 as was revealed by analyzing the three seemingly uncontentious rules proposed 
by the ICRC Study for handling the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.502 
The ICRC Study attempts to bootstrap new norms of customary international law that 
plug perceived gaps,503 but which deviate from the existing treaty law obligations, and by 
citing to State practice only a few instances of which actually support the new norms.504  
Moreover, its methodological approach is not rigorous but slipshod,505 not laser-accurate506 
                                               
500 David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 201, 213.  See id. at 211-19 (2006) (admitting that ICRC Study Rule 70 (prohibition on “means 
and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”) and Rule 
71 (prohibition on the use of inherently indiscriminate weapons) reflect customary international law); ICRC 
STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at 237-50. 
501 Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 252 (2006) 
(concluding that “[t]hough the [ICRC Study] is the product of many years of extensive research, it does not 
reflect the customary IHL rules in the traditional sense of customary law.”). 
502 See supra notes 241-378 (evaluating proposed Rule 109:  Duty to Search For, Collect and Evacuate the 
Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked), supra notes 379-455 (evaluating proposed Rule 110:  Duty to Care 
For the Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked), and supra notes 456-497 (evaluating proposed Rule 111:  
Duty to Protect the Wounded, the Sick, and the Shipwrecked). 
503 David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 201, 235-36 (2006); Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: 
The Impact of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 
179, 181 (2006) (arguing that “[w]here there are gaps in existing positive law, states should be encouraged to 
use the ICRC Study with a view to closing such gaps, rather than criticizing progressive statements made in the 
Study, or taking advantage of legal lacunae in a spirit of advocating freedom of operations”). 
504 See, e.g., Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello: The Impact of the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 197 (2006) 
(noting that “[s]ome of [the ICRC Study’s] findings remain rather vague due to the absence of convincing 
practice.”); supra notes 281, 313, 329, 338, 359, 410, 421, 439, 491 (criticizing the ICRC Study for attempting 
to assert new norms of customary international law based on remarkably thin or nonexistent State practice). 
505 See supra notes 55, 233-238 (criticizing the ICRC Study for its sloppy methodology). 
506 See David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 203 (2006) (comparing the ICRC Study to a blunderbuss); Yoram Dinstein, The 
ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 3 ¶ 4 (2006) (noting that the 
  118 
but oversimplified,507 and not descriptive but aspirational.508  By striving for too much,509 the 
                                                                                                                                                 
ICRC Study should have “systematically examin[ed] AP I, Article by Article” rather than “go[ing] in several 
different directions.”). 
507 See supra note 76 (criticizing the ICRC Study for its tendency to oversimplify complex and nuanced rules); 
supra note 280 and accompanying text (criticizing the ICRC Study for citing to “Reports” of State practice as 
further evidence of State practice, when they merely represent a working draft of the ICRC Study itself, and 
they are not generally available for examination); supra notes 47 and 55 (criticizing the ICRC Study for not 
considering actual battlefield behavior); supra notes 49, 114, 317, 328, 394 (criticizing the ICRC Study for its 
overreliance on military manuals).  Cf. Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 244-45 (2006) (observing that the problem with the ICRC Study citing to non-
traditional sources as reflecting State practice is that States have “not consented to being governed by that law” 
and thus won’t follow the ICRC Study rules). 
508 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 406-07; Jamieson L. Greer, A Critique of the ICRC’s 
Customary Rules Concerning Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity, 
192 MIL. L. REV. 116, 116-17 (2007); Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 223 (2006); David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 202 (2006); supra note 58.  See also 
Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 2 ¶ 3 
(2006) (recounting his earlier suggestions to the ICRC to identify those API “provisions reflecting customary 
lex lata [what the law is] or wide supported lex ferenda [what the law ought to be].”); id. at 12 ¶ 22 (citing Rule 
55 as “a prime example that the Study – instead of looking for a compromise between Contracting and non-
Contracting Parties to API – actually transcends API (which is lex lata for the former States) and moves into the 
realm of the lex ferenda (for both the former and the latter States).”); George H. Aldrich, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 521 (2006) (citing Rule 85’s prohibition on the anti-personnel use of incendiary 
weapons “as an effort to propose a new rule of law” that “is not soundly based in the practice of States and, 
even as a proposal, it is flawed.”).  Contra ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xi, xiii, xviii.  But see 
Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and 
its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 232 (2006) 
(arguing “that such a project conducted by the ICRC could not possibly be objective:  the ICRC is not a 
disinterested bystander, but an organization that actively promotes more comprehensive IHL”); id. at 233 
(noting that the progressive mandate given to the ICRC in conducting the Study was to “enable more effective 
implementation of IHL” which “provided another strong incentive for the ICRC to push for an expansive view 
of customary IHL.”); id. at 245 (concluding that “none of [the ICRC Study’s] rules are particularly surprising 
because they reflect the ICRC’s previously-stated impression of the law (which is of course a major 
methodological problem).”); id. at 247 (noting that “[i]f the international community regards these [ICRC 
Study] rules as being a reasonable articulation of what IHL ought to be [lex ferenda], it will cite to them 
frequently, and over time, the ICRC’s list will probably become law through precedent.”); supra notes 38-39 
(summarizing the mandate given to the ICRC in conducting the Study). 
509 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that the ICRC Study “sought to take on the 
mantle of the Pictet commentaries to the Geneva Conventions” and failed); id. at 14 (same, because 
“[c]rystallising custom is not the same as interpreting a treaty.”); id. at 5-6 (observing that the ICRC Study is 
too sanguine in its formulation of rules, while simultaneously admitting that the rules have attendant “ambiguity 
or controversy in respect of some element”).  See generally PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 5; 
PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 5; PICTET GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 5; PICTET GENEVA 
CONVENTION IV, supra note 5.  But see PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 16 (expecting the 
ICRC Study to assume the mantle accorded to the ICRC commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols “because of its provenance and the wealth of practice it surveys.”). 
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ICRC Study perhaps achieves too little.510  As the proponent of new norms of customary 
international law, the ICRC Study simply fails to muster sufficiently dense State practice, 
and sufficiently clear opinio juris.511 
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, and despite admonitions that “[i]t is 
premature to speculate upon the influence the Study will exert,”512 it is inevitable that the 
ICRC Study will be used at least as a reference,513 or perhaps as the “first port of call for the 
existence of customary international law on a particular issue.”514  The ICRC Study might 
even be viewed as “the leading source of customary IHL,”515 if only because of the 
                                               
510 See, e.g., Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the 
Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 
227-28 (2006) (questioning whether the ICRC expended too much of its hard-won “political capital” in 
publishing the ICRC Study, and possibly “push[ing] its agenda too far”); Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 14 (2006) (arguing that the ICRC Study 
overreached in trying “to show that controversial provisions of API are declaratory of customary international 
law (not to mention the occasional attempt to go even beyond API).  By overreaching, I think that the Study has 
failed in its primary mission [of systematically examining API, article by article, and declaring which 
provisions have clearly crystallized into customary international law norms].”); id. at 15 (arguing that the ICRC 
Study “authors missed a golden opportunity to bring Contracting and non-Contracting Parties to API closer 
together. … [instead] the Study will only drive the two sides of the ‘Great Schism’ farther away from each 
other.”); CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 21, at 119 (noting that “international actors 
prefer stability and determinacy to instability and indeterminacy”). 
511 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the proponent of a new norm of customary 
international law has the burden of proving it); supra notes 168-170 (requiring a clear manifestation that a 
significant number of States intend to deviate from existing treaty law). 
512 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 47. 
513 Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 1 ¶ 
1 (2006) (noting that “whatever one’s view is of the overall success of the [ICRC Study], no scholar or 
practitioner can afford to ignore it.”); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 4.  Contra Jamieson 
L. Greer, A Critique of the ICRC’s Customary Rules Concerning Displaced Persons:  General Accuracy, 
Conflation, and a Missed Opportunity, 192 MIL. L. REV. 116, 126 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he aspirational nature 
of the ICRC Rules concerning displaced persons and the covert attempt to expand IDP protections at refugee 
expense ensures that the Rules will remain purely of academic interest rather than contributing substantively to 
the development of customary law.”). 
514 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 411.  See also Ryszard Piotrowicz, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 25 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 348, 348 (2006) (book review) (same); Theodor 
Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (same). 
515 Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The 
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imprimatur of the ICRC itself,516 and the ease of referencing putative rules of customary 
international law that were hitherto difficult to discern.517  The problem with this is that the 
ICRC Study will be and has been cited as final authority518 by the uninitiated public,519 by 
putative scholars who only read the rules without carefully analyzing either the 
commentary520 or supporting State practice, and by overburdened judges521 or those 
                                                                                                                                                 
New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1240 (2005). 
516 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 14, 16; Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy 
Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 251 (2006).  Cf. supra note 2 (discussing whether credit 
and responsibility for the ICRC Study should be given to the ICRC, or to its two authors).  Contra Peter Rowe, 
The Effect on National Law of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 165, 166-67 (2006) (noting that it is difficult to conclude that any of the ICRC Study rules are 
binding on States as customary international law norms, and that merely because the ICRC has stated that the 
rules are “reflective of customary international law does not, ipso facto, make them so.”). 
517 Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 248 (2006) 
(noting that “it can be assumed that those involved in the process were aware that such articulation [of the ICRC 
Study rules] may be too easy a tool for judges and lawyers to resist.”); id. at 249 (explaining that “[t]he legal 
minds of the world are tempted to use articulations of vague areas of the law as law, though the articulations 
may contain inaccuracies.”).  See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty of 
discerning customary international law). 
518 David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 201, 236 (2006); Frederic L. Kirgis, Some Proportionality Issues Raised by Israel’s Use of Armed 
Forces in Lebanon, American Society for International Law, ASIL Insight, Aug. 17, 2006, 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/08/insights060817.html.  See infra note 525 (noting that the ICRC Study 
should be viewed as a starting point for the discussion of customary international humanitarian law, not as the 
final word). 
519 In fact, the ICRC could use the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to disseminate the Study, as 
part of their duty to disseminate international humanitarian law, in order to inform public opinion, and thus “it 
might be more difficult for governments to disregard its Rules.”  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra 
note 2, at 21.  See also ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxix (discussing the dissemination of the 
ICRC Study via the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix 
Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1239 (2005) (same). 
520 See PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 405-06 (noting that because the rules are often 
oversimplified, they “should not be read on their own, without regard to the Commentary.  A publication which 
contained only the Rules would give a misleading account of customary international humanitarian law, for this 
reason alone.”).  See also Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 262 
(2006) (noting the ICRC Study “rules themselves cannot be seen as self-contained. … the rules in the Study 
have to be read with their commentaries.”); DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 4 (noting “how the 
Study’s methodological flaws undermine the ability of States to rely, without further independent analysis, on 
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unfamiliar with the law of armed conflict and seeking an anchor in this admittedly complex 
area of international law.522  This concern is only partially obviated by the recent publication 
of the companion book “Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law,”523 because it is one step removed from the Study itself, and because it 
does not carry the imprimatur of the ICRC.524 
In publishing the study, the ICRC intended to start the conversation,525 but it may 
                                                                                                                                                 
the rules the Study proposes.”). 
521 Leah M. Nicholls, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 224 & n. 8, 
232, 249, 252 (2006).  ICTY Judge Meron has already acknowledged the potential usefulness of the ICRC 
Study in “ascertaining customary rules.”  Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 817, 833 (2005); id. at 834 (noting that “the [ICRC] study is certain to enter the repertoire of courts and 
tribunals, especially insofar as statements of practice are concerned.”). 
522 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that while States may hesitate to use the 
Study because they were not involved in its creation, “this consideration will not apply to non-governmental 
lawyers or, presumably, to domestic and international courts and tribunals.”); id. at 409 (noting that the Study’s 
“use, as a matter of course, by international and national courts and tribunals can be confidently expected.”); id. 
(noting that “[t]he Study has already had an impact in judicial decisions.”); Leah M. Nicholls, The 
Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161 Rules of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 250-51 (2006) (same); David 
Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 201, 202, 236 (2006) (same); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the 
Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 
GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1231 (2005) (same); Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 817, 834 (2005) (same); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2797, 2803 (2006) (citing to 
commentary to Rule 100 regarding the definition of a “regularly constituted court” in Common Article 3); 
Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 241 n. 11 (2006) (citing to 
courts which have already relied on the ICRC Study). 
523 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2. 
524 See supra note 516 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the ICRC’s imprimatur on the perceived 
utility of the ICRC Study). 
525 Dr. Yves Sandoz recognizes, in his forward to the ICRC Study, that “this study will have achieved its goal 
only if it is considered not as an end of a process but as a beginning.”  ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  
Rules, at xvii.  See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 14 (noting “[That t]he Study is and 
should be the appropriate starting point in a review of State practice and opinio iuris relevant to the 
crystallization of custom is clear.  It is less evident that it is the last word on the subject.”); DOS/DoD Letter to 
ICRC, supra note 3, at 5 (hoping “that the material provided in this letter … will initiate a constructive, in-depth 
dialogue with the ICRC and others on the subject.”); George H. Aldrich, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. 
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have unwittingly ended it.526  Although the ICRC Study was published in 2005, there has 
only been one State to officially comment on it, and then only cursorily.527  What is needed is 
for States and “the most highly qualified publicists”528 “to parse every Rule in the Study,”529 
and then to provide their observations and objections.530  Obviously, due to the enormity of 
the ICRC Study, this would be a massive undertaking that might dwarf even the monumental 
work represented by the ICRC Study.  However, this process of commenting on the ICRC 
Study could be achieved more efficiently, and perhaps more effectively, if interested 
                                                                                                                                                 
Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505 (2006) (noting the ICRC Study’s “importance rests on its being used as a basis for 
further work, and as a spur to such works, rather than on its conclusions.”). 
526 See, e.g. PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at 8 (asking “[w]hy should a State that is not now 
a party to the 1977 Additional Protocols ratify these treaties if the relevant principles therein operate at the level 
of customary international law?”); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the 
Development of International Law:  The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 
GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1221 (2005) (noting that the provisions of the Additional Protocols, to the degree they 
reflect customary international law, “will benefit from the Study’s findings.  Their provisions will effectively 
become invocable against every State, without the need for ratification.”).  Cf. David Turns, Weapons in the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 211 (2006) 
(arguing that “States that do not accept the prohibition of certain weapons may refuse to sign up to the relevant 
treaties and may ignore or denounce the Study, in which case it will have contributed very little to the cause of 
international humanitarian law”).  Contra Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The 
Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 239, 263 (2006) (arguing that “by even setting down the rules, [the ICRC Study] has provided both 
impetus for further study in the area and a basis for debate.”). 
527 DOS/DoD Letter to ICRC, supra note 3, at 1 (admitting that “[g]iven the Study’s large scope, we have not 
yet been able to complete a detailed review of its conclusions.”); id. at attachment (only analyzing Rules 31, 45, 
78 and 157 in depth). 
528 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis 
added).  See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, at § 102(1); ICRC STUDY, supra note 
2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxxi. 
529 Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 11 
¶ 21 (2006).  See also Peter Rowe, The Effect on National Law of the Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 165, 165 (2006) (noting that the ICRC Study “is a work calling for 
detailed discussion by those with a serious interest in the subject.”); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, 
Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law 
Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 241 (2006) (arguing that a close analysis is important if the point of 
the study is to be the beginning of discussions). 
530 See supra notes 87-90, 186-187 (discussing whether the U.S. response to the ICRC Study constitutes 
persistent objection, if any of the ICRC Study rules become recognized as norms of customary international 
law). 
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institutions sponsored regular conferences or symposia531 that each focused on a single subset 
of related rules in the ICRC Study.  This series of conferences, and their related scholarship, 
would help cement the international community’s understanding of just what exactly are the 
rules of customary international humanitarian law.532 
If States and scholars were to begin this process of adding commentary to the corpus 
of the ICRC Study, that public debate would serve as the Study’s lasting legacy, rather than  
                                               
531 Cf. Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 263 (2006) (explaining that 
one piece or symposium can only begin to discuss issues raised by the ICRC Study). 
532 To be sure, the recently published “Perspectives on the ICRC Study” contributes to the debate, and serves as 
a handy companion reference to the ICRC Study.  PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, at ix. 
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the perhaps less-than-candid533 rules of the ICRC Study itself.534  Once again the ICRC will 
have served as the catalyst535 for the development of international humanitarian law.
                                               
533 See David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 236 (2006) (using the metaphor that if the ICRC Study is a photograph, then it 
has been airbrushed); id. at 202 (noting that “the more closely one reads the Study, the more certain flaws 
become apparent.”); Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel:  The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 241 
(2006) (using the metaphor that the ICRC Study is an impressionist painting—the closer you look, the less 
beautiful it seems); W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study:  A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y 
INT'L L. PROC. 208, 208 (2005) (agreeing that the ICRC Study “is, on first appearance, an impressive effort.”). 
534 This commentary could also be used to update the ICRC Study itself, which may be a useful enterprise.  See, 
e.g. ICRC STUDY, supra note 2, Vol. I:  Rules, at xxx (saving discussion of the Martens Clause for a “future 
update.”); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of International Law:  
The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1241 (2005) 
(arguing that “[t]he ICRC’s research data should be updated to keep pace with the constantly changing 
circumstances, and if the Study is to maintain its authority, editions will have to be published in [the] future.”).  
Additional topics might also be added to subsequent editions of the ICRC Study, such as a rule for determining 
the existence of an armed conflict, or whether it is international or non-international in scope.  Id.  Another 
potential rule could concern the legality or illegality of using nuclear weapons.  See supra note 58 (discussing 
these lacunae in the ICRC Study). 
535 Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1, 5 ¶ 
9 (2006).  See also George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on 
behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503, 505 (2006) (noting the 
ICRC Study’s “importance rests on its being used as a basis for further work, and as a spur to such works, rather 
than on its conclusions.”); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 109 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (deciding that “[t]he practical results the ICRC has 
thus achieved in inducing compliance with international humanitarian law ought therefore to be regarded as an 
element of actual international practice; this is an element that has been conspicuously instrumental in the 









International Armed Conflicts (IAC) 
 




Geneva—Wounded & Sick, Article 12: 
• Members of the armed forces … who are wounded or sick, shall be respected and 
protected in all circumstances 
• They shall be treated humanely … 
• Without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political 
opinions, or any other similar criteria 
• Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be 
administered 
Geneva—Wounded & Sick, Article 15: 
• At all times, and particularly after an engagement 
• Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures 
• To search for and collect 
• The wounded and sick [members of armed forces] 
• Whenever circumstances permit, an armistice … suspension of fire … or local 
arrangements [shall be] made, to permit the removal, exchange and transport of the 
wounded left on the battlefield 
• Likewise, local arrangements may be concluded between Parties to the conflict for 
the removal or exchange of wounded and sick from a besieged or encircled area, and 
for the passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment on their way to that 
area 
Geneva—Wounded, Sick & Shipwrecked, Article 18: 
• After each engagement 
• Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures 
• To search for and collect 
• The shipwrecked, wounded and sick [members of armed forces] 
• Whenever circumstances permit, the Parties … shall conclude local arrangements for 
the removal of the wounded and sick by sea from a besieged or encircled area and for 
the passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment on their way to that 
area 
Geneva—Civilians, Article 16: 
• As far as military considerations allow 
• Each Party to the conflict shall facilitate the steps taken 
• To search for the killed and wounded [civilians] 
• To assist the shipwrecked [civilians] and other persons exposed to grave danger 
Geneva—Civilians, Article 17: 
• The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements 
• For the removal from besieged or encircled areas 
• Of [civilian] wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases 
• And for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical 
equipment on their way to such areas 
 
Common Article 3(2): 
• The wounded, sick and shipwrecked 





Additional Protocol I, Article 10(1): 
• All the [military or civilian] wounded, sick and shipwrecked … 
• Shall be respected and protected 
Additional Protocol II, Article 8: 
• Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement 
• All possible measures shall be taken, without delay 
• To search for and collect 
• The wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
 
2005 ICRC 
Study on CIHL 
Rule 109: 
• Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement 
• Each party to the conflict must, without delay, take all possible measures 
• To search for, collect and evacuate 
• The wounded, sick and shipwrecked (military or civilian) 
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Geneva—Wounded & Sick, Article 12: 
• Members of the armed forces … who are wounded or sick, shall be respected and 
protected in all circumstances 
• They shall be treated humanely and cared for … 
• Without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political 
opinions, or any other similar criteria 
• … they shall not wilfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor shall 
conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created 
• Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be 
administered 
• Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex 
• [A party who] is compelled to abandon wounded or sick to the enemy shall, as far as 
military considerations permit, leave with them a part of its medical personnel and 
material to assist in their care 
Geneva—Wounded & Sick, Article 15: 
• At all times, and particularly after an engagement 
• Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures 
• To ensure [the] adequate care [of wounded and sick members of armed forces] 
Geneva—Wounded, Sick & Shipwrecked, Article 12: 
• Members of the armed forces … who are at sea and who are wounded, sick or 
shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances … 
• Such persons shall be treated humanely and cared for … 
• Without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political 
opinions, or any other similar criteria 
• … they shall not wilfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor shall 
conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created 
• Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be 
administered 
• Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex 
Geneva—Wounded, Sick & Shipwrecked, Article 18: 
• After each engagement 
• Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures 
• To ensure [the] adequate care [of wounded and sick members of armed forces] 
Geneva—Civilians, Article 16: 
• The wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant mothers 
• Shall be the object of particular protection and respect 
 
Common Article 3(1): 
• Members of armed forces … placed ‘ hors de combat ‘ by sickness, wounds 
• Shall in all circumstances be treated humanely 
• Without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or 
wealth, or any other similar criteria 
Common Article 3(2): 
• The wounded, sick and shipwrecked 





Additional Protocol I, Article 10(2): 
• [All the military or civilian wounded, sick and shipwrecked] 
• Shall be treated humanely and 
• Shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the 
medical care and attention required by their condition 
• There shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other than medical 
ones 
Additional Protocol II, Article 7: 
• All the wounded, sick and shipwrecked … 
• In all circumstances they shall be treated humanely and 
• Shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical 
care and attention required by their condition 
• There shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other than medical ones 
Additional Protocol II, Article 8: 
• Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement 
• All possible measure shall be taken, without delay 
• To ensure [the] adequate care [of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked] 
 
2005 ICRC 
Study on CIHL 
Rule 110: 
• The wounded, sick and shipwrecked (military or civilian) 
• Must receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay 
• The medical care and attention required by their condition 
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Geneva—Wounded & Sick, Article 15: 
• At all times, and particularly after an engagement 
• Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible 
measures 
• To protect [the wounded and sick] against pillage and ill-
treatment 
Geneva—Wounded, Sick & Shipwrecked, Article 18: 
• After each engagement 
• Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible 
measures 
• To protect [the shipwrecked, wounded and sick] against 
pillage and  ill-treatment 
Geneva—Civilians, Article 16: 
• As far as military considerations allow 
• Each Party to the conflict shall facilitate the steps taken 
• To protect [the killed, wounded, shipwrecked [civilians], 
and other persons exposed to grave danger] against pillage 
and ill-treatment 
 
Common Article 3(1): 
• The following acts are and shall remain prohibited … 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture 
(b) taking of hostages 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 






Additional Protocol I, Article 10(1): 
• All the [military or civilian] wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked … 
• Shall be respected and protected 
Additional Protocol II, Article 7: 
• All the wounded, sick and shipwrecked … 
• Shall be respected and protected 
Additional Protocol II, Article 8: 
• Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an 
engagement 
• All possible measure shall be taken, without delay 
• To protect [the wounded, sick and shipwrecked] 






• Each party to the conflict must take all possible measures 
• To protect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
• Against ill-treatment and 
• Against pillage of their personal property 
 
